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BRIEF SYNOPSIS 
The ability to accurately interpret facial emotion is crucial to social being and our 
capacity to correctly interpret threat-related expressions has obvious adaptive 
value. Healthy individuals appear to process facial emotions rapidly, accurately 
and effortlessly, while individuals with schizophrenia often present with marked 
impairment in emotion processing. The hypothesis of continuity between 
schizophrenia and normal behaviour suggests that the signs and symptoms of 
the disorder also occur to varying, lesser degrees in the general population. 
This thesis presents a series of studies that explore the limits of facial emotion 
processing in healthy individuals, and its relationship with schizotypal 
personality traits.  
The first paper describes a set of three studies that use eye tracking 
techniques to explore the limits of rapid emotion processing. It is shown that we 
can quickly orient attention towards emotional faces even when the faces are 
task-irrelevant, presented for very brief intervals, and located well into 
peripheral vision. The remaining studies explore whether high schizotypes have 
similarities to individuals with schizophrenia in the way that they process facial 
emotion. High schizotypes were significantly less accurate at discriminating 
facial emotions and significantly more likely to misperceive neutral faces as 
angry, offering support for continuum models of visual hallucinatory 
experiences. A further study revealed that high relative to low schizoptypes feel 
as though they are exposed to angry faces for longer. It is argued that this 
experience itself may serve to maintain hypervigilance to social threat. Finally, 
laterality biases during face perception were explored. Contrary to the 
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predictions of continuum models of schizophrenia, high schizotypes had an 
increased left side / right hemisphere bias for face processing.  
In summary, the thesis offers partial support for the hypothesis of 
continuity between the impairments in emotion discrimination observed in 
individuals with schizophrenia, and normal, healthy variation in facial emotion 
processing. 
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THESIS OVERVIEW 
2 
 
  
General Introduction 
 
The ability to accurately read faces is critical to our existence as social 
beings. We rely heavily upon information from faces during social interaction 
both to identify people and to correctly interpret their emotions and intentions. 
Furthermore, the capacity to attend swiftly to threat-related (e.g., angry or 
fearful) faces has obvious adaptive value in that it allows for a more rapid 
defensive response to impending threat or danger in the environment. It is 
therefore unsurprising that the human brain is highly specialised for face and 
emotion processing. Converging research, for example, shows that when 
emotional and non-emotional stimuli are presented, emotionally charged stimuli 
such as expressive faces are encoded preferentially (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007) 
and are processed by dedicated distributed neural systems (see Adolphs, 2002; 
Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1996; Murphy et al., 2003). The human 
brain is so highly specialised for emotion processing that we are able to identify 
the emotion depicted by faces extremely rapidly (e.g., Smith, 2012) and usually 
with very little apparent effort, despite the constraints of our limited visual 
processing resources, particularly in terms of spatial acuity and attention (see 
Bayle, Henaff & Krolak-Salmon, 2009).  
The visual environment is often extremely complex with many elements 
of a scene competing for limited visual attention, yet there is evidence that faces 
can recruit visual attention in less than 150 ms even when presented alongside 
other competing stimuli. Crouzet, Kirchner, and Thorpe (2010), for example, 
presented images of faces and vehicles either side of a central fixation cross 
and asked participants to make an eye movement (saccade) as quickly as 
possible to the image belonging to a pre-specified target category (face or 
vehicle). Saccades to faces were initiated on average in 138 ms, significantly 
faster than the average saccade latency to vehicles (167 ms). The fastest 
saccades to faces were initiated in as little as 110 ms. Since the stimuli were 
presented either to the left or right visual field (with 1.6° between the fixation 
cross and the inner edge of the stimuli), those visual properties of the face 
stimuli that fed into saccade programming to exert the observed speeding effect 
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were processed, by their very nature, in non-foveal areas of the retina. This is 
particularly interesting because the concentration of receptors in the retina is 
not uniform, and visual acuity is therefore not constant across our entire visual 
field (see Wade & Swanston, 2001). By far the greatest concentration of cones 
is contained in the comparatively small foveal region of the retina, and there are 
far fewer cones in the surrounding parafoveal region with virtually none at all in 
the peripheral retina (Wade & Swanston, 2001). There is, as a consequence, 
greatest visual acuity for the comparatively small fixated region of the visual 
field that falls on the fovea and acuity diminishes sharply with increasing 
eccentricity from the fovea. Despite this diminished acuity, Crouzet, Kirchner, 
and Thorpe (2010) demonstrate that some information from faces can be 
encoded in just over 100 ms and that this information can be used to guide and 
speed up subsequent prosaccades.  
In order to focus our limited processing resources on those regions of the 
visual scene that contain the most salient or useful information (given our 
current behavioural goals), we make two to three saccades per second. A 
saccadic eye movement to a specific spatial location is preceded by a covert 
(without moving the eyes) shift of attention to this region in space (Posner, 
1980; Hoffman, 1998). Saccades are interspersed with fixations, during which 
the image on the retina is sufficiently still to be processed. Eye movements are 
therefore intimately linked with the concept of attention – and the location and 
duration of fixations made whilst people view a given scene are generally 
assumed to reflect (in a reasonably transparent way) which aspects of the 
scene the participants have attended. It is generally agreed that a combination 
of both exogenous factors (such as a sudden change in luminance) and 
endogenous factors (such as expectations or memories of an object’s location) 
combine to influence the location of each fixation (see Hutton, 2008 for a 
review).  
The full extent and the limits of our ability to encode information from 
faces presented in non-foveal locations are not yet fully understood. For 
example, how do specific properties of the nonfoveally presented face stimuli 
such as contrast or luminance affect prosaccades and how do task instructions 
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influence the speed and accuracy of saccades to distal faces? What types of 
visual information can be extracted from parafoveal locations (e.g., overall gist 
of the stimulus versus fine details) and then used to guide saccades, and just 
how far into peripheral vision can faces influence saccade latencies and landing 
points? Do these limits vary systematically by the emotional expression on the 
faces? Given the adaptive value of identifying threat-related emotions, are these 
limits greater for angry or fearful faces than for facial emotions that do not 
communicate threat-related information? A fuller understanding of some of 
these issues is extremely important if we are to grasp the fundamental role of 
attention allocation in interacting adaptively with the environment. Where we 
attend to in a given scene reflects, reasonably transparently, which information 
we have chosen to process and individual differences in how attention is 
allocated may reflect variation in how scenes are interpreted- this inevitably has 
very important social implications.  
Despite the evolution of rapid and specialised processing of faces and 
facial emotions in humans, there are of course circumstances when the face 
processing system fails to perform efficiently and the consequences can be 
profound. The failure to accurately recognise and interpret the emotions of 
others is one of the most enduring and pervasive deficits associated with 
schizophrenia (Morris, Weikert, & Loughland, 2009) and is directly related to 
symptom severity (Hofer et al., 2009) and outcome measures such as 
occupational functioning and independent living (Kee, Green, Mintz, & Brekke, 
2003). 
Schizophrenia is a clinical diagnosis of a psychosis characterised by 
syndromes of psychotic symptoms. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Ed., text rev (DSM-IV-TR) definition of 
schizophrenia, two or more of the following symptoms must be present for a 
significant portion of a one month period to reach a diagnosis of schizophrenia: 
delusions (e.g., persecutory, grandeur), hallucinations (e.g., auditory, visual, 
olfactory), odd / disorganised behaviour, disorganised speech, catatonic 
behaviour (e.g., unusual motor movements), one or more negative symptoms 
(e.g., low or flattened mood, alogia, apathy / low drive) (DSM–IV–TR; American 
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Psychiatric Association, 2000). Schizophrenia is also associated with stable 
cognitive impairment which is unrelated to positive symptoms (delusions, 
hallucinations, odd / disorganised behaviour, disorganised speech, catatonic / 
disorganised behaviour) of the disorder (see Harrison, Geddes & Sharpe, 
2005). Individuals with schizophrenia, for example, often present with marked 
impairment in discriminating facial expressions of emotion, but the precise 
nature of their impairment is not yet fully understood (Mandal, Pandey, & 
Prasad, 1998 for a review). One possible explanation is that individuals with 
schizophrenia, in contrast to healthy controls, do not allocate attention optimally 
to faces. A number of studies using eye tracking techniques, for example, have 
revealed that, in contrast to controls, schizophrenia patients attended less to the 
most salient and informative features of faces, such as the eyes and mouth 
(Williams, Loughland, Gordon, & Davidson, 1999). Improving our understanding 
of the mechanisms underlying impaired emotion detection in schizophrenia is 
fundamental to designing and informing effective treatment and remediation 
therapies for the amelioration of social difficulties in schizophrenia. 
In addition to impairments in accurately detecting and optimally attending 
to facial emotions, there is also some evidence to suggest that individuals with 
schizophrenia show particular error patterns when attempting to identify facial 
emotion- specifically, patients as compared to healthy controls are more likely to 
make false positive errors (seeing emotions in neutral faces) (e.g., Brown & 
Cohen, 2010). The precise pattern of false positive errors common in those with 
psychosis has not, however, been fully elucidated. Whether or not individuals 
with schizophrenia are more likely to misattribute threat-related emotions to 
faces, and how this possibly relates to particular positive symptoms such as 
hallucinations and paranoia, as well as comorbid anxiety and a state of long-
term hypervigilance, has not been fully explored. Repeatedly interpreting neutral 
faces as angry, for example, will likely leave an individual feeling under threat, 
disliked or confused. Given the pervasiveness of persecutory delusions and 
false beliefs about the intentions of others (e.g., that other people pose an 
imminent threat) associated with psychosis, research in this area is extremely 
important. If further research identifies very specific error types when 
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processing facial emotions associated with particular symptoms of 
schizophrenia, then interventions and treatments can be created that are aimed 
specifically at reducing these types of errors during social interaction, thus 
increasing the likelihood of improving functional outcome. 
Many researchers agree that liability for schizophrenia can be expressed 
in ways other than full-blown schizophrenia. The “hypothesis of continuity” 
between schizophrenia and normal behaviour suggests that the signs and 
symptoms of the disorder, such as difficulties processing facial emotion, also 
occur to varying, lesser degrees in the general population (Claridge, 1997). The 
term “schizotypy”, which was first coined by Rado in 1953, describes this 
variation in schizophrenia liability across the general population. Those who 
exhibit more psychosis-like behaviours are referred to as high “schizotypes” or 
as being high in schizotypy. There is a large body of evidence in support of this 
symptomatic continuum between normal functioning and those behaviours such 
as benign referential thinking, hallucinatory-like experiences or non-
symptomatic odd / eccentric behaviour associated with psychosis (see Claridge, 
1997; Eckblad & Chapman, 1983; Johns & Van Os, 2001; Verdoux and van Os, 
2002). Healthy individuals who experience hallucination-like experiences, for 
example, are at higher risk for developing a schizophrenia spectrum disorder 
than individuals who do not have such experiences (see Kelleher & Cannon, 
2011 for a review). In addition, a large literature has shown that the information 
processing deficits associated with schizophrenia are also present, albeit less 
severely, in high schizotypes (e.g. Barrantes-Vidal et al, 2003; Park, Holzman & 
Lenzenweger, 1995). Johns and Van Os (2001) postulate that there may be a 
threshold at which those benign, non-symptomatic psychotic traits associated 
with high schizotypy become pathological and require treatment (but see work 
by Mohr and colleagues). In line with stress-diathesis models of psychiatric 
illness (see Walker & Diforio, 1997), the threshold may be lowered by increased 
stress levels (Williams, Henry & Green, 2007). 
It is argued that the onset of schizophrenia precedes the commencement 
of symptomatic psychotic behaviours and that high schizotypes represent “a 
valid, albeit nonpsychotic, expression of the same liability that underpins 
7 
 
  
schizophrenia” (Lenzenweger, 2010, p.17). It has further been argued that it is 
important to consider in psychosis research, groups other than individuals with 
diagnoses of schizophrenia (who form the very extremity of the psychosis 
continuum) (see Johns & Van Os, 2001; Lenzenweger, 2010). Considering, for 
example, healthy individual variation in psychotic-like behaviour (schizotypy), 
individuals at-risk for psychosis, and those who exhibit symptomatic behaviour 
associated with full-blown psychosis (under the acknowledgement that the 
boundaries of each of these “stages” are not clearly demarcated) will enhance 
understanding of the dynamics of the vulnerability continuum for schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders. 
There are numerous questionnaires devised to assess individual 
differences in schizotypy. Descriptions of the most frequently used measures of 
schizotypy are detailed below in Table 1. The development of these inventories 
has confirmed that schizotypy is a multidimensional construct and that there are 
parallels between the multiple dimensions of schizotypy and the positive, 
negative and disorganised symptom clusters of schizophrenia (Claridge, 1997). 
The measures are clearly wide-ranging and this variety enables researchers to 
tap into selective components of schizoptypy. An inevitable consequence of 
these numerous scales, however, is that it makes valid comparison across 
studies using different measures of schizotypy difficult. 
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Questionnaire Description Response Reference 
Physical 
Anhedonia Scale 
A 61-item inventory 
measuring deficit in 
the ability to 
experience pleasure 
from typically 
pleasurable physical 
stimuli. 
True/False Chapman, 
Chapman, and 
Raulin, 1976 
Social 
Anhedonia Scale 
A 48-item scale 
devised to measure 
deficit in the ability to 
experience pleasure 
from social interaction 
or exposure to social 
stimuli. 
 
True/False Chapman, 
Chapman and 
Raulin, 1976 
Perceptual 
Aberration Scale 
A 35-item scale which 
assesses psychotic-
like perceptual 
aberration such as 
somatic distortions 
and hallucinations. 
 
True/False Chapman, 
Chapman, and 
Raulin, 1978 
Launay Slade 
Hallucination 
Scale 
A 12-item measure of 
predisposition 
towards hallucination 
and delusional 
ideation. 
True/False Launay and 
Slade, 1981 
Revised Social 
Anhedonia Scale 
A shortened 40 item 
version of the original 
1976 scale with the 
original items tapping 
social anxiety 
removed. 
True/False Eckblad, 
Chapman, 
Chapman, 
Mishlove, 1982 
Magical Ideation 
Scale 
A 30-item measure of 
propensity to 
nonscientific belief, 
often related to 
causation. 
True/False Eckblad and 
Chapman, 1983 
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Impulsive 
Nonconformity 
Scale 
A 51-item 
questionnaire 
designed to measure 
impulsive antisocial 
behaviour. 
True/False Chapman, 
Chapman, 
Numbers et al., 
1984 
The Intense 
Ambivalence 
Scale 
A 45-item measure of 
the tendency to 
simultaneously 
experience conflicting 
feelings or desires. 
True/False Raulin, 1984 
Launay-Slade 
Hallucination 
Scale Revised – 
LSH-R 
A revision of the 
original 1981 scale to 
include a Likert-type 
response format. Also, 
the two negative 
response items in the 
original scale were 
made into positive 
response items. 12 
items. 
5-point Likert 
scale 
Bentall and 
Slade, 1985 
Rust Inventory of 
Schizotypal 
Cognitions - 
RISC 
A 26-item measure of 
cognitive traits 
qualitatively 
associated with the 
positive symptoms of 
schizophrenia. 
4-point Likert Rust, 1988 
A scale for the 
measurement of 
Schizotypy 
A 30-item 
measurement of sub-
dimensions of positive 
schizotypy (cognitive, 
perceptual and 
attentional function) 
and negative 
schizotypy (social 
dysfunction, social 
anhedonia, and 
physical anhedonia). 
True/False Venables, 
Wilkins, Mitchell, 
Raine, and 
Bailes, 1990 
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Oxford-Liverpool 
Inventory of 
Feelings and 
Experiences – 
OLIFE 
 
A 150 item, multi-
dimensional 
schizotypy 
questionnaire 
measuring the 
following four 
constructs of 
schizotypy: unusual 
experiences, cognitive 
disorganization, 
impulsive 
nonconformity and 
introverted anhedonia. 
Yes/No Mason, Claridge, 
and Jackson, 
1995 
The Barratt 
Impulsiveness 
Scale – BIS II 
A 30-item 
questionnaire 
measuring attentional 
and cognitive 
impulsivity. 
4-point Likert 
scale 
Patton, Stanford, 
and Barratt, 1995 
Referential 
Thinking Scale - 
REFS 
A 34-item 
questionnairedesigned 
to measure the 
tendency to ascribe 
personal meaning to 
neutral, everyday 
occurrences. 
True/False Lenzenweger, 
Bennett, and 
Lilenfeld, 1997 
Peters Delusions 
Inventory - PDI 
A 40-item inventory 
measuring delusional 
ideation- the tendency 
to hold on to false 
beliefs despite strong 
contravening 
evidence. 
Yes/No 
followed by 
three rating 
scales (1-4) 
for “yes” 
responses. 
providing a 
measure of 
distress, 
preoccupation, 
and conviction  
Peters, Joseph 
and Garety, 1999 
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Revised Launay 
Slade 
Hallucination 
Scale 
A 15-item version of 
the original 1981 
scale, revised to 
include items 
associated with visual 
as well as auditory 
hallucination-like 
experiences such as 
vivid imagery and 
daydreams. 
4-point Likert 
scale 
Morrison, Wells, 
and Nothard, 
2000 
Schizotypal 
Ambivalence 
Scale 
A 19-item revised 
version of the Intense 
Ambivalence Scale. 
True/False Kwapil, Mann, 
and Raulin, 2002 
Revised version 
of the Launay-
Slade 
Hallucination 
Scale 
Adaptation of the 
original 1981 scale to 
include items referring 
to tactile and olfactory 
hallucinatory 
experiences. 16 items. 
5-point Likert Larøi, 
Marczewski, & 
Van der, Linden, 
2004 
Thinking and 
Perceptual Style 
Questionnaire 
A 99 item 
questionnaire 
measuring 9 
subscales of 
schizotypy, namely: 
physical anhedonia, 
social anhedonia, 
hallucination 
proneness, social 
paranoia, negative 
evaluation, thought 
disorder, magical 
ideation, self-
referential ideation, 
and perceptual 
illusion. 
5-point Likert Linscott and 
Knight, 2004 
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The 21-item 
Peters Delusions 
Inventory – PDI-
21 
A brief version of the 
original 44-item PDI. 
Yes/No 
followed by 
three rating 
scales (scored 
1-4) for 
distress, 
preoccupation, 
and conviction 
for any 
endorsed 
items 
Peters, Joseph, 
Day, and Garety, 
2004 
The Cardiff 
Anomalous 
Perceptions 
Scale - CAPS 
A 32-item 
questionnaire 
measuring the 
intrusiveness and 
frequency of 
anomalous 
experiences. 
Yes/No plus 5-
point Likert 
ratings for 
distress, 
intrusiveness, 
and frequency 
for any “yes” 
responses 
given 
Bell, Halligan, 
and Ellis, 2006 
Schizotypic 
Syndrome 
Questionnaire - 
SSQ 
108-item inventory 
assessing the 
following three 
subscales: negative, 
asocial and positive 
schizotypy. 
4-point Likert Van Kampen, 
2006 
Schizotypal 
Symptoms 
Inventory - SSI 
A 20-item measure of 
sub-threshold 
psychotic symptoms. 
5-point Likert Hodgekins, 
Coker, Freeman, 
Ray-Glover, 
Bebbington, 
Garety, et al., 
2012  
    
Table 1. Questionnaires commonly used to measure individual differences in 
schizotypy. An adapted and expanded version of the table presented in 
Fonseca-Pedrero et al., 2008, p.580.  
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A key advantage of schizotypy research is that it allows researchers to 
study the cognitive processes associated with psychosis while avoiding some of 
the well-documented methodological issues associated with working with 
individuals with schizophrenia such as confounding effects of medication, 
extended periods of hospitalisation, low motivation, poor concentration, 
generalised neuropsychological deterioration, severe psychopathology, and 
comorbid alcohol and substance abuse. In addition, schizotypy research allows 
for the assessment of those unusual thoughts and behaviours that commonly 
precede an episode of psychosis (Poreh, Whitman, Weber & Ross, 1994) and 
which therefore have important implications for preventative and early 
intervention treatments (see McGorry et al., 2002; van’t Wout, Aleman, Kessels 
et al., 2004).   
Given the advantages and the potential usefulness of research with non-
clinical participants discussed above, it might be informative to address some of 
the research questions in the schizophrenia and emotion processing literature, 
that have thus far produced inconsistent results, using non-clinical schizotypy 
samples instead. For example, how do high and low schizotypes vary in terms 
of emotion processing accuracy? Are errors of misperception in emotion 
processing affected by general schizotypy / specific schizotypy trait profiles? 
Addressing the latter question, for example, may help in our understanding of 
those types of errors that are frequently made by individuals with psychosis 
because data collected from clinical groups are usually noisy with effects of 
many of the confounding variables mentioned above. As such, research with 
schizotypy samples may provide a cleaner measure of the impairments 
apparent in clinical groups. A better understanding of misperceptions and errors 
of facial emotion processing in those with liability for schizophrenia would prove 
invaluable to the design of therapeutic interventions and remediation training 
aimed at reducing these errors in social situations, hopefully eventually leading 
to marked improvements in social functioning in individuals with psychosis. 
Where specific misperceptions (e.g., a tendency to frequently misperceive 
neutral faces as angry) may play a role in maintaining clinical symptoms or high 
arousal (a state that has been shown to predict the onset of positive symptoms 
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of schizophrenia), then carefully designed interventions could also lead to 
symptom amelioration. 
Another area of face and emotion processing in which individuals with 
schizophrenia deviate from the general population is in terms of laterality biases 
when viewing faces. Healthy individuals show reliable right hemisphere (left 
visual field) dominance for face and emotion processing (see Hole & Bourne, 
2010) whereas patients with schizophrenia have been found to display a 
significantly reduced or completely absent  hemifield bias during face 
processing (see Kucharska-Pietura, David, Dropko and Klimkowski, 2002). For 
example, using eye tracking techniques Phillips and David (1997) found that 
when images of faces were presented centrally onscreen, healthy controls 
tended to direct initial saccades to the left visual field (consistent with the right 
hemisphere dominance for face processing in the general population) whereas 
the schizophrenia patients made significantly more initial saccades to the right 
side of the face stimuli (indicative of left rather than right hemisphere 
dominance). Continuum models of schizophrenia predict that atypical laterality 
biases during face processing similar to those observed in schizophrenia 
patients would also be apparent in high schizotypes. There is, however, 
evidence to the contrary- Leonards and Mohr (2009), in a very similar 
experiment to the Phillips and David (1997) study, found that high schizotypes 
as compared to low schizotypal controls had significantly greater leftward 
biases in initial saccades to faces. Given that this was the first demonstration of 
a somewhat unexpected result, more research in this area would help to resolve 
this apparent contradiction.  The third paper in this thesis therefore presents an 
attempt to replicate and extend the Leonards and Mohr (2009) finding. 
In addition to atypical face processing in psychosis, it is well documented 
that individuals with schizophrenia also have disturbances in time perception 
(which, like the emotion processing impairment, may also be linked to a 
fundamental deficit in attentional processes), but the precise nature of the deficit 
is not fully understood (see Bonnot et al., 2011; Allman & Meck, 2012 for 
reviews). Discrepancy in the literature surrounding the nature of time processing 
deficits associated with schizophrenia may be the result of confounding effects 
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of medication, generally small sample sizes and the very different 
methodologies used to assess temporal processing across these experiments 
(e.g., Bonnot et al., 2011; Davalos, Rojas & Tregellas, 2011). As previously 
discussed in this general introduction section, schizotypy research allows some 
of these issues to be circumvented and interestingly, there is some evidence 
that high as compared to low schizotypy is also associated with less accurate 
time perception (e.g., Lee et al., 2006). Importantly, there is potential for 
dysfunctions in face processing and time processing to interact. It has been 
shown, for example, that high relative to low anxious participants, overestimate 
the duration that an angry as compared to a neutral face is presented for (so for 
high anxious participants time appears to slow down when viewing angry faces) 
(Bar-Haim, Kerem, Lamy & Zakay, 2009). Given that individuals with 
schizophrenia and high schizotypes are particularly sensitive or hypervigilant to 
threat-related faces (see Green and Phillips, 2004 for a review), the interaction 
between time processing and exposure to emotional faces in the context of 
schizotypy is potentially very interesting, particularly in terms of how the 
subjective experience of exposure to threat may be moderated by schizotypy. It 
is possible that, for example, high schizotypes feel as though they were 
exposed to threat for longer than they in fact have been and that such an 
experience could serve to maintain a state of hypersensitivity to threat or even 
to maintain specific symptoms such as paranoia or anxiety. The association 
between time and emotion processing in the context of schizotytpy has not 
been previously researched and the final paper in this thesis presents a timely 
attempt at elucidating this important relationship.  
This thesis presents a series of studies that explore the limits of optimal 
facial emotion processing in healthy individuals, and how facial emotion 
processing ability is related to individual differences in schizotypal personality 
traits. Four key themes are addressed: 1) the limits of healthy individuals’ ability 
to rapidly attend to briefly presented nonfoveal faces, 2) the association 
between individual differences in schizotypy and misperceptions during facial 
emotion processing, 3) the relationship between laterality biases in face 
processing and schizotypy, and finally 4) the effects of schizotypy on facial 
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emotion processing and time perception. Each of these themes is discussed in 
turn in the proceeding sections.  
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1. Evidence for preferential and rapid processing of emotional faces 
 
1.1 The processing of faces as compared to other visual stimuli 
 
As argued in the previous section, faces are central to everyday social 
experience. It is therefore unsurprising that humans appear to be particularly 
responsive to face as compared to non-face stimuli. Eye tracking studies 
provide evidence that upright faces are processed significantly more quickly 
than other animate stimuli such as inverted faces or butterflies (Crouzet, 
Kirchner & Thorpe, 2010). Furthermore, face stimuli, as compared to images of 
other animate objects matched for low-level visual properties, are particularly 
effective at capturing visual attention even when they are task irrelevant. For 
example, Devue, Belopolsky and Theeuwes (2012) presented a circular array of 
6 dots. A task irrelevant image was positioned next to each dot in the array. On 
each trial one of these images was of an animate object (either an upright face, 
inverted face or a butterfly) and the remaining 5 images were of inanimate 
objects (e.g., a musical instrument, item of clothing etc.). One of the dots (the 
target) was always a different colour to the other five dots. Saccades to the 
target dot were significantly faster when its position was congruent with the 
upright face as compared to when the target dot was congruent with the 
inverted face or butterfly. Further, there were significantly more capture errors to 
upright faces than to inverted faces or butterflies when positioned at a non-
target location (i.e., participants would mistakenly look towards the non-target 
dot positioned next to the upright face more frequently than to non-target dots 
co-located with inverted faces or butterflies). 
Morand, Grosbras, Caldara, and Harvey (2010) asked participants to make 
a rapid eye movement either towards (prosaccade) or away from (antisaccade) 
images presented to the left or right of a central fixation cross. These saccade 
target images depicted faces, vehicles or noise patterns. Significantly more 
errors were made when individuals were required to saccade away from faces 
as compared to both cars and noise patterns, indicating that faces are 
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particularly effective at capturing attention. Interestingly on the prosaccade 
trials, saccades were significantly faster to both faces and cars as compared to 
noise patterns (with no speed advantage for faces over cars). This may reflect 
the face-like appearance of the front of cars with, for example, headlights and 
number plates / grills corresponding to the position of eyes and mouth 
respectively. There is indeed further evidence that face-like stimuli are 
processed more rapidly than stimuli matched for low-level visual properties, but 
that are without a face-like appearance / configuration. Tomalski, Csibra, and 
Johnson (2009) presented oval shapes for 200 ms either to the left or right of a 
central fixation cross and participants were asked to look towards the stimulus 
as quickly as possible. The ovals always contained 3 small squares that either 
corresponded to the positions of the eyes and mouth on an upright face or of an 
inverted face. When schematic “upright faces” were presented, saccade 
latencies were significantly faster than when schematic “inverted faces” were 
presented (162 ms vs. 173 ms).  
 
1.2 Rapid emotion discrimination 
 
Faces are carriers of a wealth of important social information such as the 
identity, emotions and intentions of others. Our ability to accurately interpret the 
facial expressions of others is central to social functioning, and the rapid 
detection of threat-related emotion has important implications for our safety and 
survival. Given the importance of emotion processing to survival and social 
being, it is unsurprising that the intact human brain has evolved to be able to 
identify and discriminate between emotions extremely effectively. 
Electrophysiological measures of brain activity have revealed that the brain 
rapidly reacts in an emotion-specific way to facial expressions and emotional 
scenes. For example, Ashley, Vuilleumier & Swick (2004) recorded event 
related potentials to presentations of faces depicting different emotions (happy, 
fearful, disgusted, neutral) and found that in less than 250 ms there was a 
significant increase in P200 amplitude (as measured from electrodes placed 
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around the frontocentral region) during the presentation of upright fearful faces 
as compared to faces expressing happiness and to non-face stimuli (houses). 
The findings of a number of studies imply that the human brain is 
capable of processing emotional stimuli “pre-attentively” (see Dolan, 2002; 
LeDoux, 2000; Ohman et al., 2007). Information is said to have been processed 
pre-attentively when a participant displays behavioural or physiological changes 
resulting from their exposure to a visual stimulus that they explicitly report not 
having seen (Pessoa, 2005), or that they have not yet selected for visual 
processing (Wolfe, 2003). Preattentive effects can be studied using backward 
visual masking, which involves replacing the original stimulus with a masking 
stimulus (e.g., a grid pattern) at the exact time at which the researcher wishes 
processing of the original stimulus to terminate (Coltheart, 1980). Another 
method for assessing whether a stimulus has a “preattentive” effect involves 
measuring whether the presentation of a stimulus to non-foveal locations results 
in any measurable change in behaviour even though the stimulus has not been 
overtly attended. 
Tamietto and de Gelder (2008) report that a fearful facial expression 
flashed centrally onscreen for 20 ms (so briefly that participants report not 
seeing a face) speeds up the recognition of a simultaneously presented fearful 
expression and slows down the recognition of a simultaneously presented 
happy expression. In other words, they claim to have found evidence for an 
effect of subliminal emotion processing on the conscious recognition of facial 
expressions. In addition, it has been found that these subliminal effects can vary 
by emotion. Whalen, Rauch, Etcoff, McInerney, Lee, & Jenike, (1998) 
investigated the difference in amygdala activity during the subliminal (33 ms) 
presentation of masked fearful and masked happy faces. They found that 
activation in the amygdala was significantly higher for subliminally presented 
fearful than happy faces and suggest that subcortical processing of emotional 
material may be limited to threat-related information. 
 Despite the evidence presented thus far in section 1 that faces are 
processed rapidly and preferentially, and the evidence above that facial 
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emotions can even be detected preattentively, the limits and extent of this ability 
remain unknown. For example, it has not been established how far into 
peripheral vision we are able to distinguish emotional from non-emotional faces 
and whether these limits are systematically affected by facial emotion. In 
addition, it is generally agreed that attention is preferentially allocated to threat-
related facial emotion and that there is obvious adaptive value in being able to 
rapidly and preferentially attend to threat-related emotional material (see section 
1.3 below). It is unclear, however, what the limits of our ability to preferentially 
encode and respond to threat-related faces are, especially when these stimuli 
are located in extreme, nonfoveated peripheral locations. In other words, are 
the maximum non-foveated distal eccentricities at which we can identify facial 
expressions greater for threat-related faces than for non-threat related faces, as 
a result of the adaptive value of being able to swiftly recognise impending 
threats in the environment? Do the same mechanisms underlie both our ability 
to rapidly discriminate emotional versus unemotional natural scenes and our 
ability to discriminate emotional and unemotional faces even though the visual 
differences between emotional and neutral faces are considerably more subtle 
than the differences between two scenes varying in affective valence? The first 
paper in this thesis sets out to address some of these issues. 
 
1.3 Preferential processing of threat-related faces 
 
Researchers from a number of disciplines have studied the interface between 
threat-related information and attention in the human brain (see Compton, 2003; 
and for a review of neuroimaging studies in particular, see Davis & Whalen, 
2001). Facial expressions of fear and anger, unlike the other basic emotions, 
convey information about impending danger. An angry face is threatening in 
itself and a fearful face indicates that a potential threat has been detected in the 
vicinity by someone else (Gerritsen et al., 2008). Ohman and Mineka (2001) 
among others propose that the heightened response to threat occurs because 
humans possess a highly evolved neural and behavioural module for facilitating 
a very rapid, defensive response to impending danger.  LeDoux (1996) further 
21 
 
  
states that fear functions to expedite a defensive response to survival threats. 
Indeed, a number of psychophysiological responses to threat-related 
experimental stimuli have been recorded, including increased muscle tone and 
heart rate (Palomba, Sarlo, Angrilli et al., 2000).  
Whalen, Rauch, Etcoff, et al. (1998) investigated, using fMRI, the 
difference in amygdala activation (blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) fMRI 
signal) during the subliminal (33 ms) presentation of masked fearful and 
masked happy faces. Heightened activity in the amygdala during exposure to 
subliminally presented faces has been taken as evidence for involvement of the 
amygdala in the processing of the subliminal stimulus. Activation in the 
amygdala was significantly higher during the presentation of masked fearful 
faces as compared to masked happy faces. Evidence for subliminal processing 
of threat-relevant faces is, however, equivocal. Phillips, Williams, Heining et al. 
(2004), presented faces depicting fear subliminally (30 ms backward masked) to 
healthy participants. fMRI recordings did not reveal amygdala activation above 
baseline during the covert presentations of fearful faces. Heightened amygdala 
activation was only observed during exposure to supraliminally (170 ms) 
presented fearful faces. 
Visual search experiments have also been used to explore whether 
threat-related as compared to non-threatening faces capture attention 
preferentially. In visual search tasks, participants are presented with a set of 
items (a search array) and are asked to search for a specific target item (which 
is typically only present on a subset of trials) within that array (Wolfe, 1998). 
The key measure is the time taken to decide whether the target is present or 
absent. Ohman, Flykt & Esteves (2001) found that fear-relevant stimuli were 
detected more rapidly than fear-irrelevant stimuli in visual search tasks. 
Interestingly, their experimental design allowed them to distinguish a specific 
“threat advantage” in visual search from a more general negative valence 
advantage. Participants reliably detected threatening (angry) faces more rapidly 
and more accurately than other faces with negative valence (e.g. scheming). 
Similarly,  Fox et al. (2000) presented a search array consisting of schematic 
faces and asked participants to ascertain whether all the faces in the array were 
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identical or whether one of the faces was different (i.e., depicting another 
expression). In target absent trials (all faces identical), participants were slower 
to complete the trial when the search arrays were made up of angry faces than 
when the arrays were made up of happy faces. In addition, target (discrepant) 
faces were identified more rapidly when they were angry faces than when they 
were happy faces. It appears then that angry faces are processed preferentially 
as compared to happy (or non-threat-relevant) emotional faces.  
Further support for an attentional bias towards threat-relevant stimuli comes 
from experiments using the dot probe paradigm. Bannerman, Milders, de 
Gelder & Sahraie (2009) presented fearful and neutral faces simultaneously, 
and found that response times to a subsequently presented target dot were 
faster if the dot appeared where the fearful face was previously located 
compared to when it appeared where the neutral face had been located. They 
suggest that attention is preferentially allocated to the location of the threat-
relevant stimuli and it therefore takes longer to disengage attention from this 
region in order to react to the appearance of a dot at a location other than 
where the threat-relevant stimulus was previously positioned. 
 
1.4 The processing of emotional stimuli at varying distal eccentricities 
 
As discussed more briefly in the general introduction, the concentration of 
receptors in the retina is not uniform, and as a result visual acuity is not 
constant across our entire visual field. By far the greatest concentration of 
cones (the photoreceptors responsible for colour vision that function in daylight 
conditions) is contained in the comparatively small foveal region of the retina. In 
an adult human this foveal depression measures a mere 650–700 μm in 
diameter (Yuodelis & Hendrickson, 1986), and is capable of resolving 
approximately two degrees of visual angle with very high acuity. There are far 
fewer cones in the surrounding parafoveal region (which corresponds to 2-10 
degrees of visual angle) and virtually none at all in the peripheral retina, which 
is dominated by rods capable of detecting changes in luminance or motion that 
occur in the remainder of the visual field (which can be anything up to 200 
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degrees of visual angle for binocular vision) (Wade & Swanston, 2001). Around 
80 percent of retinal ganglion cells (the axons of which form the optic nerve) in 
primates receive information from these foveal cones (Wade & Swanston, 
2001). Since the optic tract axons (stemming from the optic nerve) terminate in 
the lateral geniculate nucleus (whose cells project to the primary visual cortex), 
a correspondingly large proportion of the cells in V1 process information from 
the foveal region (Wade & Swanston, 2001).  As a result, visual acuity is 
greatest for the comparatively small region of the visual field that falls on the 
fovea and diminishes sharply with increasing distal eccentricity from the fovea.  
We make two to three saccades per second in order to focus on those 
regions of the visual scene that contain the most salient or useful information 
given our current behavioural goals (Wade & Swanston, 2001). It is generally 
assumed that a saccadic eye movement to a specific spatial location is 
preceded by a covert (without moving the eyes) shift of attention to this region in 
space (Posner, 1980; Hoffman, 1998). Saccades are interspersed with fixations, 
during which the image on the retina is sufficiently still to be processed. Whilst 
there are different theoretical accounts of the relationship between attention and 
eye movements, it is generally agreed that they are closely linked (see Deubel 
& Schneider 1996, cf Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, & Umilta, 1987; and see 
Hutton 2008 for a review) such that the location and duration of fixations within 
a scene are typically assumed to reveal which aspects of the scene have been 
attended.  
The factors that determine where we allocate our attention is a topic of 
considerable debate (see Burnham, 2007 for a review). Purely bottom up 
models of visual processing propose that attention is attracted to points of high 
salience in terms of colour intensity, contrast, orientation and so forth (Itti & 
Koch, 2001). Others argue that it is predominantly top down processes such as 
task instructions, expectancy or target descriptions that affect the location and 
order of saccades during visual processing (e.g., Yarbus, 1967; Wolfe, Cave & 
Franzel, 1989; Zelinsky, Zhang, Yu, Chen & Samaras, 2006). More recent 
theories generally argue for some combination of the two influences. Theeuwes 
(2010), for example, contends that the allocation of visual attention is initially 
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stimulus driven (bottom up), but with time top-down effects also begin to 
influence which aspects of the scene are selected for processing. 
What is particularly interesting about the effect of bottom up influence is 
that the information that is used to guide subsequent saccades is extracted from 
non-foveal regions where visual acuity is comparatively diminished. As 
mentioned, the limits of our capacity to draw upon important stimulus 
information such as emotional content located at extreme distal eccentricities is 
not yet fully understood. Only a few studies have sought to determine the extent 
to which threat-related stimuli are processed when such stimuli are located at 
different peripheral eccentricities. Calvo and Esteves (2005) presented faces 
foveally (within 2˚ of central fixation point) or parafoveally (between 2.1˚ and 5˚ 
of central fixation) for between 25 ms and 75 ms. Faces were then masked and 
a probe (face or word label) was presented.  Participants were required to 
indicate whether the probe face depicted the same expression as the prime 
face or not. When the probe stimulus was a word (angry, happy, fearful or 
neutral), participants had to indicate whether the probe word described the 
expression depicted by the prime face or not. Results indicated that emotional 
faces were identified more accurately than neutral faces both when the primes 
were presented foveally and when they appeared in extrafoveal locations.   
There is also evidence (e.g., Nummenmaa et al., 2009) that complex 
task-irrelevant emotional scenes presented at 2.5 degrees distal eccentricity 
can reduce the latency of saccades to co-located cues (prosaccades are faster 
to emotional than to neutral scenes), but whether similar impact is observed at 
greater eccentricities has not been established. De Cesarei et al. (2009) 
observed systematic modulation of brain activity during exposure to scenes of 
varying valence presented as far as 8.2 degrees eccentricity and for only 24 ms. 
Similarly, using MEG imaging techniques to record evoked brain activity, Bayle 
et al. (2009) found increased right hemisphere amygdala activation in response 
to peripherally (8˚ from fixation) presented fearful faces compared to 
peripherally presented neutral faces within the first 80 ms of viewing. Although it 
is clear that modulation of brain activity occurs in response to peripherally 
presented emotional material, more studies are necessary in order to establish 
25 
 
  
whether emotional information presented at such distances impacts on overt 
allocation of attention as well. 
 
1.5 Paper 1 Summary 
 
Paper 1 presents a series of three experiments designed to build on the 
previous research suggesting that emotional stimuli are very rapidly and 
preferentially processed, and to address some of the issues and uncertainties 
raised in the previous section. Specifically, we set out to determine the limits of 
our ability to rapidly direct overt attention towards non-foveally presented 
emotional faces using a prosaccade task in which the face stimuli were 
presented at varying horizontal distances from a central fixation cross. Whether 
or not the presence of faces depicting varying emotions systematically affects 
rapid eye movements to a co-located cue was monitored. In addition, since a 
previous study used a similar prosaccade task to explore rapid discrimination of 
emotional content using natural scenes (Nummenmaa et al., 2009), this set of 
experiments allowed us to draw direct comparisons between our ability to 
rapidly discriminate emotionally charged scenes from neutral scenes with our 
ability to rapidly discriminate emotive from unemotional faces. 
Task-irrelevant emotional (happy, angry and fearful) and neutral faces 
were co-located with two potential saccade targets positioned up to 12 degrees 
to the left and right of a central fixation cross. On each trial one face was 
emotional and the other was neutral. On half of the trials the cued saccade 
target contained the emotional face. The presence of emotional but not neutral 
faces at the location of the cued saccade target significantly reduced saccade 
latencies. This speeding effect was observed when the faces appeared in the 
potential target areas 150 ms before the cue appeared and when the cue and 
faces appeared simultaneously. The paper extends the literature in this area by 
highlighting that emotional faces (even when irrelevant to the experimental task) 
presented at extreme distal eccentricities can still be encoded and used to 
guide saccades, and that this process is an extremely rapid one, observable 
even with a 0 ms stimulus onset asynchrony. The ability to rapidly process 
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emotional information from faces is fundamental to optimum social function. As 
discussed in the general introduction, many individuals present with sub-optimal 
emotion processing ability and schizophrenia is associated with particularly 
marked impairments in facial emotion processing. Continuum models of 
schizophrenia predict similar, though attenuated, impairment in high 
schizotypes. In the second paper, rapid processing of non-foveally presented 
emotional faces is explored in the context of schizotypy. 
 
2. Misreading non-foveally presented emotional faces: the role of 
individual differences in schizotypy 
 
Deficits in facial affect recognition are associated with a number of 
psychological disorders such as depression and bipolar disorder, but as with 
other cognitive deficits associated with psychopathology, the impairment is 
arguably most severe in schizophrenia (see Addington & Addington, 1988; 
Gaebel and Wolwer, 1992). Impaired facial emotion processing has long been 
associated with schizophrenia (see Edwards et al., 2002; Mandal et al., 1998; 
Morrison et al., 1988 for reviews) and impaired social functioning in 
schizophrenia is one of the most severe and enduring symptoms (see Mueser, 
Doonan, Penn et al., 1996 for a review). Converging research suggests that 
social cognition in schizophrenia is a strong predictor of functional outcome (see 
Hooker & Park, 2002; Kee et al., 2003 and see Couture, Penn, Roberts, 2006 
for a review) and gaining a more thorough understanding of the cognitive 
deficits behind impaired emotion processing is imperative if we are to inform 
remediation strategies and develop treatments focussed on improving emotion 
processing ability and in turn social functioning. 
 
2.1 Visual processing of emotional stimuli in individuals with schizophrenia 
 
Bleuler (1911) provided one of the very first descriptions of impaired facial 
emotion processing in schizophrenia, and a large body of literature has since 
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then attempted to uncover the precise nature of this deficit (see Mandal, 
Pandey, & Prasad, 1998 for a review). Researchers have been interested, for 
example, in whether the face processing impairments apparent in schizophrenia 
reflect a more general cognitive deficit that extends to other complex stimuli as 
well (i.e., the impairment is perhaps not distinct for faces) (see Kerr & Neale, 
1993 for a review). Williams, Loughland, Gordon, and Davidson (1999) argue 
that the observed face processing deficits in schizophrenia do not reflect 
generalised cognitive deficit, and patients with schizophrenia do not show the 
same impairment when processing other, carefully matched complex stimuli. In 
an eye tracking study, Williams et al. (1999) showed that individuals with 
schizophrenia as compared to non-psychiatric controls elicited comparatively 
restricted visual scanning techniques and poorer recognition memory for non-
degraded face stimuli. In contrast, there was no difference in recognition 
memory or scanning behaviour for face stimuli that were degraded using a 
mosaic filter (which results in fine detail being filtered out). Williams et al. (1999) 
postulate that these findings support a specific deficit in face processing that is 
distinct from impairments processing other stimulus types. Williams et al. (1999) 
broadly compared schizophrenic patients with non-psychiatric controls without 
investigating possible effects of specific symptom profiles on visual scanning 
when viewing degraded and non-degraded faces. Given that a number of 
studies have in fact suggested that positive symptoms of schizophrenia may be 
associated with extended scanning of visual stimuli (see Gaebel et al., 1986, 
1987), it would have been particularly informative if the symptom profiles of the 
patients in the Williams et al. (1999) study were considered (e.g., by comparing 
the scan paths of patients with predominantly positive symptoms, patients with 
predominantly negative symptoms and non-psychiatric controls). 
 
Whether or not facial emotion processing deficits are differential (e.g., in 
affect recognition specifically) or reflect a more general impairment in 
processing information from faces that may detrimentally impact on other 
abilities such as age discrimination or familiar face recognition has also been 
explored. In support of a differential deficit, a number of studies have found that 
individuals with schizophrenia perform as well as controls on, for example, face 
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recognition or age discrimination tests, but are impaired relative to controls in 
affect recognition (e.g., Cutting, 1981; Gooding & Tallent, 2002; Heimberg et al., 
1992; Hooker & Park, 2002). In contrast, other studies report impairment in 
schizophrenia as compared to controls both in affect recognition tasks and 
control tasks that require the processing of non-emotional information such as 
identity or age from face stimuli (e.g., Archer et al., 1994; Kerr & Neale, 1993; 
Kohler, Bilker et al., 2000; Salem et al., 1996). As pointed out by a number of 
authors (e.g., Behere et al., 2011; Flack et al., 1997; Kohler et al., 2000), the 
discrepancy in the literature could be explained by methodological 
inconsistencies across studies such as not matching the experimental and 
control tasks for difficulty, failure to partial out effects of antipsychotic 
medication dosage, symptomatology differences in the clinical groups 
compared across studies,  and the wide variation in the types of face stimuli 
used between studies.  
Ekman argues that there are six basic emotions that have evolved for 
their adaptive value (Ekman, 1994) and that these six emotions (happiness, 
anger, surprise, fear, disgust and sadness) are universally recognisable from 
their corresponding facial expressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1971). Although there 
is evidence that deficient emotion processing in schizophrenia spans across all 
six basic emotions (Weniger et al., 2004), the deficit appears to be stronger for 
negative emotions such as fear, sadness, anger and disgust (e.g., Bellack et al., 
1996; Edwards et al., 2001; Gaebel & Wolwer, 1992; Kline et al., 1992; Mandal 
et al., 1998; Schneider et al., 1995; Van’t Wout et al., 2007; cf. Wolwer et al., 
1996) and emotion-specific deficits appear to vary by schizophrenia subtype. 
For example, when patients with schizophrenia were asked to sort pictures of 
expressive faces into piles according to the emotion being expressed, those 
with paranoid symptoms were particularly impaired for sadness and fear as 
compared to controls (with residual symptoms of schizophrenia). Those with 
disorganised symptoms, in contrast, showed impairment across all six basic 
emotions relative to the control group even after partialling out antipsychotic 
dosage (Weniger, Lange et al., 2004).  Poole et al. (2000) also found a negative 
correlation between schizophrenia patients’ positive symptom severity 
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(specifically disorganised thoughts) and affect recognition accuracy in an 
emotion processing task. Furthermore, there is some evidence that non-
paranoid schizophrenics are more impaired in emotion detection than patients 
with paranoid symptoms (see Kline et al., 1992; Phillips et al., 1999). It appears 
then, that emotion processing impairment is systematically affected by specific 
sub-dimensions of positive schizophrenia. Specifically, disorganised symptoms 
seem to predict greater impairment than other positive sub-dimensions and 
those with non-paranoid symptoms are likely to present with worse emotion 
discrimination ability than those with paranoid symptoms. 
Research into the relationship between negative symptoms of 
schizophrenia and emotion recognition ability is somewhat inconsistent. Some 
studies have found no relationship between negative symptoms of 
schizophrenia and emotion processing ability whereas others highlight specific 
sub-dimensions of negative schizophrenia as particularly related to emotion 
processing impairment. For example, scores on a picture sorting task, in which 
individuals with schizophrenia were asked to categorise images by the emotion 
being depicted, were unrelated to negative symptoms of schizophrenia 
(Weniger, Lange et al., 2004). Deficits in processing facial emotion are, 
according to other studies however, related to negative symptoms such as 
anergia (e.g., Mueser et al., 1996), affect flattening (Martin et al., 2005), and 
alogia (e.g., Kohler et al., 2000). There is also evidence that poorer 
performance on emotion processing tasks may be associated with overall 
negative symptom severity (e.g., Baudouin et al., 2002). As well as the 
association between emotion processing deficits and specific symptoms, 
symptom severity and neurocognitive performance are both positively 
correlated with emotion processing impairment (Kohler, Bilker et al., 2000, cf 
Kucharska-Pietura et al., 2005).  
Although there is discrepancy in the literature surrounding the 
relationship between schizophrenia and emotion processing, there is quite 
convincing evidence that emotion processing can be systematically affected by 
particular symptom types. It is likely therefore, that discrepancy in the literature 
reflects the wide heterogeneity in the psychopathology of schizophrenia, 
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underscoring the importance of carefully considering inclusion criteria in terms 
of individuals’ specific symptoms. Further, when comparing across studies, the 
prevalent symptoms in particular samples need to be equated for comparisons 
to be valid and informative. 
False positive errors in emotion recognition research indicate that an 
individual claims to have seen an emotion that in reality was not there (e.g., 
misattributing anger to what is actually a neutral face), and in a sense this type 
of misperception is analogous of visual hallucinations in which an individual 
sees something that does not really exist. The majority of the research on 
emotion processing in schizophrenia has focussed on accuracy scores in 
emotion recognition / discrimination tasks. However, a limited number of studies 
have also considered error patterns and from these it appears that patients with 
schizophrenia are more likely than controls to mistakenly perceive negative 
emotions such as disgust (Kohler et al., 2003), fearfulness or sadness (Tsoi et 
al., 2008). Whether, as is the case in accuracy measures of emotion 
processing, these misattribution errors are specifically related to certain sub 
symptoms of schizophrenia has received very little attention. Paranoid 
symptoms of schizophrenia have been associated with heightened sensitivity to 
threat-related stimuli (e.g., Davis and Gibson, 2000; Kline et al., 1992; Pinkham 
et al., 2011) suggesting that there may be good grounds for hypothesising that 
schizotypy is associated with an increased bias to perceive neutral faces as 
angry / fearful. There are very few studies that have set out specifically to 
explore whether certain sub-dimensions of schizophrenia are associated with 
particular misattribution errors during facial emotion identification. An exception 
is a study by Behere et al. (2011) in which facial emotion recognition in 
schizophrenia patients (with and without positive symptoms) and controls was 
tested using static and video face stimuli. Those with positive symptoms were 
significantly more likely than both the clinical and non-clinical controls to 
misattribute threat to non-threatening faces. This study, however, could have 
been improved by using alternative analyses that allow for effects of poor 
accuracy in identifying particular emotions to be separated from a tendency to 
falsely see emotion on neutral faces since impaired emotion recognition and a 
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tendency to misattribute emotion to neutral faces may in fact be dissociable 
processes.  
It would be interesting to consider more specifically the role of sub-
dimensions of schizophrenia (rather than the quite broad distinction between 
presence of first rank symptoms or not), especially given some of the previously 
discussed studies looking at accuracy in emotion detection which suggest, for 
example, that those with paranoid symptoms are better at emotion detection as 
compared to those with non-paranoid symptoms (Kline et al., 1992; Phillips et 
al., 1999). More research is necessary to further elucidate the role of very 
specific sub-symptoms of schizophrenia in emotion recognition deficits and in 
misattribution error patterns. For example, do those individuals who experience 
visual hallucinations make more misattribution errors during facial emotion 
processing, and how do these individuals compare with those who experience 
non-visual hallucinations such as auditory or somatic hallucinations? The 
broader distinctions between positive and negative symptoms or between first 
rank or no first rank symptoms of schizophrenia are unable to answer these 
more detailed, specific questions around the cognitive mechanisms underlying 
both visual hallucinatory experiences and facial emotion processing deficits (in 
terms of accuracy and misperceptions). Subtypes of schizophrenia have also 
been associated with systematic differences in arousal ratings for expressive 
faces. In particular, disorganised symptoms predict higher overall arousal 
ratings (Wenige et al., 2004) and it has been speculated that this may be the 
result of increased intrusiveness (into working memory) of the emotional 
material in these individuals (Wenige et al., 2004).  
It has been suggested that the emotion processing deficits evident in 
schizophrenia samples may result from atypical scan paths and sub-optimal 
allocation of attention when processing visual stimuli (Williams et al., 1999). In 
support of this contention, studies of face processing in schizophrenia using eye 
tracking techniques have revealed that individuals with schizophrenia, as 
compared to controls, free-view faces with shorter scan paths, fewer fixations 
and with reduced attention to the most salient or informative facial features 
(Loughland et al., 2002). In addition, the inefficient scanning of faces associated 
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with schizophrenia persists across symptom dimensions of the disorder 
(Williams et al., 1999). Failure to attend to those facial features that provide the 
most information about another’s emotional state would inevitably be 
detrimental to emotion recognition accuracy which would in turn be detrimental 
to social competence- the inability to accurately read the expression on 
another’s face could lead to inappropriate social responses to others, for 
example. 
To summarise, although there is convincing evidence for specific 
difficulties in processing facial emotion in schizophrenia, there are 
inconsistencies in the literature with regards to the role of specific sub-
dimensions of schizophrenia and how these individually contribute to overall 
emotion processing impairment. Methodological issues such as variation in 
tasks and in stimuli used across experiments may offer partial explanation for 
the discrepancies in findings. The heterogeneous nature of schizophrenia 
psychopathology is also extremely likely to contribute significantly to some of 
the apparent divergence in the literature. This claim is not only supported by 
studies indicating that emotion processing deficits vary by sub-symptoms of 
schizophrenia, but also by neuroimaging experiments illustrating that neural 
responses to emotional stimuli vary significantly by schizophrenia subtype 
(Andreasen & Carpenter, 1993). Finally, a number of studies converge to 
suggest that the emotion processing deficits apparent in schizophrenics may be 
due to restricted visual scanning in which the most informative regions of faces 
are attended relatively infrequently. 
 
2.2 Emotion processing and individual differences in schizotypy 
 
It is currently unclear whether the marked emotion recognition deficits (Edwards 
et al., 2000) and sub-optimal allocation of attention to emotional material 
(Williams, Loughland, Gordon & Davidson, 1999) characteristic of patients with 
schizophrenia are also evident, but to a lesser extent, in sub-clinical 
schizophrenia groups such as in those with inflated schizotypy scores (as would 
be predicted by continuum models of psychosis). The literature on face 
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processing and schizotypy is still very small, and the topic has certainly been 
considered far less than emotion processing in schizophrenia (see Phillips and 
Seidman, 2008 for a review).  
 
There are a handful of studies that offer some support for the hypothesis 
of continuity between emotion processing disturbances in schizophrenia and 
schizotypy. Williams, Henry and Green (2007) for example presented one target 
face and seven comparison faces to high and low schizotypes, and asked 
participants to point out which of the comparison faces had the same 
expression as the target face. A wide range of target emotions were used 
(anger, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise, disgust and neutral). Individuals with 
inflated negative schizotypy scores on the Schizotypal Personality 
Questionnaire (Raine, 1991) made significantly more  errors identifying negative 
emotions (anger, fear and disgust) even after controlling for group differences in 
general face processing using the Benton test of facial recognition (Benton et 
al., 1983) and in depression / anxiety scores using HADS (Snaith, 2003). No 
significant difference between high and low schizotypes emerged in the 
recognition of positive emotions and, as the authors point out, this may be a 
result of the relative ease with which positive as compared to negative emotions 
are identified (Williams et al., 2007). The experimental design resulted in twice 
as many negative emotion categories (anger, fear, sadness, disgust) than 
positive emotion categories (happy, surprise) arguably making it (after an initial 
distinction between positive and negative) comparatively easy to correctly 
identify the emotion depicted by faces expressing positive as compared to 
negative emotion. Also, although the authors report no association between 
emotion recognition and positive schizotypy, the specific error patterns made by 
participants were not deconstructed which, given the results of other studies, 
may also have been related to sub-scales of schizotypy (particularly positive 
schizotypy). For example, when asked to classify the emotion depicted by 
happy, angry, fearful and neutral faces, Van’t Wout et al. (2004) found that 
those individuals who endorse questionnaire items referring to unusual 
perceptual experiences were more likely to misclassify happy faces as either 
angry or fearful. 
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A study by Germine and Hooker (2011) also found an association 
between schizotypy (SPQ-B scores) and facial emotion discrimination deficits. 
Pairs of faces were presented to participants in rapid sequence (500ms inter-
stimulus interval) and participants were given 7 seconds to decide whether the 
two faces depicted the same emotion (in the emotion block) or were of the 
same person (in the identity block). Unlike in the previously mentioned Williams 
et al. (2007) study, in which only inflated negative (not inflated positive or 
disorganised) schizotypy scores, as measured using the SPQ (Raine, 1991), 
were associated with poorer emotion identification, their study revealed that all 
of the subscales of schizotypy measured (interpersonal, cognitive-perceptual 
and disorganised) were negatively correlated with accuracy on emotion 
discrimination even after controlling for general face processing ability (identity 
discrimination). This study therefore suggests that the emotion recognition 
difficulties found in high schizotypes cannot be fully accounted for by general 
face processing difficulties in those with high schizotypy scores. 
Finally, a study by Poreh, Whitman, Weber & Ross (1994) found no 
difference between high and low schizotypes in emotion processing ability. 
Emotional and neutral faces were presented to the left or right visual fields 
using a tachistoscope. After controlling for scores on a general face recognition 
task, there was no difference between high and low schizoptypes in emotion 
recognition ability. The authors suggest that any observed difference in emotion 
recognition associated with schizotypy score may in fact reflect generalized 
attentional dysfunction or visual perception deficits in high schizotypes rather 
than poorer performance in emotion recognition per se.  
In summary, there is some evidence that the emotion processing deficits 
apparent in schizophrenia can be observed to varying lesser degrees in high 
schizotypes, although not all studies demonstrate this. It is likely that the 
discrepancy in results arises from variation in stimuli and tasks (particularly in 
terms of difficulty) and through the use of a wide range of different schizotypy 
measures. Clearly, further research is necessary to fully elucidate whether the 
emotion recognition deficits apparent in schizophrenia, and more specifically the 
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way that these have been shown to vary by different sub-dimensions of the 
disorder, are mirrored in high schizotypes. This requires studies that are 
designed to assess how emotion processing ability varies by specific sub-
dimensions of schizotypy (e.g., hallucination proneness, disorganised thoughts 
etc.) rather than by overall schizotypy scores. Further, research aimed to 
specifically investigate error patterns during facial emotion recognition are 
lacking in the schizophrenia literature and are non-existent in the schizotypy 
literature. As argued previously, error patterns are particularly important to study 
as frequent misperception of faces, specifically falsely seeing negative emotions 
would inevitably have detrimental implications for an individual’s sense of safety 
or of acceptance from others. Feeling under threat or disliked by others is 
extremely likely to negatively impact social functioning and psychological 
wellbeing whilst possibly increasing arousal or hypervigilance to environmental 
threat or potential harm from others. Importantly, for individuals with paranoid 
symptoms these types of false positive errors / misperceptions in interpreting 
non-threatening visual stimuli such as unemotional faces or neutral scenes as 
threatening, for example, could serve to maintain or to exacerbate their 
paranoid symptoms. In order to circumvent a number of the difficulties 
associated with clinical research (e.g., whether or not individuals are well 
enough to take part, confounding effects of medication, low motivation etc.), 
research in this area would benefit greatly from the use of non-clinical samples 
(e.g., by considering systematic effects of sub-dimensions of schizotypy on 
emotion recognition and error patterns during facial emotion processing). 
Experiments designed especially to assess error patterns in emotion recognition 
in schizotypy could be extremely informative to our understanding of impaired 
emotion processing in individuals with particular symptoms or sub-types of 
schizophrenia and it is clear that more studies are required to ascertain whether 
or not there is support for the hypothesis of continuity for error patterns in 
emotion processing. 
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2.3 Paper 2 Summary 
 
The study presented in paper 2 was designed to assess the relationship 
between rapid emotion processing and schizotypy with particular interest in 
error patterns during emotion identification. Unlike previous emotion recognition 
studies, the experimental task used here was purposefully designed to generate 
false positive errors so that participants’ misattribution error patterns (ascribing 
an emotion to a neutral face) could be analysed. Two faces were briefly 
presented onscreen either side of a central fixation cross and participants were 
asked to judge whether both faces were neutral in expression or whether one of 
the faces was emotive.  The study allowed us to measure accuracy as well as 
misattribution error rate, so that effects of general poor performance in emotion 
recognition could be considered when assessing tolerance for false positives. 
This was achieved through signal detection theory from which sensitivity 
(accuracy) and response bias (tendency to make false positive errors) scores 
are derived for each participant. In light of research suggesting that 
hallucinations are the result of a perceptual system that has evolved to tolerate 
false positives during threat identification (Dodgson & Gordon, 2009), we set out 
to investigate whether more false positive errors (ascribing emotion to one of 
the faces presented in a neutral – neutral trial) occur when the target emotion is 
anger (angry block) than when the target is another less threatening emotion 
such as happiness or fear. To test continuum models of visual hallucinatory 
experiences, we also measured individual’s hallucination proneness score to 
investigate whether error patterns vary as a function of susceptibility to visual 
hallucinations. Scores on questionnaires assessing general schizotypy and 
auditory hallucination proneness were treated as covariates.  
High as compared to low hallucination proneness was associated with 
poorer emotion recognition across all emotion blocks (happy, angry and fearful), 
and with increased false positive errors in the angry block only. Our results 
provide evidence for poorer emotion recognition in high schizotypes (specifically 
those with susceptibility for visual hallucination) and therefore offer further 
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support for continuum models of emotion identification deficits in schizophrenia / 
schizotypy. The fact that the high hallucination prone group was poorer at 
emotion identification for all emotions, but only made significantly more false 
positives than the low group in the angry block suggests that the tendency to 
misperceive neutral faces as angry cannot be explained by comparably poorer 
emotion identification by the high group- if this were the case, more false 
positives by the high hallucination prone group would have occurred equally 
across all emotion blocks. These results suggest that hallucinations are more 
likely to occur when individuals are hypervigilant to threat and support 
continuum models of positive symptoms of schizophrenia – specifically 
symptomatic visual hallucinations fall on a continuum with anomalous 
perceptual experiences in the general population.  
 Finally, all individuals were more accurate at emotion discrimination 
when emotional faces were presented to the left as compared to the right visual 
field (and thus processed predominantly by the right hemisphere). This result is 
consistent with a right hemisphere advantage for face / emotion processing (see 
section 3 for further discussion on laterality biases in face processing). There 
was also a trend for more misattributions of emotion to neutral faces that were 
presented to the right visual field, showing that laterality biases in facial emotion 
processing also extend to misattribution errors. A considerable body of literature 
suggests that hemispheric asymmetry in schizophrenia is anomalous with the 
general population, specifically that “normal” lateral asymmetry is attenuated or 
non-existent in schizophrenia patients. One manifestation of atypical lateral 
asymmetry is altered laterality biases during face processing in schizophrenia 
as compared to healthy controls. Specifically, the right hemisphere dominance 
for face processing in the general population is reportedly less apparent in 
schizophrenia patients. However, we did not find any interaction between 
schizoptypy and laterality (for accuracy or errors) in this study. Most reports of 
atypical laterality biases in schizophrenia use chimeric faces and are therefore 
interested in an effect of left versus right hemifield of the face stimuli on task 
performance (e.g. by asking participants whether the right or left side of a face 
looks more emotive). Here we presented two whole faces- one to the left visual 
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field and one to the right which may explain why no interaction between 
schizotypy and laterality was observed. The proceeding study was designed 
specifically to investigate whether the attenuated (as compared to the general 
population) laterality biases during facial emotion processing in schizophrenia 
are also evident in healthy individuals with high schizotypy scores using a task 
that is more sensitive to laterality biases in schizophrenia. 
 
3. Schizotypy and lateral asymmetry in facial emotion processing 
 
3.1 Lateralised emotion processing 
During saccades the image is not stable enough on the retina for us to “see”, so 
there is some cost involved when we decide to make a saccadic eye movement 
to a new location. A large degree of filtering occurs, therefore, as we sample the 
visual environment, and an inevitable consequence of this selectivity is that 
significant proportions of the visual field are not fixated (Tatler, Baddeley & 
Gilchrist, 2005). As such, patterns of saccadic eye movement to a given scene 
represent “decisions” about whether or not to fixate certain elements of the 
visual environment, and these decisions are influenced by a number of factors 
(for further discussion see Findlay & Gilchrist, 2003).  
Due to the anatomical arrangement of the neural pathways from the eyes 
to the visual cortex, visual information presented to either the left or the right 
visual hemifield is received in the contralateral cerebral hemisphere (primary 
visual cortex) (Wade & Swanston, 2001) and there is an established link 
between hemispheric activation and contralateral eye movements (see 
Charlton, Bakan and Moretti, 1989). The location of fixations within a given 
scene, therefore, not only reveals which aspects of a scene are being 
selectively resolved in high acuity, but may also indicate which cerebral 
hemisphere is dominant in the selection and initial processing (information 
reaches the contralateral hemisphere first) of this visual information.  
39 
 
  
The two cerebral hemispheres in the human brain are functionally 
different and a number of cognitive (e.g., language and face recognition) and 
motor (e.g., handedness) functions are lateralised- preferentially carried out 
predominantly by the right or left cerebral hemisphere. It is unlikely that any 
function is carried out solely by one hemisphere in the healthy human brain 
given that the two hemispheres are linked by the corpus callosum (see 
Demaree et al., 2005 for a review), however, it appears that the direction and 
the degree of hemispheric specialisation varies between individuals (see 
Hellige, 1993). For example, even though fine motor control is frequently 
associated with left hemisphere specialization (the majority of the general 
population is right handed), there are still a number of individuals whose right 
hemispheres are dominant in fine motor control (e.g., approximately 8% of the 
general population is left handed), and as pointed out by Papousek and 
Schulter (2006), it is likely that individual differences in lateral asymmetries for 
other known lateralised behaviours also exist.  
There is a large body of literature to support preferential involvement of 
the right cerebral hemisphere in face and emotion processing (see Adolphs, et 
al., 1996; Blonder et al., 1991; Borod, 1993; Ley and Bryden, 1979). Research 
with patients with focal brain damage, for example, reveals that impaired 
emotion recognition correlates significantly with lesions located in the right 
hemisphere (e.g., right inferior parietal cortex and right mesial anterior 
infracalcarine cortex), with emotion recognition unimpaired in individuals with 
lesions confined to the left hemisphere (Adolphs, et al., 1996). Another method 
for assessing hemispheric asymmetry in emotion processing involves hemifield 
tests which systematically manipulate visual information presented to the left 
and right visual fields. Bourne (2008), for example, presented on each trial two 
chimeric faces (in which one half of a vertically split face was neutral and the 
other emotional), one face above and one below a fixation point. One face in 
the pair always expressed emotion on the left whilst the other face in the pair 
always expressed emotion in the right chimera. On each trial participants were 
asked which of the two faces is the more emotive, and participants showed a 
significant bias towards choosing the face that depicted emotion in the left 
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visual field, demonstrating an increase in sensitivity to emotional material that is 
processed predominantly by the right hemisphere.  
 
The right hemisphere advantage for face and emotion processing is the 
result of “normal” cerebral asymmetry in the human brain. Schizophrenia, 
however, has long been associated with atypical lateral asymmetry and it has 
even been argued that this abnormal cerebral lateralization is central to the 
disorder (Crow, 1989). How atypical lateralization relates to differences in 
emotion processing between schizophrenia patients and controls is not yet fully 
understood, and it is to this topic that discussion will now turn.  
 
3.2 Atypical hemispheric lateralization in schizophrenia 
 
As discussed in section 3.1, schizophrenia has long been associated with 
atypical hemispheric lateralisation but the precise nature and cause of 
anomalous cerebral dominance in schizophrenia patients has not yet been fully 
elucidated (see Oertel-Knoechel and Linden, 2011; Shenton et al., 2001 for 
reviews). There is a significantly higher incidence of mixed hand preference in 
schizophrenia samples as compared to population estimates which implies that 
schizophrenia is associated with patterns of cerebral asymmetry anomalous 
with the general population (see Satz & Green, 1999 and Sommer et al., 2001 
for reviews). In addition, it appears as though these cerebral differences are 
also apparent in young, early onset patients as well. Collinson, Phillips, James, 
Quested & Crow (2004) assessed whether lateral biases in hand and eye 
preference in an early-onset schizophrenia sample close to first episode (n=44) 
were anomalous with lateral preferences in the general population as they are 
shown to be in chronic schizophrenia samples. There was an increase in mixed 
handedness and a decrease in left eye dominance in their early onset sample 
as compared to estimates for the general population. Their study provides 
further support for atypical cerebral lateralisation characteristic of schizophrenia.  
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3.2.1 Schizophrenia and laterality biases in face processing 
 
Laterality biases in face processing, another manifestation of cerebral 
asymmetry, are also deviant in schizophrenia as compared to the general 
population. In contrast to the left hemifield bias for face processing observed in 
the majority of healthy participants, patients with schizophrenia have been 
found to display a significantly reduced perceptual asymmetry or indeed no 
hemifield bias at all for facial emotions (Kucharska-Pietura, David, Dropko and 
Klimkowski, 2002). White, Maher and Manshreck (1998) presented faces or 
letters to either the right or to the left visual field (tachistoscopic presentation). 
For certain letters / faces the participants were required to make a manual 
response (go trials) and for other letter / face types participants were required to 
inhibit a response (no go trials). Unlike the controls who showed a performance 
advantage for faces presented to the left visual field (consistent with preferential 
processing of faces in the right hemisphere), patients showed no hemifield 
advantage during the face trials. Furthermore, David and Cutting (1990) asked 
patients with schizophrenia to decide whether happy-sad chimeric faces 
depicted a happy expression or a sad one. Unlike the controls, who showed the 
expected left-hemifield bias (i.e. were more likely to think the overall emotion of 
the face was congruent with the emotion depicted by the left hemiface), the 
schizophrenia group had no bias in either direction. Finally, when face stimuli 
are presented, laterality differences between healthy individuals and 
schizophrenia patients are observable from the very first saccade- Phillips and 
David (1997) presented greyscale neutral faces to individuals with 
schizophrenia and to controls and compared the location of initial saccades to 
the face stimuli between the two groups. Controls displayed a significant left 
visual field bias for the initial saccade (as expected given that face processing is 
reportedly a right hemisphere specialization), while the schizophrenia group 
made significantly more initial saccades to the right side of the face stimuli, 
suggesting atypical (reversed) hemispheric specialization in the clinical group. 
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3.3 Laterality effects and schizotypy 
 
Numerous studies report that, consistent with schizophrenia samples, there is 
also a higher incidence of mixed handedness in high schizotypes as compared 
to estimates for the general population (Chapman & Chapman, 1987; 
Grimshaw, Yelle, Schoger, & Bright, 2008; Kelley, 2012; Poreh, 1994; Shaw, 
Claridge, & Clark, 2001). There is some inconsistency surrounding which 
particular dimensions of schizotypy are most associated with mixed 
handedness. For example, Grimshaw, Yelle, Schogar and Bright (2008) found 
that mixed hand preference predicted higher magical ideation score while 
Stefanis (2006) found that it was the disorganized sub-scale of schizotypy that 
was most associated with mixed handedness. Asai & Tanno (2009) found that 
overall higher schizotypy scores predict mixed handedness, but that the 
association was particularly strong for positive sub-dimensions of schizotypy. 
Thus whilst several studies reveal atypical handedness variations in high 
schizotypes that are consistent with the schizophrenia literature, more research 
is required in order to fully elucidate the relationship between hand preference 
and specific sub-dimensions of schizotypy. The schizotypy literature 
nevertheless offers support for the hypothesis of continuity between 
schizophrenia and schizotypy samples in terms of the atypical incidence of 
particular laterality biases manifesting themselves as left, right or mixed hand 
preference. 
 
3.3.1 Schizotypy and laterality biases in face processing 
 
As in the schizophrenia literature, manifestations of atypical laterality biases 
associated with high schizotypy also extend beyond hand preference to other 
typically lateralized abilities such as face processing. The left-hemifield (right 
hemisphere) bias when viewing chimeric faces has been shown to be 
attenuated in both individuals with schizophrenia and in those who have higher 
negative schizotypy (social anhedonia) scores (Luh and Gooding, 1999). 
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However, the direction of laterality biases in high schizotypes during face 
processing has been shown to diverge from those found in patients with 
schizophrenia. For example, Leonards and Mohr (2009) tracked participants’ 
eye movements during free-viewing of face and fractal stimuli and found that 
elevated positive schizotypy (magical ideation) was in fact associated with an 
increased bias in initial saccade landing positions towards the left side of the 
face (i.e. indicative of greater right hemisphere involvement during face 
processing). This unexpected laterality finding is in direct contrast to the clinical 
group in the Phillips and David (1997) study who demonstrated increased 
saccades to the right and therefore comparatively greater left hemisphere 
preference. 
 
3.4 Paper 3 Summary 
 
The aim of paper 3 was to further investigate the association between 
schizotypy and lateral asymmetry in gaze behaviour during face processing 
given the apparent discrepancy with clinical studies. We speculated that some 
low-level stimulus characteristics that were not matched across the face and 
non-face stimuli used by Leonards and Mohr (2009) may have confounded the 
results. An alternative explanation for their finding, for example, could be that 
high schizotypes are more sensitive than low schizotypes to the visual 
differences (e.g. in colour or shape) between faces and fractals and that it is a 
visual characteristic of the face stimuli such as their smaller size (fractals were 
larger) or their shape (faces were oval whereas fractals were rectangular) rather 
than being the fact that they are faces per se that was driving the differences in 
gaze behaviour when viewing faces as compared to fractals. In order to rule out 
possible influence of bottom-up processes, we improved the experimental 
stimuli used in the original Leonards and Mohr (2009) study by matching the 
face and fractal stimulus sets for shape, size and colour, and by using 
symmetrical rather than asymmetrical fractals in order to make them more 
“face-like”. With the improved stimuli, we attempted to replicate the somewhat 
unexpected finding that higher schizotypy scores are associated with an 
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increase in leftward initial saccade and dwell bias when viewing faces but not 
when viewing fractals. 
 In support of the Leonards and Mohr finding, there was a significant 
positive association between Magical Ideation (MI) and extent of left side bias 
for initial saccade landing points and dwell times when free-viewing faces with 
the new, improved stimuli. Also consistent with the original study, there was no 
such association when viewing the fractals. We therefore provide further 
evidence that high schizotypes’ laterality biases during face viewing are not in 
the same direction as schizophrenia patients’. We speculate that effects of 
medication on patients’ performance may, in part, explain the apparent 
discrepancy. We also postulate that the patient sample in the Phillips and David 
(1997) study predominantly suffered delusions and negative symptoms, 
whereas the high schizotypes in our sample and in the Leonards and Mohr 
(2009) sample endorsed items referring to magical ideation - these two sub-
dimensions are not qualitatively equivalent. We suggest future research 
explores the role of specific sub-dimensions of schizophrenia and schizotypy on 
face processing laterality biases.  
As an extension of the Leonards and Mohr study, the emotion depicted 
by the faces was also manipulated in order to investigate whether laterality 
biases vary as a function of emotion. Previous research suggests that laterality 
biases are systematically affected by arousal (Alfano & Cimino, 2010) and given 
the findings of paper 2 that high schizotypes were hypersensitive to angry faces 
it was possible that the laterality biases of high schizotypes may have been 
particularly sensitive to exposure to anger. However, there was no overall effect 
of emotion, nor was there any interaction between schizotypy and emotion on 
laterality biases during face processing. Paper 2 in the thesis suggests that high 
schizotypy is associated with a hypervigilance to potential threat in the 
environment resulting in a higher tolerance for falsely perceiving threat when it 
is not in fact there. However, when really exposed to angry faces as was the 
case here in paper 3, there was no measurable difference in behaviour (gaze 
biases to the left or right hemiface) between high and low schizotypes. Laterality 
biases in gaze, however, tell us very little about an individual’s subjective 
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experience of exposure to certain stimuli. A left side bias for face processing is 
consistent with the general population yet most people are unaware that they 
more frequently look initially to one side of a face than to another. In order to 
assess whether different facial emotions systematically affect the subjective 
experience of being exposed to faces would require a very different task to 
simply free-viewing faces. One way to tap into variation in the experience of 
being exposed to, for example, threatening as compared to non-threatening 
faces, could be to measure an individual’s perception of how long they were 
looking at the face for. It is possible that with a hypersensitivity to threat comes 
a tendency to overestimate exposure time- in other words some individuals may 
feel as though they are exposed to certain types of faces for longer. The final 
study in the thesis aims to explore whether an individual’s subjective experience 
of time is systematically affected by both emotion and schizotypy. 
 
4. Effects of schizotypy on time perception during exposure to emotional 
faces 
An accurate perception of time is essential to daily living (Bonnot, 2011) and 
has important implications for the subjective experience of how long we have 
been exposed to certain types of stimuli (e.g. those related to reward or threat) 
for. Importantly, research suggests that time estimates are systematically 
affected by the presence of different facial expressions (Effron et al., 2006). 
Specifically, when individuals are exposed to threat-related faces time is 
frequently overestimated – people feel as though more time has passed than 
actually has (Droit-Volet et al., 2004; Droit-Volet & Gil., 2010). Importantly, time 
perception is altered in schizophrenia as compared to healthy individuals, but 
the research in this area is limited and has arguably been neglected in recent 
years (Bonnot, 2011).  
A number of studies show that highly anxious people have attentional biases to 
angry faces- specifically they fixate threat-related stimuli such as angry faces for 
longer than controls in the initial 1800 ms of exposure (Rohner, 2002) and, 
unlike low anxious individuals, they experience difficulties disengaging visual 
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attention from threatening faces (Georgiou et al., 2005; Yiend & Mathews, 
2001). It is argued that this pattern of behaviour may serve to maintain their 
highly anxious state (see Fox, Russo & Dutton, 2002). Inaccurate time 
perception may indicate that a person feels as though they have been exposed 
to certain stimuli for longer or shorter periods than, in reality, they have been 
and this experience itself may also serve to moderate psychological states such 
as mood, anxiety and hypervigilance in the same way that increased dwell to 
threat, for example, likely serves to maintain states of anxiety. Whether 
inaccurate perception of time is involved in maintaining high arousal levels and 
a hypervigilance to threat-related stimuli, such as angry faces, in schizophrenics 
or high schizotypes has not previously been directly explored.  Given that high 
arousal levels and hypervigilance in schizophrenia are related to positive 
symptoms of the disorder (see Corcoran et al., 2003), research in this area is 
fundamental. The final section of the thesis, therefore, aims to explore the 
nature of the interface between emotion processing and time perception and 
how this may vary as a function of positive schizotypy which requires, initially, 
an understanding of the dominant models of time processing in healthy 
individuals. 
 
4.1. Models of time processing: the internal clock 
 
According to internal clock models of time perception (e.g., Gibbon et al., 1984; 
Meck & Church, 1983; Wearden, 2004; Zakay & Block, 1996), humans possess 
an “internal clock” which consists of a pacemaker, a switch or gate (see 
Lejeune, 1998 for discussion), and a time pulse accumulator. As an event to be 
timed commences, the switch or gate closes and pulses emitted from the 
pacemaker begin to collect in the accumulator. At the cessation of the timed 
event, the switch or gate opens and no more pulses accumulate. Subjective 
time is based on the quantity of pulses that have been accumulated during the 
period being timed - duration estimates increase with the number of pulses 
collected. Heightened arousal is said to increase the speed of the pacemaker 
(Noulhiane et al., 2007; Zakay, Nitzan & Glicksohn, 1983) which results in the 
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accumulation of more pulses over a given period (hence time would be 
overestimated). For example, time durations are consistently overestimated 
when individuals are exposed to arousing emotional (specifically angry and 
fearful), as compared to neutral faces during the “to be timed” interval (Droit-
Volet et al 2004; Droit-Volet & Meck & Church, 2007; Schiff & Thayer, 1970; 
Tipples, 2008).  In addition, stressful situations (in which arousal is increased) 
also result in the subjective slowing of time. For example, spider phobics 
overestimate the duration of the period that they were exposed to an image of a 
spider as compared to non-phobics (Watts and Sharrock, 1984). Furthermore, 
according to internal clock models, when attention is diverted away from timing 
the accumulation of pulses is disrupted and fewer pulses reach the accumulator 
(time is therefore underestimated).  Dual-task experiments in which a secondary 
task is introduced to divert some attention away from the primary time 
processing task offer support for this contention because in such paradigms 
time periods are typically underestimated (Thomas and Weaver, 1975; Zakay, 
1989).  
 
4.2 Effects of emotional stimuli on time judgements 
 
Experiments investigating time processing using affective stimuli such as 
expressive faces tend to support a predominant role of arousal rather than of 
attention on time processing during exposure to emotional material (e.g., Bar-
Haim et al., 2010; Effron et al., 2006; Tipples, 2008; cf. Burle and Casini, 2001). 
Time estimates tend to be exaggerated when individuals are exposed to 
emotional as compared to neutral faces during the timing interval (e.g., Effron et 
al., 2006) when exposure durations are less than 4 s (Angrilli et al., 1997) and 
overestimations tend to be greatest for threat related emotions such as anger 
and fear in both adults (Droit-Volet et al., 2004; Droit-Volet & Gil., 2010) and in 
children (Gil, Niedenthal and Droit-Volet, 2007). Individual differences also play 
a role in time estimates during the viewing of affective stimuli. For example, 
higher negative emotionality (Tipples, 2008) and increased trait anxiety (Bar-
Haim et al, 2010) both predict overestimations of time intervals, but interestingly 
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effects of these individual differences are only evident in the most arousing 
experimental condition (trials that involve exposure to threat-related faces).  
Paper 2 in the thesis provided evidence for oversensitivity to threat in 
high schizotypes (who were more likely than low schizotypes to misperceive 
neutral faces as threatening) which would suggest that these individuals may 
also be more likely than low schizotypes to overestimate the length of time that 
they are exposed to threat-related faces for. The experience of feeling exposed 
to threat in the environment for longer than controls has important implications 
for the maintenance of a sense of hypervigilance and for social functioning in 
schizotypy and schizophrenia and it is therefore surprising that time processing 
in schizotypy and, importantly how this relationship is affected by exposure to 
threat, has not previously been researched. 
 
4.3 Time processing and the schizophrenia continuum 
 
4.3.1 Time processing in schizophrenia 
It is widely accepted that the ability to estimate time periods is altered in 
schizophrenia as compared to controls (e.g., Carroll et al., 2009; Elvevag, 
McCormack, Gilbert et al., 2003; Rammsayer, 1990; Tracy et al, 1998; Tysk, 
1990; Volz et al., 2001), but the precise nature of any deficit has not been fully 
elucidated (Bonnot, 2011). It has been suggested that deficient temporal 
information processing in schizophrenia is related to, and may even underlie, 
some of the most intrusive symptoms and cognitive disturbances associated 
with the disorder (Andreassen, 1999; Volz et al, 2001) such as delusions of 
alien control, megalomania, and verbal auditory hallucinations. Specifically, it is 
argued that these experiences may be the phenomenological expression of 
dysfunctional neural timing (Carroll et al., 2009; Gallagher, 2000; Haggard et al., 
2003; Shergill et al., 2005) and temporally disordered information processing 
(Bressler, 2003; Carroll, O’Donnell et al., 2009).  Disturbances to an individual’s 
sense of agency (e.g., the failure to recognise self-generated actions as your 
own, or the belief that one’s own speech originated from an external source) are 
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some examples of symptomatic behaviour in schizophrenia that have been 
argued to derive from disorderly temporal processing on a neural level (see 
Franck, Posada et al., 2005; Shergill, 2005). This argument is consistent with 
the contention that individuals with schizophrenia have difficulty forming a 
“specious present” from which they can think forward and backward in time (see 
Allman & Meck, 2012). Without this usual sense of the present, it is unsurprising 
that difficulties mapping self-generated actions to their corresponding 
consequences emerge in individuals with schizophrenia (see Franck et al., 
2005).  
Haggard et al. (2003) asked schizophrenia patients and matched 
controls to view onscreen a clock face with a revolving hand, similar to the 
second hand on a conventional clock (see Libet et al., 1983). One revolution 
lasted 2560 ms. Participants were asked to press a key at any point after they 
had viewed one full clock hand rotation. Following the key press there was a 
250 ms delay before the “consequence” (an auditory tone) of their voluntary 
action occurred. At the end of each trial, participants were asked to verbally 
report the “time” (the position of the clock hand) when they had pressed the key, 
or to report when the tone sounded. In a second experiment a pair of auditory 
tones were played twice (with a 250 ms interval in between), and participants 
were asked to judge the time at which either the first or the second set of tones 
(depending on the trial) began to sound. For both experiments, the discrepancy 
between the perceived onset time of the event in question (key press / tone 
onset in experiment 1 or first / second tone sound in experiment 2) and the 
actual time that this event occurred was calculated. Participants consistently 
fused together action and consequence (e.g. the action was perceived to occur 
later and the consequence earlier than their actual onset times) but this 
occurred to a much greater extent in patients than controls. Importantly this 
“binding” of action and consequence was significantly more pronounced (twice 
as large) for patients in the first experiment which involved agency than in the 
second experiment which did not, implying that agency is highly involved in the 
observed “binding” effect. When the average perceptual shift in ms of the action 
towards its consequence and of the consequence towards the action that 
50 
 
  
caused it in experiment 1 were considered for both groups, the patients judged 
the 250 ms delay between the voluntary key press and the onset of the tone as 
lasting only 51 ms (60 ms delay in action awareness and 139 ms anticipatory 
awareness of the consequent tone) in contrast to controls who judged the 
duration to be 229 ms.    
Although binding experiments such as these imply a shortening of 
subjective time in patients as compared to controls, other types of temporal 
processing experiments (e.g., time production tasks) reveal a greater 
overestimation of the objective time period in patients as compared to controls. 
For example, Tracy et al. (1998) found that when asked to produce a specified 
time interval, schizophrenia patients overestimated whereas controls 
underestimated the given duration. Similarly, Wahl and Sieg (1980) report 
systematic overestimation of temporal durations by patients on a verbal time 
estimation task. However, not all studies of time perception in schizophrenia 
have reported overestimation. For example, Tysk (1983) and Penney, Meck, 
Roberts et al. (2005) both report an underestimation, whereas Carroll, 
O’Donnell et al. (2009) found no significant difference in time estimates. One 
possible explanation for discrepant findings is that a vast range of different 
paradigms are considered to tap into “temporal processing” (Davalos et al., 
2011). For example, some tasks require visual processing during the timing 
intervals whereas others require auditory signals to be processed; different 
paradigms may require prospective or retrospective time estimates; the time 
intervals used across studies are not standardised; some tasks require 
voluntary action and others do not require agency. This last point is expanded 
by Haggard et al. (2003) who propose that tasks focussed on perception result 
in a lengthening of subjective time, whereas those requiring action have the 
opposite effect thus shortening subjective time estimates (see also Franck, 
Posada et al., 2005).  
 
Individuals with schizophrenia display a number of behaviours that would 
suggest they might be particularly susceptible to arousal effects on time 
perception, and that the extent of these effects may depend on the nature of 
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their positive symptoms. For example, Williams et al. (2004) found that 
individuals with paranoid schizophrenia displayed much higher skin 
conductance (a measure of arousal) to threat-related faces than did matched 
controls which might predict a greater arousal based “slowing” of subjective 
time in these individuals compared with matched controls. Similar heightened 
arousal responses to threat-related stimuli by schizophrenia patients have also 
been reported by, among others, Kring and Neale (1996). Heightened anxiety 
and arousal is not just predictive of altered time perception. Delespaul et al. 
(2002) report that state arousal and anxiety are particularly strong predictors of 
the occurrence and intensity of hallucination, again suggesting that there is an 
association between arousal, time processing, and positive symptoms of 
schizophrenia. Experiments designed specifically to assess how 
symptomatology, time processing and arousal interact are required if we are to 
fully understand the role of altered time processing in symptom exacerbation / 
maintenance, and importantly if we are to design interventions aimed at 
ameliorating the oversensitivity to threat and enduring sense of impending 
danger that many individuals with schizophrenia frequently experience. 
 
 
4.3.2 Time processing and schizotypy 
 
As argued previously, studies using non-clinical samples are potentially very 
informative in tapping into the cognitive mechanisms underlying altered time 
perception in schizophrenia not least because a number of confounds that pose 
problems for clinical studies can be avoided when non-clinical samples are 
used instead. However, no study has set out to explore how schizotypy is 
related to time processing during exposure to threat and non-threatening 
stimuli. One study, however, has more broadly considered time processing per 
se in schizophrenia using non-clinical samples- Lee et al. (2006) recorded time 
estimations by healthy students classified as high or low schizotypes (based on 
their scores on the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire- SPQ) using a time 
bisection task in which participants were asked to categorise auditory tones 
lasting between 1000 ms and 2000 ms as closer to a probe short (1000 ms) or 
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long (2000 ms) anchor duration. Bisection points (the tone duration giving rise 
to 50% “long” responses) were obtained for each participant. Analysis of 
bisection points revealed that high as compared to low SPQ scorers 
significantly underestimated the duration of the auditory tones. This 
underestimation of time by high SPQ scorers is consistent with findings from 
binding experiments, as previously discussed, in which individuals with 
schizophrenia tend to underestimate the intervening time between action and 
effect. However, it is unclear whether similar results would be obtained if the 
task focussed on the visual rather than on the auditory modality. In addition, 
since auditory tones were used in the Lee et al. (2006) study there was no 
scope to explore the influence of exposure to social threat on an individual’s 
experience of time. 
 
4.4 Paper 4 Summary 
 
Following on from the established links between schizophrenia pathology 
(specifically positive symptoms), increased arousal and altered temporal 
information processing, and from the results of paper 2 in the thesis that reveal 
an oversensitivity to threat in high schizotypes, the aim of the final paper in the 
thesis was to explore the relationship between schizotypy and time processing 
and how exposure to social threat may moderate this relationship. Specifically, 
this last study was designed to investigate whether high positive as compared 
to low positive schizotypes present with altered time processing, and whether 
there is an interaction between schizotypy and exposure to threat on time 
processing such that the duration judgements made by the high schizotypes are 
particularly susceptible to alteration by threat exposure. This may provide 
another (as in paper 2 in the thesis) indication of oversensitivity to threat in high 
schizotypy, but this time highlighting how this oversensitivity to threat manifests 
itself in everyday experience (e.g., the subjective feeling of being exposed to 
threat in the environment may vary by schizotypy with some individuals feeling 
as though they are under threat for longer). In order to assess whether there is 
any effect of threat exposure on time perception, we manipulated the threat-
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relevance of the exposure stimuli by using happy, angry, fearful and neutral 
faces, with presentation of angry faces providing a condition in which 
participants are exposed to social threat. No other study to date has set out to 
investigate the relationship between schizotypy, time processing and exposure 
to social threat. 
 
We used a time reproduction task in which, on each trial, participants 
viewed a happy, angry, fearful or neutral face for exposure durations of between 
1 and 5 seconds. The face then disappeared and participants were asked to 
reproduce the time period that the face was present for with a spacebar press. 
Higher scores on a measure of hallucination proneness were associated with 
longer time estimates, but only during exposure to the angry faces. It appears 
then that when exposed to social threat, individuals susceptible to hallucinations 
feel exposed to the threat for longer than controls. It is argued that this 
experience itself may serve to maintain a state of hypervigilance which has 
been shown previously to be associated with positive symptoms of 
schizophrenia. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The thesis set out to explore the limits of facial emotion processing in healthy 
individuals, and how facial emotion processing is affected by individual 
differences in schizotypal personality traits. The literature on emotion 
processing deficits in schizophrenia is inconsistent and it was argued that this 
may reflect the fact that it is extremely difficult to obtain “clean” data from 
schizophrenia samples due to the many confounding variables associated with 
research with individuals affected by severe psychopathology. As argued in the 
general introduction section of the overview and elsewhere, there is a 
widespread consensus that a continuum of liability for schizophrenia exists, 
such that the disorder can be expressed in ways other than full-blown 
schizophrenia. The use of non-clinical samples varying in schizotypy, therefore, 
provides a valid means of testing the same liability, albeit attenuated and non-
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psychotic that is at the root of schizophrenia psychopathology (Lenzenweger, 
2010). Unlike research with schizophrenia patients, the data derived from 
schizotypy samples is not confounded by the effects of severe psychopathology 
and generalised neuropsychological deterioration, medication, hospitalization, 
low motivation and so forth. 
The first section of the thesis focussed on the limits of healthy individuals’ 
ability to accurately interpret facial emotion. This ability to correctly identify and 
appropriately respond to facial emotion is crucial for interpersonal 
communication and general social being, and our capacity to correctly interpret 
threat-related expressions has obvious adaptive value. Furthermore, in order to 
understand the mechanisms behind sub-optimal facial emotion processing it is 
useful to gain a thorough understanding of the maximum extent of intact facial 
emotion processing. Using eye tracking techniques to explore these limits, it 
was shown that the intact human brain is so specialised for facial emotion 
processing that it is possible to discriminate between nonfoveal emotional and 
neutral facial expressions so rapidly that this information can be used to 
selectively speed up prosaccades to the abrupt luminance changes that are co-
located with emotional but not neutral faces. Furthermore, this happens even 
when the emotional face stimuli are task-irrelevant, located well into peripheral 
vision (where visual acuity is considerably compromised), and when the faces 
and the saccade cue appear simultaneously allowing no “extra” time to process 
the faces before saccade programming commences in response to the 
luminance change saccade cue.  
 These findings are consistent with Nummenmaa et al. (2009) who 
reported a facilitative effect of complex emotional but not neutral scenes on 
prosaccades. In contrast to the complex emotional and neutral scenes used in 
the Nummenmaa et al. (2009) study, the stimuli used here were very simple 
images of faces depicting emotional or neutral expression. The use of more 
simple emotional and neutral stimuli allowed for more careful control of the 
visual differences between stimuli falling with and between the different affect 
conditions because all faces share the same constituent parts regardless of 
expression whereas two scenes varying in emotional content are likely to be far 
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more visually distinct. Despite the fact that, visually, the difference between an 
emotional and a neutral face is considerably more subtle than the difference 
between a positive/negative and a neutral natural scene, a facilitative effect on 
saccade latencies to emotional as compared to neutral faces was still observed. 
In addition, this facilitative effect of emotional as compared to neutral faces on 
prosaccades persisted even when the face stimuli were presented well into 
peripheral locations (at even greater distal eccentricities than in the 
Nummenmaa et al. (2009) study). Since the faces were presented nonfoveally, 
and the facilitative effect of emotional faces on prosaccades was apparent even 
with a 0 ms stimulus asynchrony between the presentation of the faces and the 
co-located cue, it was proposed that covert (without moving the eyes) shifts of 
attention towards the parafoveal emotional faces were driving the speeding 
effect on saccades towards emotional faces. This first paper presented in the 
thesis provides a timely demonstration that the ability to identify and respond to 
those very subtle differences between faces depicting different expressions is 
possible even when the faces are presented 12⁰ to the left or right of fixation 
thus relying on information extracted from covert shifts of attention towards the 
faces. Interesting questions arise about exactly which aspects of the emotional 
faces were gleaned from these covert attention shifts and then used to speed 
up prosaccades to the co-located cue. Future research in this area could 
attempt to establish whether the facilitative effect of emotional faces relies on a 
crude representation of the entire face or a featural analysis of the face, 
extracting selective information from isolated face regions (e.g. those features 
with learned significance for emotion recognition). This could be achieved by 
presenting degraded and non-degraded faces as stimuli and assessing whether 
the same facilitative effect of emotional faces on prosaccades emerges when 
degraded face stimuli are presented (which would offer some support for a 
crude representation of the stimuli driving the facilitation). Furthermore, it would 
be interesting to see whether the same prosaccade facilitation is observed 
when isolated features of emotional versus neutral faces are presented as 
stimuli as opposed to whole faces. An example of this would be to just present 
the eyes or the mouth of fearful and neutral faces as stimuli- if specific elements 
of the faces are capturing covert attention and subsequently speeding up 
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prosaccades to co-located cues, then the same speeding effect to emotional as 
compared to neutral features of faces might be observed for specific facial 
features and not for others. Studies like these would further elucidate the 
mechanisms underlying our highly evolved ability to respond to emotional faces. 
There is certainly scope to improve the set of studies presented in the first 
paper of this thesis. Firstly, the error rates across the three experiments were low and 
as a result it was not possible to analyse error patterns. The experimental design 
could therefore be improved (perhaps with a less salient saccade cue, for example) 
so that the experiments generate a higher number of error saccades- analysing 
capture errors, for example, would be particularly interesting. Perhaps there were 
more error saccades to emotional faces when the cue was co-located with the neutral 
face in the pair, which would suggest that attention is drawn preferentially towards 
emotional faces even when completely task irrelevant and when competing against a 
task-relevant abrupt luminance change for visual attention. Additionally, the second 
study presented in paper 1 in this thesis only considered neutral and fearful faces 
since there was no evidence from experiment 1 that certain emotions exerted a 
greater influence on prosaccade latencies than others. However, it is possible that 
with the faces presented at greater distal eccentricities in the second study in paper 1, 
that some differences between emotions may have emerged. Recent research has 
found that the amygdala responds to the presentation of threat related stimuli 
presented outside of the focus of attention, and importantly, it is activated by low 
spatial frequency information (Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver and Dolan, 2003). The 
inclusion of emotional faces depicting expressions other than fear in the second 
experiment (in which the stimuli were presented up to 12⁰ away from central fixation) 
may have revealed a greater congruency advantage for threat-related emotional (e.g. 
fearful or angry) over non-threat related emotional faces (e.g., happy or sad) at those 
most extreme locations.  
Taken together, the findings from the set of experiments presented in paper 1 
of this thesis support previous research that suggests facial affect can be processed 
extremely rapidly even when the faces are presented nonfoveally. The results 
presented in this paper were, however, the first demonstration that emotional faces 
presented 12 degrees peripherally can still exert influence on the very early stages of 
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saccade programming- i.e., when there is no interval between the presentation of the 
face stimuli and the onset of the saccade cue.  
The remaining studies explored the relationship between emotion 
processing accuracy and individual differences in schizotypy. Those who scored 
highly on measures of hallucination proneness were less accurate at identifying 
happy, angry and fearful faces and also more likely to misattribute anger to 
neutral faces. The finding that non-threatening faces were more frequently 
misperceived as angry by those with increased as compared to low liability for 
visual hallucinations supports previous research (e.g., Brown and Cohen, 2010) 
and is consistent with the predictions of continuum models of visual 
hallucinatory experiences. The finding was discussed in terms of 
“hypervigilance hallucinations”, a theory postulated by Dodgson and Gordon 
(2009) that contends that hallucinations may result from an over-tolerance for 
false positive errors during threat-detection.  
This finding that high schizotypes are more likely than low schizotypes to falsely 
perceive threat on neutral faces suggests that these individuals are 
hypersensitive to threat in the environment. Therapeutic interventions aimed at 
increasing tolerance for potential threats in individuals with schizophrenia may 
prove to be effective in reducing the frequency and perhaps even the intensity 
(given that the theme of psychopathological hallucinations is often hostile- see 
Nayani and David, 1996) of symptomatic hallucinatory experiences. This study 
could be improved in a number of ways, including increasing the number of 
trials in each block and including a measure of handedness to control for those 
individuals with anomalous cerebral asymmetry (which would strengthen the 
analysis of lateral asymmetry in facial emotion misperception). 
Given the results of this second paper, a further experiment was 
designed to assess differences in the subjective experience of exposure to 
threat in the environment between high and low schizotypes. This study 
revealed that higher hallucination proneness was associated with longer time 
estimates, but only during exposure to the angry faces during the exposure 
period. This study therefore provides further evidence that high as compared to 
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low schizotypes are more hypersensitive to social threat – high schizotypes feel 
as though they have been exposed to angry faces for longer, an experience that 
possibly serves to maintain hypervigilance to social threat and that may even 
contribute to the increased tendency to falsely perceive threat (e.g., an angry 
face) in the environment. This finding implies that the effectiveness of 
therapeutic intervention aimed at ameliorating positive symptoms in 
schizophrenia may be improved with increased focus on reducing the 
hypersensitivity to threat that is associated with schizophrenia. In order to 
further elucidate the role of threat hypersensitivity in time overestimation, it 
would be interesting to assess whether initially desensitizing participants to the 
threatening face stimuli attenuates the overestimation of time in high as 
compared to low schizotypes. It would also be interesting to track participants’ 
eye movements during this task to investigate whether high and low 
schizotypes vary systematically in terms of which facial features they 
predominantly dwell on during exposure to the face stimuli and whether 
increased dwell to or even avoidance of particular features (e.g., the eyes of 
angry faces) correlates with time overestimation. 
Finally, given the inconsistency in the schizophrenia literature concerning 
laterality biases during face perception in schizophrenia and schizotypy a 
further study in this thesis attempted to elucidate the relationship between 
schizotypy and laterality biases during face processing. Contrary to the 
predictions of continuum models of schizophrenia, higher magical ideation 
score predicted a greater leftward bias for initial saccades and for dwell times to 
faces presented centrally onscreen. This finding was consistent with the first 
report by Leonards and Mohr (2009) of this unexpected directional bias. The 
finding is nevertheless contrary to continuum models of psychosis– a left-side 
bias for face processing is in agreement with the general population, whereas 
schizophrenia is associated with a rightward or indeed no bias for face viewing. 
More studies, considering a wider variety of schizotypy measures, are required 
to further understand the increased left-side bias observed in high schizotypes 
and how this relates to the schizophrenia literature. It was speculated that 
issues equating clinical and non-clinical samples across studies (in terms of 
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appropriately matching schizotypal traits with their corresponding 
psychopathological symptoms or symptom profiles) combined with potential 
confounding effects of medication may, at least partially, explain the 
discrepancy. The study could therefore have been improved by using 
schizotypy measures more carefully matched to the original clinical study by 
Phillips and David (1997) reporting the increased rightward bias in initial 
saccades during face processing in individuals with schizophrenia. 
There are some more general improvements / extensions that could be 
applied to all experiments presented in this thesis to strengthen the studies. 
Firstly, considering a broader range of schizotypy measures and how specific 
combinations / clusters of these scores interact to affect emotion processing 
ability across the range of tasks would help to elucidate whether emotion 
processing impairments in schizophrenia are linked with particular symptoms / 
symptom profiles and would provide a fuller understanding of the disorder. In 
addition, throughout the thesis it is assumed that the way that individuals 
process pictures of emotive faces in a laboratory setting is representative of 
how the same individual processes real faces in natural settings. It would be 
particularly interesting to replicate the studies with more ecologically valid face 
stimuli such as photographs of natural rather than posed expressions and video 
images of emotional expression rather than static images in order to ensure that 
any differences in emotion processing ability observed in laboratory settings 
have external validity. Perhaps, for example, the differences in emotion 
processing observed between high and low schizotypes are in part driven by 
the inherent unnaturalness of the posed face stimuli, and as a result the 
observed differences in emotion processing impairment across the 
schizophrenia spectrum may vary with the use of more natural stimuli.   
In summary, the thesis set out to explore the relationship between 
individual differences in schizotypy and facial emotion processing. The series of 
papers presented offer partial support for the hypothesis of continuity between 
the impairments in emotion discrimination observed in individuals with 
schizophrenia, and normal, healthy variation in facial emotion processing. The 
main finding to emerge was that high as compared to low schizotypes are 
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particularly hypervigilant to social threat, and that this state appears to manifest 
itself in an increased tendency to misattribute anger to emotionally neutral faces 
and to experience time as slowing down during exposure to angry faces. It has 
been argued in this thesis that these experiences may themselves serve to 
maintain symptoms such as paranoia and visual hallucinations in schizophrenia 
patients. Further research projects aimed at investigating whether interventions 
which target a reduction in threat hypervigilance result in improved emotion 
processing ability, and in turn social functioning, in individuals with 
schizophrenia are strongly encouraged.     
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1. The influence of extrafoveal emotional faces on prosaccade latencies 
 
1.1 Abstract 
Across three experiments we sought to determine whether extrafoveally 
presented emotional faces are processed sufficiently rapidly to influence 
saccade programming. Two rectangular targets containing a neutral and an 
emotional face were presented either side of a central fixation cross. 
Participants made prosaccades towards an abrupt luminance change to the 
border of one of the rectangles. The faces appeared 150 ms before or 
simultaneously with the cue. Saccades were faster towards cued rectangles 
containing emotional compared to neutral faces even when the rectangles were 
positioned 12 degrees from the fixation cross. When faces were inverted, the 
facilitative effect of emotion only emerged in the -150 ms SOA condition, 
possibly reflecting a shift from configural to featural face processing. Together 
the results suggest that the human brain is highly specialized for processing 
emotional information and responds very rapidly to the brief presentation of 
expressive faces, even when these are located outside foveal vision. 
 
Keywords: attention, cognitive control, emotion, eye movements, saccade 
programming 
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1.2 Introduction 
Converging evidence suggests that emotional stimuli are preferentially processed (for 
reviews see Compton, 2003; Palermo and Rhodes, 2007; Vuilleumier, 2005) in that 
they both attract attention more rapidly (e.g., Lavie, Ro and Russell, 2003; Morand, 
Grosbras, Caldara and Harvey, 2010) and retain attention for longer (Bindeman, 
Burton and Jenkins, 2005; Georgiou, Bleakley, Hayward et al., 2005) than do non-
emotional stimuli. Furthermore, the findings of a number of studies imply that the 
human brain is capable of processing emotional stimuli “pre-attentively” (see LeDoux, 
1996; Morris, Öhman and Dolan, 1998; Öhman, 2002; Williams et al., 2006; and for a 
review see Tamietto and De Gelder, 2010).  
The fact that the brain appears able to rapidly direct attention towards 
emotional stimuli raises interesting questions about the extent to which emotional 
stimuli that fall in peripheral (non-foveal) vision are processed, given the steep decline 
in visual acuity that occurs as stimuli are located more eccentrically. Several studies 
have sought to determine this by presenting such stimuli at different peripheral 
locations. For example, rapid eye movements towards a cue that could appear in one 
of two opposite hemifields (these types of eye movements are known as 
“prosaccades”- see Richards, 2003) are faster to positive emotional scenes than to 
neutral scenes presented 4.1˚ to the left or right of a central fixation cross (Kissler and 
Keil, 2008). In addition, De Cesarei, Codispoti and Schupp (2009) report that 
passively viewed emotional scenes presented as briefly as 24 ms, and positioned 
non-foveally up to 8.2˚ from fixation can elicit modulation of the electrical activity 
(event related potentials) generated by the brain during the experimental trials. 
Comparable modulation did not occur for neutral scenes presented at the same 
eccentricity, suggesting that the emotional content of a scene can be encoded (or that 
some discrimination between emotional and neutral scenes can occur) even when 
scenes are presented up to 8.2˚ from fixation.  
It is generally agreed that a combination of both exogenous factors (such as a 
sudden change in luminance) and endogenous factors (such as expectations or 
memories of an object’s location) combine to influence the allocation of attention to 
specific scene regions (see Hutton, 2008 for a review). Given that the exogenous 
properties of the visual scene that feed into saccade programming are, by their very 
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nature, being processed in non-foveal areas of the retina, a key question for 
researchers is what types of information can be extracted from peripheral vision and 
then used to guide saccades. Nummenmaa, Calvo and Hyöna (2009) directly 
investigated the extent to which extrafoveally presented emotional scenes influence 
saccade programming. An initial screen consisted of a central fixation cross with a 
rectangle either side. Participants fixated the central cross until they saw a cue (an 
abrupt luminance change to the outline of one of the rectangles). They were asked to 
look as quickly as possible to this cue (make a prosaccade). Either simultaneously 
with or 150 ms before the cue occurred, images of natural scenes appeared inside 
both rectangles. One of the scenes was always emotional (positive or negative) and 
the other always neutral. Nummenmaa et al. (2009) found that prosaccades were 
faster to cued rectangles containing emotional (positive or negative) scenes 
(congruent trials) than neutral scenes (incongruent trials) even at 0 ms stimulus onset 
asynchrony (SOA). It was argued that the content of emotional information presented 
in peripheral vision can be encoded prior to saccade onset, and that this early 
acquisition of information from stimuli that have not yet been fixated can influence the 
latencies of prosaccadic eye movements towards a simultaneous exogenous cue.  
The stimuli used by Nummenmaa et al. (2009) were complex emotional 
(positive or negative) and neutral scenes taken from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS) (Lang, Bradley and Cuthbert, 2005). Given that visual acuity 
diminishes rapidly with increasing eccentricity from the point of fixation, their finding 
begs the question as to exactly what information was extracted from the peripherally 
presented scenes that led to the facilitation of saccades. The “emotional” IAPS 
scenes used in the study vary greatly in terms of their content, and indeed the 
emotions they portray and elicit. Furthermore, complex emotional scenes used to 
evoke the same emotional response (e.g., fear) can vary greatly in their content. Two 
scenes that are equally fear-eliciting and “threatening” in nature, may be visually very 
distinct from each other, and it is not clear whether the decrease in prosaccade 
latencies in the congruent trials is the result of a rapid “gist” based representation of 
the entire scene or a more detailed perception of a specific feature within the scene 
(such as a weapon, for example) (see Wolfe, 1998).  The Nummenmaa et al. (2009) 
study found no effect of emotional valence- saccades were faster to both positive and 
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negative emotional images compared to neutral images, and it is unclear whether the 
saccadic facilitation they observed is moderated by specific emotions or by how 
threatening the scenes were. 
Many studies that have explored how the brain processes emotional 
information have used emotional faces rather than emotional scenes as stimuli. There 
is considerable converging evidence that face information is processed in dedicated 
brain areas such as the fusiform face area (see e.g., Rhodes, Byatt, Michie and Puce, 
2004). In addition, faces appear to attract attention particularly rapidly – for example, 
Crouzet, Kirchener and Thorpe (2010) found that participants could initiate saccades 
towards faces in less than 150 ms after image onset and Devue, Belopolsky and 
Theeuwes (2012) have shown that irrelevant faces can capture eye movements 
during a simple visual search task. Faces have a number of advantages over 
complex scenes - unlike the IAPS scenes, faces depicting specific emotions have 
characteristic visual properties. For example, fearful faces have widened eyes and 
angry faces have contracted eyebrows allowing for more control in matching the 
appearance of the stimuli used within and between different affect conditions. In 
addition, emotions such as anger, fear, happiness (Ekman, 1999) and more complex 
emotions such as anxiety (Perkins, Inchley-Mort, Pickering et al., 2012) can be 
universally recognised from facial expression. In contrast, the same universal 
labelling of certain scenes as being associated with unique emotions does not exist- a 
scene may be considered disgusting by one person but not another. Finally, both 
emotional and neutral faces consist of the same basic constituent parts (e.g., two 
eyes, one nose, one mouth etc.), whereas emotional and neutral scenes can vary 
dramatically in constitution potentially resulting in significant difference in the content 
of scenes that fall within the same or different affect categories. In contrast, the 
variation in image properties between neutral and emotional faces is considerably 
more subtle than differences between neutral and emotional scenes. A tiny alteration 
to a person’s mouth, for example, could completely change the emotion portrayed. It 
is currently unclear whether information about these very subtle changes to the 
configuration of facial features can be extracted from extrafoveal locations in the 
same way as the “gist” of complex scenes appears to be extracted from peripheral 
vision in the Nummenmaa et al. (2009) study. 
90 
 
  
Nummenmaa et al. (2009) found that complex emotional scenes positioned 2.5 
degrees to the left or to the right of a central fixation cross speeded up prosaccades 
to co-located targets when the scenes and saccade cue were presented 
simultaneously. In the current set of experiments we present task-irrelevant faces 
much further (6 degrees in experiment 1, and 4 or 12 degrees in experiments 2 and 
3) from foveal vision. In order to determine whether specific emotions (as opposed to 
less specific differences between positive and negative valence) differ in their ability 
to influence prosaccade latency, we compared the effect of happy, angry and fearful 
versus neutral faces in our first experiment.  It was predicted that saccade latencies to 
cues containing emotional faces would be faster than prosaccades to cues containing 
neutral faces. Saccade latencies were expected to be shorter in the -150 ms condition 
compared to in the 0 ms condition irrespective of whether an emotional or a neutral 
face is cued because the appearance of the faces serves as a warning for the onset 
of the cue in the -150 ms condition (see e.g., Ross & Ross, 1981). 
 
1.3 Experiment 1 
1.3.1 Method 
Participants.    37 healthy participants (22 female; mean age 24 years) took part in the 
experiment. All participants were students at Sussex University and received either 
course credit or payment for their participation.  All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal visual acuity.  The study was approved by the University of 
Sussex Psychology and Life Sciences Research Ethics Committee. 
Apparatus.    Stimuli were presented on a 21-inch Sony CRT monitor with the refresh 
rate set to 60 Hz. Participants’ eye movements were recorded using an EyeLink II 
lightweight, head-mounted eye tracker (SR Research, Ontario). The EyeLink II was 
set to monitor eye position at a rate of 500 Hz and has an average accuracy of 0.5˚. 
Eye event detection is based on an internal heuristic saccade detector built in the 
EyeLink tracker program. To detect a saccade, for each data sample, the built-in 
event parser computes instantaneous velocity and acceleration and a saccade is 
detected when these values exceed 30 degrees per second or 8500 degrees per 
second squared for two or more samples. A blink is defined as a period of saccade-
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detector activity with the pupil data missing for three or more samples in a sequence. 
Trials in which a blink obscured the primary saccade following target onset were 
excluded from analysis. 
Materials.    The face stimuli were sixteen greyscale photographs (transformed into 
JPEGs) selected from the Ekman and Friesen Pictures of Facial Affect (Ekman and 
Friesen, 1976). Each model appeared in four different photographs, one per facial 
expression considered (happy, angry, fearful and neutral).  To ensure that low-level 
image characteristics would not confound the results, image statistics were obtained 
using MATLAB 7.0 (Math Works, Natick, MA) for the selected Ekman faces and the 
low-level visual properties of each were compared. One-way ANOVAs were run for 
each low-level image characteristic (contrast, luminance, energy, and root-mean-
square) to assess whether any image property varied systematically with facial 
expression. None of the image characteristics varied by emotion (all Fs ≤ .882, all p 
values > .10).  
Stimulus displays.    The initial display screen consisted of a horizontally and vertically 
centred white circular (unfilled) fixation target (1.5˚ in diameter) along with two 
vertically centred white (unfilled) rectangles, one positioned 2.5˚ to the right and the 
other 2.5˚ to the left of the central fixation point (measurement taken from centre of 
the fixation circle to the inner edge of the rectangle). These landscape oriented 
rectangles formed the saccade target areas and subtended visual angles of 10.54˚ x 
7.98˚. The background colour was black. The imperative signal to the cued saccade 
target area was a change to the colour of the border of one of the rectangles from 
white to orange. The Ekman faces (oval cropped to remove non-facial information 
and placed on a black background) that appeared inside the saccade targets 
subtended 10.24˚ x 7.68˚. These distracter images filled the saccade target area but 
did not obscure the outline of the rectangle. Face pairs always consisted of one male 
and one female actor, and of one neutral face alongside either a fearful, happy or 
angry face. 
Design.    The experiment had a within subjects 2 (SOA: -150 ms or 0 ms) X 2 
(Congruence: congruent when the cued rectangle contained an emotional face or 
incongruent when the cued rectangle contained a neutral face) X 3 (Emotion: happy, 
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angry, fearful) design. The key dependent variable was time (in ms) taken to initiate a 
saccade to the cued target. 
Procedure.      After providing their informed consent to participate, the participants 
were seated approximately 60 cm from the monitor, the head-mounted eye tracker 
was fitted, and a brief calibration procedure was performed to ensure that the eye-
tracker was accurate to at least the nearest 0.5˚.  Before the experiment began, an 
instruction screen was presented to participants that explained that their task was to 
focus on the central fixation point at the start of every trial until the border of one of 
the two rectangles changed from white to orange at which point they should look as 
quickly as possible to the centre of the cued rectangle. Participants were also 
informed that some pictures would appear inside the rectangular frames, but that 
these had nothing to do with their task. Participants completed 12 practice trials 
before moving on to the experimental trials. 
All trials began after a brief drift correction procedure. At this point a random delay 
between 0 and 100 ms (to reduce anticipations) was implemented. Then, in the 0 ms 
SOA trials the two face images appeared inside the two rectangular borders and 
simultaneously one of the rectangle borders turned orange. On trials with -150 ms 
SOAs, after the initial random delay the face picture appeared inside the rectangles 
and then 150 ms (9 retraces) later one of the rectangle borders turned orange.  All 
trials timed out 1350 ms (81 retraces) after the onset of the imperative signal. At this 
point the initial display screen consisting of the fixation circle and the two rectangle 
frames (one either side) reappeared and the proceeding trial commenced again with 
the drift correct procedure. See figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: Sequence of events over time for a congruent trial with either a 0 ms or a     
-150 ms SOA 
 
There were 192 experimental trials- 64 trials for each of the emotions (angry, fearful 
and happy) which were always paired with a neutral face. Half of the trials had a 0 ms 
SOA and half had a -150 ms SOA.  The visual field to which the emotional and 
neutral face pictures were presented was counterbalanced across trials. Additionally, 
the visual field to which the male and female models in each picture pair were 
presented to was also counterbalanced across trials, as was cue side. Trials were 
presented to participants in random order and split into three blocks of 64 trials each. 
At the end of blocks one and two, the eye tracker was recalibrated.   
Before leaving, all participants were fully debriefed about the hypotheses under 
investigation. 
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1.3.2 Results and discussion 
Hierarchical linear modelling.    In traditional statistical analyses the performance 
indices of interest (e.g., reaction times) are obtained by aggregating scores across 
trials of a given type for each participant. The means obtained from such aggregation 
are given equal weight in subsequent analyses despite the fact that the number of 
trials these means are based upon could vary greatly between participants and 
consequently loss of potentially interesting trial level information can occur. 
Traditional statistical approaches therefore are not ideal when data are multilevel, as 
they are here, with trials (level 1) nested within participants (level 2). Multilevel 
modelling approaches (Byrk and Raudenbush, 1992; Goldstein, 1995; Hox, 2002) 
allow each trial to be treated as an individual data point (avoiding aggregation) nested 
within a participant.  
The basic multilevel model (adapted from Hox, 2002): 
yij = 0j+1jXij+eij 
where 0j is the usual regression intercept, 1j is the regression coefficient for the 
explanatory variable X and eij is the residual error term. The subscript j is for level 2, 
the person level (j = 1…J) and the subscript i is for level 1, the trial level (i=1…nj). It is 
assumed that each person has a different intercept coefficient and a different slope 
coefficient (the j subscripts attached to the coefficients) and as such they are referred 
to as random coefficients (in standard analyses these coefficients are assumed not to 
vary). The explanatory trial-level variables are assumed here to be constant across 
participants (level 2 units). The residual error eij is generally assumed in multilevel 
models to have a mean of zero and an estimated variance. 
All of the explanatory variables in the current analyses are at the trial level. It is 
possible in multilevel analyses to additionally consider explanatory variables at level 2 
(here the person level), as well as interactions between level 1 and level 2 
explanatory variables (cross-level interactions). For example, it would be possible to 
use multilevel modelling to consider individual differences in arousal (person level) 
and how this variable interacts with, for example, trial congruency (level 1), but this 
was not required for the purposes of the current experiments. 
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All multilevel analyses were carried out in the current experiments using HLM (version 
6.04, SSI, Chicago). Significance tests were conducted using model deviance 
statistics that follow a chi-square distribution (with q degrees of freedom, where q is 
the difference in the number of parameters between the two nested models being 
compared). The variable of interest is always excluded from the reduced model. 
Participants made faster prosaccades when the face appeared 150 ms compared to 0 
ms before the target 2 = 1050.69, p < .0001. Prosaccade latencies were faster when 
emotional faces appeared at the cued location compared to neutral faces 2 = 6.51, p 
< .05. This effect was observed for both 0 and -150 SOAs. No other interactions or 
effects of emotion reached significance (all p values >.05). Prosaccade error rate was 
low (<5%) precluding any analysis of the effects of emotion or SOA on errors. Results 
are presented in figure 2 below. 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean saccade latencies for congruent and incongruent trials at both 0 ms 
and -150 ms SOAs split by emotion block (error bars represent SEs).  
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The results of experiment 1 replicate the Nummenmaa et al. (2009) finding that 
emotional information can be resolved sufficiently rapidly to speed prosaccades to 
target areas that contain emotional as compared to neutral information. Here we 
show that this effect extends to face stimuli in which the differences between the 
neutral and emotional stimuli are far more subtle than differences between scenes of 
contrasting valence. Consistent with Nummenmaa et al.’s results there was no 
systematic effect of emotion type on prosaccades, which raises interesting questions 
about what information is being resolved to speed prosaccades only to expressive 
faces, but not to neutral faces.  
Given decreasing acuity with distance from the fovea, the aim of experiment 2 was to 
ascertain whether the congruency effect found in experiment 1 persists even when 
the face stimuli are presented at greater distal eccentricities. Since there was no 
effect of specific emotions on prosaccade latencies in experiment 1, we only used 
fearful faces as the “emotional” stimuli in experiment 2. This decision was guided by 
reports of a facilitative effect of fear on early visual processing (e.g., Phelps, Ling and 
Carrasco, 2006) as well as by the fact that presenting only the eyes of fearful faces 
for as little as 17 ms activates a greater response in the amygdala compared to when 
eyes from happy faces are presented. It was predicted that emotional faces 
presented closer to foveal vision would impact more on prosaccade performance than 
would the same stimuli presented further from fixation due to diminishing acuity at 
greater eccentricities from fixation. 
 
1.4 Experiment 2 
The apparatus used in experiment 2 was identical to those used in experiment 1. 
However, in order to assess whether the eccentricity of the target location affects 
prosaccades, some changes were made to the stimulus displays that were used in 
experiment 1. These are described below and illustrated in figure 3. 
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1.4.1 Method 
Participants.    44 healthy participants (26 female; mean age 25 years) took part in 
experiment 2. All participants were students at Sussex University, had not taken part 
in experiment 1, and received either course credit or payment for their participation.  
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.  The study was 
approved by the University of Sussex Psychology and Life Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee. 
Apparatus.    Identical to experiment 1. 
Stimulus displays.   In the near condition the inner edge of the rectangular frames 
were positioned 4˚ from the central fixation point. In the far condition the distance 
between the central fixation target and the inner edge of the rectangle was 12˚. In 
order to allow for this degree of eccentricity from the central target in the far condition, 
the rectangles in experiment 2 were resized to subtend visual angles of 7.14˚ x 7.95˚. 
The emotional images used (pairs of Ekman faces) and their size (6.84˚ x 7.65˚.) 
remained the same as in experiment 1, see figure 3 below. 
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Figure 3: Stimulus displays in experiment 1 (left) and in experiment 2 near (right, 
upper) and far (right, lower) conditions. 
 
Design.    The experiment had a within subjects 2 (SOA: -150 ms or 0 ms) X 2 
(Congruence: congruent when cued rectangle contained an emotional face or 
incongruent when the cued rectangle contained a neutral face) X 2 (Target location: 
near or far from centre fixation target) design. Near and far trials were intermixed. 
The dependent variable was the time taken to initiate a saccade to the cued 
rectangle. 
Procedure.    The procedure was the same as in experiment 1 except for the following 
differences. The experiment had 192 experimental trials each consisting of a fearful 
face in one saccade target area and a neutral face in the other. On half of the trials 
both of the saccade target areas were close to the central fixation point and on half of 
the trials the two saccade targets were far (towards the outer edges of the screen) 
from the central fixation point. 
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1.4.2 Results and discussion 
As in experiment 1, the effects of congruence and SOA were significant. Participants 
were faster to prosaccade towards the cue in the -150 ms SOA trials than in the 0 ms 
SOA trials 2 = 1307.56, p < .05 and participants made faster saccades towards the 
cue in congruent compared to incongruent trials 2 = 12.83, p < .05. Finally, saccades 
were faster in the near trials compared to the far trials 2 = 6.45, p < .05. There was 
no eccentricity x congruence interaction. All other interactions were non-significant (all 
p values > .05). Results of experiment 2 are presented in figure 4 below. Prosaccade 
error rate was 4%. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Mean saccade latencies for congruent and incongruent trials at both 0 ms 
and -150 ms SOAs split by near and far trials (error bars represent SEs).  
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The results of experiment 2 reveal a facilitative effect of fearful faces on 
prosaccades even when the face stimuli were presented up to 12 degrees from foveal 
vision, raising further interesting questions about exactly what information is extracted 
from parafoveally presented faces to elicit the reduction in prosaccade latencies. For 
example, are the faces processed holistically and semantic content (e.g., the emotion 
being expressed) extracted, or is the saccade facilitation driven by differences in low 
level visual properties of individual features of the face (such as a greater amount of 
white visible in the eyes of frightened faces)? Nummenmaa et al. (2009) postulate 
that the results of their 4th experiment (no decrease in saccade latencies to inverted 
emotional as compared to inverted neutral scenes), suggest that their findings cannot 
be explained by low-level visual properties. Indeed, there is evidence that inverting 
scenes disrupts scene processing (see e.g., Evans and Treisman, 2005). Similarly, 
inverting faces has been shown to disrupt configural processing and reliably interferes 
with the rapid encoding of facial affect (see Maurer, Le Grand and Mondloch, 2002 for 
a review). In our final experiment we sought to determine whether fearful faces still 
facilitate prosaccades when they are inverted. Given that the processing of inverted 
faces relies predominantly on featural processing which is typically slower than 
configural processing (see Hole and Bourne, 2010) it was predicted that an effect of 
congruency might emerge but only in the -150 ms trials in which more time is 
available to resolve the faces. 
 
1.5 Experiment 3 
1.5.1 Method 
Participants.    28 healthy participants (all students at the University of Sussex, aged 
18-40 years) who had not completed experiments 1 or 2 took part. Participants 
received either course credit or payment for their participation.  All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.  The study was approved by the 
University of Sussex Psychology and Life Sciences Research Ethics Committee. 
Apparatus. Identical to experiments 1 and 2. 
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Stimulus displays.   Stimulus displays were consistent with experiment 2 except that 
the emotional images (pairs of Ekman faces, subtending 6.84˚ x 7.65˚) were inverted 
(rotated by 180˚). 
Design.   The experiment had a within subjects 2 (SOA: -150 ms or 0 ms) X 2 
(Congruence: congruent when cued rectangle contained an inverted emotional face 
or incongruent when the cued rectangle contained an inverted neutral face) X 2 
(Target location: near or far from the centre fixation target) design.  
The dependent variable was the time taken to initiate a saccade to the cued 
rectangle. 
Procedure.   The procedure was the same as in experiment 2. 
 
1.5.2 Results and discussion 
As in experiment 2, participants were faster to make prosaccades to the target in the 
near as compared to the far trials 2 = 20.04, p < .0001. Consistent with the two 
previous experiments, participants were faster to correctly prosaccade on the -150 ms 
compared to the 0 ms trials, 2 = 253.85, p < .0001. No main effect of congruency 
emerged despite the latencies being on average 3.6 ms faster in the congruent 
compared to the incongruent trials. However, the SOA x congruency interaction was 
significant 2 = 8.59, p < .01 (see figure 5 below). In the  -150 ms SOA condition but 
not in the 0 ms SOA condition, participants were faster to prosaccade on congruent 
trials. It appears then that participants needed longer exposure to the inverted faces 
prior to saccade initiation for a congruency effect to emerge. This may reflect a shift 
from configural processing to the slower feature-based processing of the face stimuli 
when they are inverted. No other interactions reached significance (all p values >.05). 
Prosaccade error rate was 3%. 
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Figure 5: Saccade onset latencies as a function of SOA and congruency in 
experiment 3 in which inverted faces were used as stimuli (error bars represent SEs). 
 
1.6 General discussion 
We set out to explore whether parafoveally presented emotional faces could influence 
the early programming and execution of saccadic eye movements. Across three 
experiments we found that prosaccades initiated by cues that were co-located with an 
emotional face were faster than prosaccades initiated by cues co-located with a 
neutral face. In experiments 1 and 2, this facilitative effect of emotion on saccade 
latency occurred both when the faces appeared 150 ms before and simultaneously 
with the cue. In Experiment 3, in which the faces were inverted, this congruency effect 
only occurred in the -150 ms SOA condition. 
The congruency effect observed at both SOAs in experiments 1 and 2 extends 
the findings of Nummenmaa et al. (2009) who showed that saccades towards 
complex emotional scenes were faster than those towards neutral scenes, even when 
the scenes and saccade cue were presented simultaneously. The authors interpreted 
this effect as evidence that high-level semantic information from emotional stimuli can 
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be encoded even when it is perceived outside of foveal vision. However, the stimuli 
used by Nummenmaa et al. (2009) depicted complex scenes which varied 
considerably in content even within emotion categories. While in some scenes the 
emotional content was evident from facial affect, in others facial affect was partially 
occluded or non-existent. As a result, it is difficult to ascertain exactly what high-level 
semantic information led to the congruency effect, and more specifically, the extent to 
which it was dependent on rapid neural mechanisms involved in processing faces and 
facial affect. The experiments reported here used simple face stimuli, and despite the 
fact that the visual differences across facial emotions are far more subtle than the 
differences between complex scenes of contrasting valence, we were still able to 
observe a facilitative effect on saccade latencies to emotional compared to neutral 
stimuli. Our results are therefore consistent with other research demonstrating very 
rapid processing of facial affect, such as functional neuroimaging studies 
demonstrating heightened amygdala activity during very brief (17 ms SOA) exposure 
to emotional (happy and angry) as compared to neutral faces (Maxwell and Davidson, 
2004). 
On average it took participants in the current experiments around  200 ms to 
initiate prosaccades to the abrupt luminance changes in the -150 ms SOA trials and 
around 235 ms in the 0 ms SOA trials. The advantage for -150 ms SOA trials is 
consistent with a large number of studies demonstrating cueing or warning effects in 
prosaccades (see e.g., Fecteau and Munoz, 2007; Hutton, 2008 for a review) and a 
cueing effect of similar magnitude was also observed by Nummenmaa et al. (2009). 
Interestingly though, the average latency of prosaccades in the Nummenmaa 
experiments was somewhat slower than was observed in the present experiments, 
ranging from 240-250 ms in the -150 SOA condition and 260-270 ms in the 0 ms SOA 
condition. The faster average latencies observed in the present study may reflect the 
relative simplicity of our stimuli (faces compared to complex scenes) and again 
suggests the operation of comparatively rapid neural mechanisms that process facial 
affect. 
It takes approximately 40 ms for visual information to be transmitted from the 
retina to the superior colliculus and approximately 20 ms for activation in the superior 
colliculus to trigger a saccade towards the cue, but average saccade latencies to 
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simple targets are around 200 ms (see Carpenter, 1981). It is generally assumed that 
the “extra” time consists of on-going stimulus processing, facilitated by shifts in visual 
attention. The relationship between saccadic eye movements and visual attention is 
complex (see Hutton, 2008), but there is a general agreement that saccades to a 
selected target are preceded by a covert (without moving the eyes) attention shift to 
its location (see e.g., Rizzolatti, Riggio and Sheliga, 1994; Schneider, 1995). These 
covert shifts of attention were not restricted in the current experiment and, as 
Nummenmaa et al. (2009) argue, are likely to underlie the reduction in latency of 
saccades towards emotional content. The overall faster reaction times in congruent 
trials across experiments 1, 2 and partially in 3 may result from faster allocation of 
attention to cues containing the emotional face, or reaction times may be slower on 
incongruent trials because of the time it takes to disengage attention from the 
emotional face (see e.g., Moriya and Tanno, 2011; Georgiou, Bleakley, Hayward et 
al., 2005) that is positioned on the opposite side of the screen to the cue.  It is also 
possible that a combination of both of these factors influence saccade latencies. 
Given how little time was available to process the stimuli presented at the cue 
location in the 0 ms SOA trials, and the low visual acuity of parafoveally presented 
stimuli, interesting questions arise about exactly which aspects of the emotional faces 
were responsible for drawing attention towards them and the resulting facilitation of 
saccade latency towards the co-located cue. For example, were saccade latencies 
affected by a crude representation of the entire face based on some type of configural 
(first order, holistic or second order- see Maurer, Le Grand and Mondloch, 2002 for 
discussion) processing or by a featural analysis of the face, extracting information 
from isolated face regions (e.g. the eyes) that we have learned are most informative 
in evaluating facial affect? In Experiment 1 for example, happy, angry and fearful 
faces elicited a speeding effect on prosaccades and it is likely that this was driven by 
the extraction of information from learned informative face regions such as the mouth 
and eye regions to distinguish, even at a subliminal level, emotional from non-
emotional faces. In support, Whalen et al. (2004) used fMRI to determine whether 
amygdala activity was related to the amount of white sclera visible around the pupil. 
Just the eyes were taken from images of fearful and happy faces and presented 
subliminally (17 ms, backward masked). Amygdala activity was significantly higher 
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when eyes from fearful faces (with more visible sclera) were presented as compared 
to when eyes from happy faces (with less visible sclera) were presented. In addition, 
there is also evidence that the mouth region is most informative for detecting happy 
faces (e.g., Calvo and Nummenmaa, 2008). 
In experiment 2, only fearful and neutral faces were used and the stimuli in the 
far trials were presented 12˚ eccentrically, thus relying more heavily on parafoveal 
regions of the retina than in experiment 1. These results suggest that low frequency 
information related specifically to the eye region of fearful faces may have driven the 
congruency effect in experiment 2. Recent research has found that the amygdala 
responds to the presentation of threat related stimuli presented outside of the focus of 
attention, and importantly, it is activated by low spatial frequency information 
(Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver and Dolan, 2003). Given the increased distal eccentricity 
of the faces in experiment 2, the observed facilitative effect of fearful faces would 
have required the decoding of very low acuity information extracted from parafoveal 
retinal regions which rely specifically on low frequency visual information. So one 
possibility is that the decrease in prosaccade latency we saw in experiment 2 was the 
result of rapid processing of low spatial information gleaned from the fearful face 
stimuli (most likely from the high contrast eye regions). This information likely 
activated a highly evolved neural and behavioural module for facilitating rapid 
responses to impending danger which, in this case, resulted in faster allocation of 
overt attention to the threat-related information (fearful face). When the neutral faces 
were cued, however, the same highly evolved threat-sensitive system was 
presumably not activated and as a result the allocation of overt attention to the cued 
neutral face was comparatively less rapid. 
Our finding in experiment 3 that inverted emotional faces were still able to 
facilitate saccade processing stands somewhat in contrast to the results of 
experiment 4 of Nummenmaa et al. (2009), in which no differences in saccade 
latencies were found to inverted emotional scenes compared to inverted neutral 
scenes. Inverting faces interferes with configural but not with featural processing 
(Collinshaw and Hole, 2000; Yin, 1969). For example, after being familiarised with a 
series of faces participants were then more accurate at detecting whether a specific 
facial feature (e.g., a nose or mouth) belonged to one of the “familiar” faces when the 
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facial feature in question was shown in the context of the whole face than when 
presented in isolation (Tanaka and Farah, 1993). The whole face advantage for 
recognising individual facial features implies that during the exposure period, the 
faces were processed holistically as opposed to featurally. Further, when the 
experiment was replicated with inverted faces, the whole face advantage for 
recognising individual facial features was no longer evident, suggesting that 
configural processing may be unique to upright faces. Several studies have shown 
that with more time facial emotion processing can still be achieved when faces are 
inverted based on a featural rather than a configural analysis (see Hole and Bourne, 
2010 for discussion).  
In experiment 3 an effect of congruency was found in the -150 ms SOA 
condition only. The lack of a congruency effect in the 0 ms trials suggests that the 
facilitation is not purely based on low-level stimulus properties, and its emergence in 
the -150 ms condition may reflect the extra processing involved in the change from 
configural to featural processing of the faces. The current set of experiments could be 
extended to investigate which features of the faces are necessary for the congruency 
effect to be observed. For example, by using only eyes (emotional versus neutral) as 
stimuli, or by directly manipulating the amount of contrast in key areas such as the 
eyes and mouth. 
Taken together, the current findings support previous research suggesting that 
facial affect can be processed rapidly, and demonstrate that the processing is 
sufficiently rapid to influence the early stages of saccade programming. The results 
also suggest that the neural mechanisms involved in processing faces are sufficiently 
sensitive to be able to derive meaningful information concerning the emotional 
content even from the relatively low acuity information available when stimuli are 
presented in parafoveal vision.  
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2. Misperceiving facial affect: Effects of laterality and individual 
differences in susceptibility to visual hallucinations. 
 
 
 
2.1 Abstract 
 
It has been suggested that certain types of auditory hallucinations may be the 
by-product of a perceptual system that has evolved to be oversensitive to threat 
related stimuli. People with schizophrenia and high schizotypes experience 
visual as well as auditory hallucinations, and have deficits in processing facial 
emotions. We sought to determine the relationship between visual hallucination 
proneness and the tendency to misattribute threat and non-threat related 
emotions to neutral faces. Participants completed a questionnaire assessing 
visual hallucination proneness (the Revised Visual Hallucination Scale – 
RVHS). High scoring individuals (N=64) were compared to low scoring 
individuals (N=72) on a novel emotion detection task. The high RVHS group 
were less accurate than the low RVHS group at discriminating emotional faces 
from neutral ones and were significantly more likely to identify neutral faces as 
being angry.  There was a trend for all participants to misperceive neutral faces 
as being emotional when presented to the right visual field than to the left visual 
field. Our results support continuum models of visual hallucinatory experience in 
which tolerance for false positives is highest for potentially threatening 
emotional stimuli. 
 
 
Keywords: emotion detection, emotion misattribution, face perception, 
hallucination proneness, hemispheric asymmetry, psychosis continuum, 
schizotypy
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2.2  Introduction 
Hallucinatory experiences are not confined to patients with schizophrenia, and 
recent research suggests they may be much more prevalent in the general 
population than previously thought, particularly among young adults (Rossler et 
al., 2007) and the elderly (Tien, 1991). Although auditory verbal hallucinations 
are most common in schizophrenia (e.g. Mueser et al., 1990), visual 
hallucinations still have a high lifetime prevalence in this disorder (Bracha, 
1989), and are also observed in patients with other disorders such as 
Parkinson’s disease (Barnes and David, 2001; Fenelon et al., 2000; Manford 
and Andermann, 1998). The prevalence of visual hallucinatory experiences in 
the general population is unclear, however, as most population studies either 
focus specifically on auditory hallucinations (e.g., Barkus, Stirling, Hopkins, 
Mckie and Lewis, 2007), or do not discriminate between auditory and visual 
hallucinations (e.g., Lincoln and Keller, 2008). One early exception is Sidgwick’s 
“Census of Hallucinations”, carried out on 17,000 “sane individuals” and 
published in 1894.  Visual hallucinations were reported by approximately 6% of 
adults aged 20-29. In a more recent large-scale survey, 2.7% of 13,057 
individuals reported experiencing visual hallucinations at least once in their life 
(Ohayon, 2000), but some individuals had a mental disorder present or an 
organic or toxic pathology involved, making the exact percentage of non-clinical 
participants difficult to ascertain. Together these surveys suggest that, like 
auditory hallucinations, visual hallucinations are also experienced by some non-
psychotic individuals.  
Healthy individuals who experience hallucination-like experiences are at 
higher risk for developing a schizophrenia spectrum disorder (see ; Delespaul 
and Krabbendam, 2009; Kelleher and Cannon, 2011; van Os, Linscott, Myin-
Germeys et al., 2009, for reviews) providing support for the suggestion that a 
continuum exists between pathological hallucinatory symptoms and normal 
perceptual experiences (see e.g., Johns and van Os, 2001). Researchers have 
explored the cognitive processes underlying auditory hallucinatory experiences 
in healthy participants by measuring performance on tasks designed to elicit 
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“false positive” responses. Such tasks typically involve detecting the presence 
of a target signal (such as a tone or a spoken word) embedded in some 
background noise. Bentall and Slade (1985) for example, found that people with 
schizophrenia and students with a higher disposition to hallucinating (based on 
a self-report questionnaire) made more false positives in an auditory signal 
detection task. The rationale behind this approach is that false positive 
responses and hallucinatory experiences both indicate that a participant 
believes they have seen or heard something that in reality was not present. 
Just as the majority of questionnaire and interview studies of 
hallucinatory experiences in non-clinical populations focus on auditory rather 
than visual hallucinations, the majority of studies investigating false positive 
errors in healthy participants have used auditory rather than visual stimuli. One 
exception is Reed et al. (2008) who asked healthy participants to perform a 
word identification task in which word and non-word letter strings were 
presented briefly on screen. High schizotypes made significantly more false 
positive errors (claiming to have seen a word when a non-word was presented) 
than low schizotypes, but this effect of schizotypy score did not interact with 
stimulus ambiguity (fast vs. slow stimulus presentation). These results suggest 
that the tendency for high schizotypes to make increased false positive errors in 
signal detection type tasks may extend to the visual modality and can be 
observed even when visual stimuli are not highly perceptually ambiguous. 
One area of visual perception in which patients with schizophrenia and 
high schizotypes have known deficits is facial affect recognition (e.g., Phillips 
and David, 1997; Williams, Loughland, Gordon and Davidson 1997; and see 
Edwards, Jackson and Pattison, 2002 and Phillips and Seidman, 2008 for 
reviews). In addition to impairments in accurately detecting facial emotions, 
there is also some evidence to suggest that individuals with schizophrenia and 
high schizotypes are more likely to make false positive errors (seeing emotions 
in neutral faces) than are healthy controls and low schizotypes respectively. 
Importantly, this tendency may be limited to “threat-related” emotions – anger, 
fear and disgust. For example, Kohler et al. (2003) found that individuals with 
schizophrenia were more likely to misattribute fear and disgust to neutral faces 
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than were the controls, and Van Rijn et al. (2010) found that individuals at ultra-
high risk of developing schizophrenia were more likely to label neutral faces as 
angry. Participants scoring highly on the disorganised schizotypy subscale are 
more likely to perceive neutral faces as expressing negative emotions (Brown 
and Cohen, 2010). Similarly, Van’t Wout, Aleman, Kessels, Laroi and Kahn 
(2004) found that the likelihood of making erroneous classifications of non-
threatening (happy) faces as threatening, when using degraded (reduced visual 
contrast) faces as stimuli, correlates positively with healthy individuals’ scores 
on the Unusual Perceptual Experiences schizotypy subscale. Together these 
findings support the recent suggestion that certain types of hallucinatory 
experience may be the by-products of a cognitive system that has evolved to 
detect threats (Dodgson and Gordon, 2009). There have, however, been no 
studies that have set out to directly test this hypothesis in the visual domain, 
and to address the relationship between individual differences in proneness to 
visual hallucinatory experiences and the tendency to ascribe threat-related 
emotions to neutral faces. 
A large body of evidence suggests there is a right hemisphere advantage 
for processing facial emotion, and indeed face processing in general (see Hole 
and Bourne, 2010). For example, Bourne (2008) used pairs of chimeric faces (in 
which one half of a vertically split face is neutral and the other emotional), and 
found that participants showed a bias towards choosing the face in which the 
emotion is expressed in the left visual field when asked which of the two faces 
is the more emotive. Whilst a right hemisphere advantage for detecting facial 
emotions appears well established, it is not clear whether similar lateralization 
effects influence the likelihood of misattributing emotion to neutral faces – in 
other words whether participants are more likely to see non-existent emotions in 
neutral faces presented to the left or right visual field. 
In contrast to the left hemifield bias for face processing observed in 
healthy participants, patients with schizophrenia have been found to display a 
significantly reduced asymmetry or indeed no hemifield bias at all for facial 
emotions (Kucharska-Pietura, David, Dropko and Klimkowski, 2002). David and 
Cutting (1990) asked patients with schizophrenia to decide whether happy-sad 
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chimeric faces depicted a happy expression or a sad one. Unlike the controls, 
who showed the expected left-hemifield bias, the schizophrenia group had no 
bias in either direction. The left-hemifield bias when viewing chimeric faces is 
similarly attenuated in those who have higher negative schizotypy (social 
anhedonia) scores (Luh and Gooding, 1999). However, the literature 
documenting decreased right hemisphere dominance in people with 
schizophrenia and in high schizotypes is not consistent. For example, Leonards 
and Mohr (2009) tracked participants’ eye movements and found that elevated 
positive schizotypy (magical ideation) was associated with an increased bias in 
initial saccade landing positions towards the left side of the face. 
In this study we developed a task in which pairs of faces were briefly 
presented in participants’ left and right visual fields. On half of the trials one of 
the two faces displayed an emotion (happiness, anger or fear) and the other 
was neutral. On the remaining trials, both faces were neutral. Participants were 
asked to indicate whether or not an emotional face was present and if so which 
of the two faces was emotive. The task thus allowed us to measure participants’ 
tendency to make false positive responses (ascribing emotions to neutral faces) 
as well as their accuracy (correctly identifying the location of an emotional face). 
We explored the effects of visual hemifield, facial emotion and individual 
differences in proneness to visual hallucinations on these two measures. All 
participants were expected to make more false positive responses to neutral 
faces appearing in the right visual field, and given the reduced left hemifield 
bias observed in patients with schizophrenia and high schizotypes in the 
majority of research described above, it was anticipated that high schizotypes 
would show a reduced left hemifield bias for emotion detection compared to low 
schizotypes. Finally, if as has been suggested, “hypervigilance hallucinations” 
reflect an oversensitivity to threat related information, then false positives 
should be higher in blocks of trials containing angry and fearful faces compared 
to happy faces, particularly for participants who are prone to visual hallucinatory 
experiences. 
117 
 
  
 
2.3 Method 
2.3.1  Participants.  136 participants were selected from a pool of 259 healthy 
participants based on their answers to a subset of items from the Revised 
Hallucination Scale (Morrison et al., 2000). This 15 item scale contains 6 items 
scored on a 4 point scale that deal specifically with visual hallucinations. Scores 
on these 6 items were summed to create an index of proneness to visual 
hallucinatory experiences we have termed the “Revised Visual Hallucination 
Scale” or RVHS. The 136 selected participants were those whose scores fell in 
the lowest and highest quartiles of all 259 scores, forming a low RVHS group ( 
Mean score = .96, SD = .91; N = 72; 55 female; mean age = 20.1 years, SD = 
2.81, age-range = 18.2 - 35.3 years) and a high RVHS group (Mean score = 
8.4, SD = 2.6; N=64; 57 female; mean age = 20.3 years, SD = 2.90, age-range 
= 18.3 - 39.17 years) respectively. All participants also completed two further 
inventories:  those questions on the Revised Hallucination Scale related 
specifically to auditory hallucinations and the Brief Schizotypal Symptoms 
Inventory (SSI), (Hodgekins et al. 2012). All participants were students at 
Sussex University and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The University 
of Sussex ethics board approved the study.  
 
2.3.2  Materials. Stimuli consisted of 16 greyscale images selected from the 
Ekman and Friesen Pictures of Facial Affect (Ekman and Friesen, 1976). The 
photographs were cropped so that no hair was visible, and then resized to fit on 
a dark grey background measuring 178 x 196 pixels. For each emotion (happy, 
angry, fearful and neutral), 2 male and 2 female faces were used. Faces were 
masked after presentation with a greyscale image consisting of 8 x 8 pixel 
squares randomly selected from the neutral faces, and then randomly combined 
to form a single image with the same dimensions as the face stimuli. Stimuli 
were presented using Experiment Builder software (SR Research, Ontario) on 
IBM compatible PCs with 17-inch TFT monitors. 
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To ensure that low-level image characteristics were equated across stimuli, 
image statistics were obtained using MATLAB 7.0 (Math Works, Natick, MA) for 
the selected Ekman faces and the low-level visual properties (skewness, 
luminance, contrast, root mean squared, kurtosis and energy) compared. One-
way ANOVAs revealed that none of the image characteristics varied by emotion 
(all Fs ≤ .882, all p values > .10).  
2.3.3  Design. The experiment had a mixed design. The within subjects factors 
were: hemifield of presentation (left or right) and target emotion (happy, angry 
or fearful). RVHS scores (high vs. low) were a between subjects factor. The 
dependent variables were the number of false positive errors made on the 
neutral-neutral trials and overall number of correct responses on the target 
present trials. There were three experimental blocks, one for each target 
emotion. Participants were informed of the target emotion at the start of each 
block. 
2.3.4 Procedure. Participants were seated approximately 60 cm from the 
monitor. All trials began with participants focussing on a central fixation cross. A 
random delay between 0 and 1250 ms (to reduce anticipations) followed. Then, 
the two face images appeared simultaneously onscreen one each side of the 
central cross and remained onscreen for 250 ms before being masked. There 
were 192 experimental trials, 64 trials in each block (angry, fearful and happy). 
Half of the trials in each block were neutral-neutral trials in which no emotional 
face was present. The remaining trials consisted of one emotional and one 
neutral face and half of the time the emotional face was presented to the left 
hemifield and half of the time the emotional face was presented to the right 
hemifield. The horizontal eccentricity of the faces was varied such that in each 
block half of the trials were near trials in which the centre of the face stimuli 
were 6.5 cm (6⁰) to the right or left of the centre of the screen and half of the 
trials were far trials in which face stimuli were presented 13 cm (12⁰) to the right 
or left of the screen centre. All face pairs consisted of one male and one female 
actor and the visual field to which the male and female models in each picture 
pair were presented was also counterbalanced across trials.  
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Participants were asked to press the ‘f’ key if they thought the face on the left 
was an emotional face, the ‘j’ key if they thought the face on the right was 
emotional, and the spacebar if they thought both faces appeared neutral in 
expression. There were three blocks of trials. The target emotion (angry, happy 
or fearful) varied across blocks and the order in which the blocks were 
completed by each participant was randomised. Participants completed 4 
practice trials at the start of each block. 
Participants also completed the Revised Visual Hallucination Scale (RVHS) 
which consists of the 6 items (listed below) from the Revised Hallucination 
Scale (Morrison et al., 2000) that deal specifically with visual hallucinatory 
experiences: 
1. The people in my daydreams seem so true to life that I think they are 
real. 
2. I have seen a person’s face in front of me when no one was there. 
3. When I look at things they appear strange to me. 
4. I see shadows and shapes when there is nothing there. 
5. When I look at things they look unreal to me. 
6. When I look at myself in the mirror I look different. 
 
The Revised Auditory Hallucination Scale (RAHS) which consists of those items 
from the Morrison et al.’s (2000) Revised Hallucination Scale that deal 
specifically with auditory hallucinatory experiences, and the brief Schizotypal 
Symptoms Inventory (SSI) (Hodgekins, 2012), a general measure of schizotypy, 
were also completed. 
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2.4 Results 
Signal detection theory was used to assess participants’ sensitivity to the 
detection of emotional stimuli as well as their response bias (the tendency to 
give positive responses regardless of whether an emotional face was present or 
not). 
The following signal detection measures were calculated: 
 
Hit rate 
How frequently a participant correctly identified the emotional face on trials with 
one emotional and one neutral face presented. Hit rate was calculated using the 
following equation: 
Hit rate =  
 
False alarm rate 
How frequently a participant responded positively on trials in which no 
emotional face was present. False alarm rate was calculated using the following 
equation: 
False alarm rate =  
 
Sensitivity (d’) 
In order to assess each participant’s ability to discriminate an emotional face 
from a neutral face, d’ (d prime) was calculated using the formula below. The 
smaller the d’ the greater the participant’s tendency to misperceive neutral faces 
as emotional. Larger d’ values indicate higher sensitivity in distinguishing 
neutral faces from emotional ones.  
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d’ = -1(H) - -1(F) 
Where -1(H) is the z score corresponding to the hit rate and -1(F) is the z 
score corresponding to the false alarm rate. 
 
Response bias (β) 
Each participant’s response bias was calculated using the following equation: 
β = e  
The lower the value of β is, the more likely it is that a “yes” response will be 
given (regardless of whether or not the target actually is present). 
 
2.4.1 Accuracy: discriminating emotional faces from neutral faces. 
A mixed design analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted on the 
sensitivity (d’) data. The between subjects factor was RVHS group (high vs. 
low). To control for other schizotypal traits and auditory hallucination proneness 
that may covary with RVHS, SSI scores and scores on the items in the Revised 
L-S Hallucination Inventory relevant to auditory hallucinations were added to the 
model as covariates. Emotion (happy, angry, or fearful) and visual field (left vs. 
right) were the two within-subjects factors. Although eccentricity of the face 
stimuli was manipulated, data for the near and far trials were collapsed and in 
order to simplify interpretation, eccentricity was not entered as a factor into the 
ANCOVA. 
The mean sensitivity (accuracy) scores for each emotion were as follows: 
Happy (Mean = 2.88, SE = .05), Angry (Mean = 2.12, SE = .06), Fearful (Mean 
= 1.93, SE = .05). There was a highly significant main effect of emotion 
F(2,258)= 24.60, p < .01 (see figure 1). Bonferroni corrected planned 
comparisons revealed that happy faces were detected more accurately than 
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both angry faces t(260) = 18.38, p < .01 and fearful faces t(260) = 14.45, p < .01 
and that angry faces were detected more accurately than fearful faces t(260) = 
3.8, p < .01. 
The mean accuracy score for faces presented to the left visual field was 2.44 
(SE = .05) and to the right visual field was 2.18 (SD = .05).There was a main 
effect of visual field on accuracy such that individuals were more competent at 
discriminating neutral faces from emotional faces when faces were presented to 
the left visual compared to when presented to the right visual field F(1,129) = 
7.44, p < .01. 
There was also a significant emotion x laterality interaction F(2,258) = 3.08, p < 
.05 revealing that although the left visual field advantage for detecting emotional 
faces was evident in all emotion blocks, it was particularly pronounced in the 
threat-related angry t(260) = 4.37, p < .01 and fear t(260) = 6.186, p < .01 
blocks compared to in the happy block t(260) = 1.78, p < .05. 
The mean accuracy score for the high and low RVHS groups were 2.15 (SE = 
.08) and 2.47 (SE = .08) respectively. There was a main effect of RVHS group 
on sensitivity scores. The high RVHS group were significantly less competent at 
discriminating emotional faces from neutral ones than the low RVHS group 
F(1,129) = 5.865, p < .05. RVHS did not interact with any of the other variables. 
The two covariates were not significantly related to emotion detection. 
There were no other statistically significant main effects or interactions.  
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Figure 1. Mean d’prime sensitivity score as a function of emotion and RVHS 
group. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: 
SSI = 17.74, auditory hallucination proneness = 6.68. Error bars represent 
standard deviations. 
 
2.4.2 Errors: decision-making (response) bias (β) 
There were no significant main effects of emotion or RVHS score on response 
bias. The two covariates were not significantly related to response bias. There 
was a trend for participants to make more false positive errors to faces 
presented to the right than to the left visual field F(1,129) = 2.99, p = .09. 
Finally, there was a significant emotion x RVHS interaction F(2,258) = 5.50, p < 
.05. Multiple comparisons revealed that there were no significant differences in 
response bias between high and low RVHS in the happy or fear blocks, but in 
the angry block the high RVHS were more likely to make false positive errors, 
t(260) = 2.58, p < .05 (see figure 2). No other interactions in the response bias 
model were statistically significant. 
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Figure 2.Mean response bias (β) as a function of emotion and RVHS group. 
Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: SSI = 
17.74, auditory hallucination proneness = 6.68. Error bars represent standard 
deviations. 
 
2.5 Discussion 
Using a novel experimental task, we set out to determine the relationship 
between facial emotion processing, laterality and individual differences in 
susceptibility to visual hallucinations. Several key findings emerged. Our task 
was successful in generating false positive responses to neutral faces in all 
experimental blocks - participants mistook neutral faces as being happy, angry 
and fearful. Importantly, those participants with high scores on the RVHS were 
significantly more likely than low scoring participants to misperceive neutral 
faces as angry. There was a trend for more misperceptions to occur when 
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neutral faces were presented to the right visual field than to the left visual field. 
The task also allowed us to look at emotion detection accuracy. Correct 
detection of emotional faces was higher in the happy block than in the angry 
and fear blocks. The high RHVS group were less accurate than the low RVHS 
group at discriminating expressive faces from neutral ones regardless of the 
emotion being expressed. All participants were more accurate at detecting 
emotional faces presented on the left than on the right, and this left visual field 
advantage was particularly pronounced for the threat-related faces. 
The finding that healthy participants who are more visual hallucination 
prone are more likely to misperceive neutral faces as being angry extends 
previous research which has found that the erroneous classification of non-
threatening faces as threatening is inflated in people with schizophrenia (Kohler 
et al., 2003), ultra-high risk adolescents (van Rijn et al., 2010) and high 
schizotypes (Brown and Cohen, 2010; Van’t Wout et al., 2004). These findings 
support suggestions that our perceptual system has evolved to tolerate 
misperceptions (false positives) when an individual perceives imminent threat 
(Dodgson and Gordon, 2009). According to this argument, tolerance of false 
positives to threat but not non-threat stimuli has evolved because the possible 
negative consequences of failing to detect a threat stimulus in the environment 
are much worse than failing to detect non-threatening stimuli. The result is a 
susceptibility to what Dodgson and Gordon term “hypervigilance hallucinations”. 
The fact that the content of pathological hallucinations is frequently described 
as hostile and threatening in nature by people with schizophrenia (Nayani and 
David, 1996) provides some support for this contention. 
We did not observe higher false positive rates in the fear block 
suggesting that any hypervigilance to threat observed in the current experiment 
is specific to a direct threat from another (angry) individual rather than some 
less specific type of impending threat in the environment (as indicated by a 
fearful face). In the present study, we provide further support for the 
hypervigilance hypothesis by showing that the tendency to falsely see anger on 
neutral faces is most apparent in individuals who report comparatively high 
levels of visual hallucinatory experiences. In addition, patients with 
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schizophrenia frequently report visual perceptual anomalies such as flooding or 
sensory overload (see Bunney et al., 1999; McGhie and Chapman, 1961) and 
differences between the high and low RVHS groups in their ability to gate or 
filter the emotional stimuli presented, particularly in the angry block, may be a 
contributing factor here. Future research into the relative roles of low-level 
perceptual anomalies and higher-level cognitive biases on misperceptions of 
threat is therefore encouraged. 
Consistent with previous research (e.g., Phillips and David, 1997; 
Williams et al., 1997) the high RHVS group were less accurate at discriminating 
emotional faces from neutral ones. Whilst the ability to correctly identify an 
emotion when it is present and the tendency to misperceive an emotion when it 
is absent might be expected to correlate, our data suggest that they are, at least 
to some extent, independent processes since the high RVHS group only 
showed inflated false positive rates in the angry block but were less accurate at 
discriminating emotional faces from neutral ones in all three emotion blocks.  
All participants were most accurate at detecting happy faces, a result that 
replicates a large amount of research suggesting happiness is the easiest 
emotion to discriminate (Ekman and Friesen, 1971) even when the happy 
emotion is of a low intensity (Hess, Blairy and Kleck, 1997) and when the face 
stimuli used have degraded resolution (Johnston, McCabe and Schall, 2003) or 
are presented as briefly as 25 msec before being masked (Calvo and 
Lundquist, 2008). Adolphs (2002) has argued that facial expression is initially 
categorised into two superordinate categories - happy and unhappy, and then 
finer discrimination into subordinate categories (e.g., discriminating between 
two non-happy emotions such as angry and fearful) ensues.  
Finally, we also replicated previous research demonstrating that emotion 
identification is enhanced for faces presented in the left visual field compared to 
the right (e.g., Bourne, 2008; Davidson, 1992) and interestingly this left visual 
field advantage for emotion detection was particularly pronounced for threat-
related (angry and fearful) faces, a finding which supports other research 
implicating a superior role for the right hemisphere in the processing of 
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threatening faces (e.g., Morris, Ohman and Dolan, 1998; Johnson and Hugdahl, 
1991). There was a trend for participants to make more misclassifications of 
neutral faces as emotional when the neutral faces appeared on in the right 
visual field compared to the left. This suggests that laterality effects in face 
processing may extend to misperceptions or false positives as well as 
identification. We are currently conducting further experiments to explore this 
possibility.  
Previous research into laterality effects in face processing in 
schizophrenia have produced inconsistent findings-  Phillips and David (1997) 
presented photographs of neutral faces and happy / sad chimeric faces on-
screen and asked individuals with schizophrenia and controls to rate the 
pleasantness of the neutral faces and to detect the emotion (happy or sad) 
depicted by the schematic faces. The controls made significantly more initial 
saccades to the left side of the faces than to the right whereas the clinical group 
showed the opposite pattern, making more initial saccades to the right side of 
the face. In contrast, Leonards and Mohr (2009) found that high magical 
ideation scores predict a pronounced initial saccade bias to the left side of 
neutral faces during free-viewing. We found no interaction between RVHS score 
and hemifield of false positives- in other words participants prone to visual 
hallucinations were no more likely than low scorers to make false positives to 
neutral faces on the right compared to faces on the left. Unlike the 
aforementioned studies, we were concerned with a possible RVHS x hemifield 
of misperception interaction as opposed to a RVHS x hemiface of misperception 
interaction which could explain why we did not find any RVHS x laterality effect. 
We are currently conducting further studies aimed at determining whether any 
RVHS x laterality interaction on accuracy and on false positive errors may be 
specific to hemiface rather than hemifield laterality manipulations. Future 
studies will also include a handedness measure to control for the differences in 
cerebral lateralisation and schizotypal traits that are associated with left, right 
and mixed handedness (e.g., Kelly and Coursey, 1992). 
In conclusion, using a novel face processing task we have shown that 
healthy individuals who score highly on a scale measuring susceptibility to 
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visual hallucinations have a greater tendency to misperceive neutral faces as 
angry than low scoring individuals. These results add to the growing weight of 
evidence suggesting that schizophrenia-like experiences occur in the general 
population, supporting the claim that symptomatic visual hallucinations lie on a 
continuum with normal perceptual experience.  
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3. Lateral asymmetry in saccadic eye movements during face processing: 
the role of individual differences in schizotypy 
 
3.1 Abstract 
Healthy individuals with high as compared to low levels of schizotypal 
personality traits make more first saccades to the left side of faces, suggesting 
increased right hemisphere (RH) dominance for face processing.  Patients with 
schizophrenia, however, show attenuated or reversed RH dominance for face 
processing. It is unclear whether the increased RH dominance found in high 
schizotypes is specific to face processing or whether it is also observable for 
other stimuli matched in terms of low-level visual properties. We measured gaze 
to faces and symmetrical fractal patterns and found higher Magical Ideation (MI) 
is associated with an increased left side bias for initial saccade landing points 
and dwell times when free-viewing faces. These laterality biases were 
unaffected by facial emotion. Schizotypy scores were not related to laterality 
biases when viewing fractals. Our results provide further evidence that high 
schizotypy is associated with an increase in RH dominance for face processing. 
 
Keywords: cerebral dominance, eye movements, emotion processing, laterality, 
magical ideation, psychosis, schizophrenia, continuum models 
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3.2 Introduction 
Healthy individuals show reliable right hemisphere (left visual field) dominance 
for face and emotion processing (Hole & Bourne, 2010). For example, Bourne 
(2008) used pairs of chimeric faces (in which one half of a vertically split face is 
neutral and the other emotional), and found that, when asked which of the two 
faces is the more emotive, participants showed a bias towards choosing the 
face that depicted emotion in the left visual field.  Schizophrenia has long been 
associated with atypical hemispheric lateralisation (particularly attenuated 
asymmetry - see Crow, 1990, 1997 for reviews) and it has been argued that the 
behavioural manifestations of this may include impaired speech processing (see 
Frith, 2005) and auditory hallucinations (Barta, Pearlson, Powers, Richards & 
Tune, 1990; Frith, 2005).  
In contrast to the left hemifield bias for face processing observed in 
healthy participants, patients with schizophrenia have been found to display a 
significantly reduced (David & Cutting, 1990), or reversed (see Kucharska-
Pietura, David, Dropko and Klimkowski, 2002) laterality bias for face and 
emotion processing. David and Cutting (1990) asked patients with 
schizophrenia to decide whether happy-sad chimeric faces depicted a happy 
expression or a sad one. Unlike the control group who showed the expected 
left-hemifield bias, the schizophrenia group had no bias in either direction. A 
later eye tracking study (Phillips and David, 1997) found that when face stimuli 
are presented, laterality differences between healthy individuals and 
schizophrenia patients are observable from the very first saccade. Phillips and 
David (1997) presented faces to individuals with schizophrenia and to controls 
and compared the location of initial saccades. Controls displayed a significant 
left visual field bias for the initial saccade, while the schizophrenia group made 
significantly more initial saccades to the right side of the face stimuli, suggesting 
atypical (reversed) hemispheric specialization in the clinical group.  
There is a large body of evidence in support of a symptomatic continuum 
between healthy individuals and those with psychotic disorders (see Verdoux & 
van Os, 2002). Psychotic traits are seen to varying lesser degrees in healthy 
individuals such as unaffected first degree relatives of schizophrenia patients, 
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as well as high / low schizotypes (see Claridge, 1997; Eckblad & Chapman, 
1983). The information processing deficits associated with schizophrenia are 
also present, albeit less severely, in “high schizotypes” (e.g., Park, Holzman & 
Lenzenweger, 1995) and there is evidence from neuroimaging studies that 
schizotypy and schizophrenia are associated on neurocognitive and 
neurophysiological levels (Aichert, Williams, Möller, Kumari & Ettinger, 2012). 
Importantly, the left-hemifield bias when viewing chimeric faces has been 
shown to be attenuated in both individuals with schizophrenia and in healthy 
participants with high as compared to low negative schizotypy (social 
anhedonia) scores (Luh & Gooding, 1999). However, the literature documenting 
decreased right hemisphere dominance for face processing in people with 
schizophrenia and high schizotypes is not consistent. For example, Leonards 
and Mohr (2009) found that elevated relative to low positive schizotypy (Magical 
Ideation) was in fact associated with an increased bias in initial saccade landing 
positions towards the left side of the face, suggesting that right hemisphere 
dominance for face processing is more prominent in high as compared to low 
schizotypes- this finding is in direct contrast to the clinical group in the Phillips 
and David (1997) study.  
A number of other studies suggest that psychosis-proneness is 
associated with stronger than average right hemisphere dominance. For 
example in a free-viewing task, psychosis prone individuals rated happy – 
neutral chimeric faces as happier when the happy hemiface appeared in the left 
spatial field, and this left side / right hemisphere bias was significantly greater in 
the high psychosis prone group than in controls (Luh & Gooding, 1999). A 
similar left hemifield bias has been observed in a lateralized tachistoscopic 
lexical decision task in which high schizotypes were more accurate than low 
schizotypes at identifying target words presented to the left visual field (Brugger, 
Gamma, Muri, Schafer & Taylor, 1993). The left side bias, therefore, likely 
extends beyond face processing tasks. 
The Phillips and David (1997) study was limited by small sample size (8 
in the clinical group) and the Leonards and Mohr (2009) study had a number of 
methodological issues- specifically, the face stimuli were grayscale whereas the 
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fractals were in colour, the two stimuli types varied in both size and orientation, 
and the fractals were not symmetrical whereas a face, by nature, is very near 
symmetrical. In addition, there may be a general left-side bias in psychosis-
prone individuals that is not specific to face processing per se. As a result, it is 
unclear whether the Leonards and Mohr (2009) results reflect a very specific 
association between elevated Magical Ideation and a general left-hemifield 
initial saccade bias for near symmetrical images, or whether the tendency is 
very specific to faces.  
There is evidence that the right hemisphere dominance for face 
processing persists across different facial emotions (Bava, Ballantyne, May, & 
Trauner, 2005). However, it has been  proposed that the direction of laterality 
biases during face processing depends on the emotion depicted by the face, 
with the left hemisphere dominant in the processing of faces expressing positive 
emotions and the right hemisphere dominant in the processing of faces 
displaying negative affect (see Hole & Bourne, 2010).  It remains unclear 
whether schizotypy-sensitive laterality biases when viewing faces are 
moderated by emotion. Such an interaction might be expected since high 
schizotypes respond differently to controls in emotion processing tasks. For 
example, high positive schizotypes are hypervigilant to threat-related emotion 
(Coy & Hutton, 2012) and negative schizotypes are less accurate in facial 
emotion classification, particularly when faces depict negative affect (Williams, 
Henry & Green, 2007). The aim of the current experiment is to replicate the 
Leonards and Mohr study with improved stimuli (faces and fractals will be 
matched for size, colour and orientation) and to explore any potential role of 
facial emotion in laterality biases. In doing so we hope to contribute to resolving 
the apparent discrepancy surrounding face processing laterality biases in 
individuals with schizophrenia and high schizoptypes. 
If the Leonards and Mohr results emerged from lateral asymmetries in 
face processing, that are observable from the very first saccade and that are 
sensitive to schizotypy, then a replication of the original study is expected: 
higher schizotypy would be associated with an increased leftward laterality bias 
during face processing but not when viewing fractals. Given that positive 
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schizotypy is associated with a hypervigilance to threat-related stimuli, and that 
increased arousal has been shown to affect lateral dominance, we expect to 
observe a schizotypy x emotion interaction whereby any effect of threat on 
laterality biases becomes more pronounced as positive schizotypy scores 
increase. Alternatively, if the results of the original study emerged from 
systematic differences in the low-level visual properties of the faces and fractals 
(which interact with schizotypy), then, with improved stimuli, we would not 
expect to replicate the results of the original study. Instead, we would expect no 
interaction between schizotypy score and stimulus type (face versus fractal).  
 
3.3 Method 
Participants. 35 healthy participants (19 female; mean age = 22.09 years, SD 
= 3.48, age-range = 20–34) took part in the experiment. All participants were 
students at Sussex University, were right handed and had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision.  The study was approved by the University of Sussex 
Psychology and Life Sciences Research Ethics Committee.   
Apparatus.  Stimuli were presented on a 22-inch CRT monitor. Eye movements 
were recorded using an EyeLink II head-mounted eye tracker (SR Research, 
Ontario) which recorded gaze at 500Hz with an average accuracy of 0.5˚. Eye 
event detection is based on an internal heuristic saccade detector built in the 
EyeLink tracker program. To detect a saccade, for each data sample, the built-
in event parser computes instantaneous velocity and acceleration and a 
saccade is detected when these values exceed 30˚ per second or 8500˚ per 
second squared for two or more samples. In order to be included in our 
analyses, initial saccades had to have amplitudes of at least 0.5°. Trials were 
excluded if the initial saccade was anticipatory (latency < 80 ms) or if 
participants were not fixating within 0.5° of the central fixation marker at 
saccade onset. 92% of data were retained for analysis.    
Materials. The stimuli comprised 24 symmetrical fractals (obtained from various 
freely available databases) and 96 faces (48 female) displaying numerous 
emotions (24 happy, 24 angry, 24 fearful and 24 neutral). The face stimuli were 
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taken from the Radboud Faces Database (Langner et al., 2010). Faces and 
fractals were oval cropped and measured 12 x 7 cm on-screen. Each image 
was displayed once in colour and once in greyscale, creating a total of 240 
images. Stimuli were presented in random order using Experiment Builder 
software (SR Research, Ontario). 
 
Schizotypy Questionnaires. 
Magical Ideation (MI) scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). This is a 30 item true 
or false questionnaire providing a measure of Magical Ideation which is a 
subset of positive schizotypy.  
The Revised Physical Anhedonia (PA) scale (Chapman et al., 1976). This 61 
item (true or false) questionnaire measures Physical Anhedonia, a subset of 
negative schizotypy.  
Figure 1. Example face and fractal stimuli. 
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Design and Procedure.  All trials began with participants (seated 60 cm from 
the monitor) focussing on a central fixation cross. After steady fixation on the 
cross, a blank screen was presented for a random time period between 0 and 
1250 ms (to reduce anticipatory saccades). A face or fractal image was then 
presented centrally onscreen for 5000ms and was then replaced with a blank 
screen. Participants were asked to free-view the stimuli, and to pay careful 
attention because there would be some questions about the stimuli at the end of 
the experiment. The 240 experimental trials were presented in random order 
across 4 blocks. The eye tracker was re-calibrated between blocks as 
necessary. Participants then completed the Magical Ideation (MI) scale 
(Eckblad & Chapman, 1983), The Revised Physical Anhedonia (PA) scale 
(Chapman et al., 1976), and the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 
1971) before being fully debriefed.  
Data Analysis.  Eye movement data were analysed using Data Viewer 
Software (SR-Research, Ontario). Equal sized rectangular regions of interest 
(ROIs) were drawn around the left and right half of each of the stimuli. The 
extent of the left visual field (LVF) or right visual field (RVF) bias for initial 
saccades was assessed using a lateralization index (I) as used by Leonards 
and Mohr (2009): 
I = (R – L) / (R + L) 
Where R is the number of initial rightward saccades and the L is the number of 
initial leftward saccades. Positive and negative values signify a rightward and 
leftward bias respectively. We also calculated a laterality index for total dwell 
time to the left and right ROIs to provide an indication of the extent / time course 
of any observed laterality biases. The formula for dwell time laterality index was 
the same as for the initial saccade laterality index, but considered total dwell 
time (rather than number of initial saccades) to the left and right of the stimuli. 
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3.4 Results 
 
Mean and SE laterality index scores for initial saccade and dwell time (split by 
stimulus type) are presented in Table 1 below.  
 
Mean (SE) Laterality Index 
 Initial Saccade Dwell Time 
Fractal -.138 (.05) .019 (.03) 
Neutral Face -.103 (.60) .046 (.04) 
Happy Face -.184 (.09) .001 (.03) 
Angry Face -.092 (.10) .054 (.04) 
Fearful Face -.100 (.10) .078 (.03) 
 
Table 1.Overall mean and standard error values for initial saccade and dwell 
time laterality measures split by stimulus type. N = 35. 
 
Questionnaire scores.  The overall mean MI score was 7.77 (N = 35, SD = 4.1, 
range = 0 - 19). The overall PA score was 11.83 (N = 35, SD = 7.2, range = 0 - 
30). All participants were right handed as measured by the Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (all scores ≥ +50), but the extent of their right 
handedness varied (mean = 83.43, SD = 15.33, range = 50 - 100). 
Despite the fact that the mean laterality index measures were similar for faces 
and fractals, the distribution of laterality scores varied by stimulus type and 
across measures (see figure 2). For initial saccade laterality index, data were 
centred closer to zero for fractals than for faces. The distribution was close to 
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normal for fractals and bimodal (the majority of cases had either a clear left- or 
clear right-hemifield bias) for faces. In contrast, for the dwell time laterality index 
data, the distributions were almost equivalent for faces and fractals, and both 
distributions were close to normal. 
 
 
Figure 2. Frequency polygon for initial saccade (upper) and dwell time (lower) 
laterality index scores. The x axis consists of the mid-point values for 0.2 unit 
wide bins. Possible laterality index scores range from -1 (maximum leftward 
bias) to 1 (maximum rightward bias). N = 35. 
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Two one-way repeated measures ANCOVAs were performed to assess 
whether initial saccade or dwell time laterality measures vary systematically with 
stimulus type (faces or fractals). Magical ideation was entered as a covariate to 
assess its relationship to the two LI measures. Physical Anhedonia was also 
entered into the ANCOVAs initially but was not significantly related to any of the 
Laterality Index measures and was therefore not included in the final analyses. 
Handedness was also considered as a covariate to control for any confounding 
effects of variation in degree of right handedness. There was no significant 
correlation between the two covariates. 
For initial saccade laterality index, there was no main effect of stimulus type 
F(1,32) = .88, ns. There was a significant interaction between the covariate 
magical ideation and stimulus type, F (1, 32) = 5.63, p< .05, η2 = .15. Scatter 
plots with regression lines revealed a negative association between magical 
ideation and initial saccade laterality index score when viewing neutral faces, b 
=-.055, p< .05, η2 = .14 (see figure 3, upper) but not when viewing fractals, b = - 
.003, ns. There was no main effect of either covariate (handedness, magical 
ideation), both Fs < 3.31, p values > .05. 
Results were replicated for the dwell time laterality measure. There was no 
main effect of stimulus type F (1, 32) = .01, ns. There was a significant stimulus 
type x magical ideation interaction F (1, 32) = 4.60, p< .05, η2 = .13. Scatter 
plots with regression lines revealed a negative association between magical 
ideation and dwell time laterality index score when viewing neutral faces, b =-
.019, p< .05, η2 = .14 (see figure 3, lower) but not when viewing fractals, b < 
.001, ns.  There was no significant effect of either of the covariates 
(handedness, magical ideation), both Fs < 1.81, both p values > .05. 
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Figure 3. Initial saccade (upper) and dwell time (lower) laterality 
index plotted against magical ideation. Positive laterality index 
values represent a rightward (R) initial saccade bias. Negative 
laterality index values represent a leftward (L) initial saccade bias. A 
score of zero indicates no laterality bias and is marked with a dotted 
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vertical line. The best fit line has a negative slope- as MI scores 
increase, laterality index scores are more biased towards the left 
side of the neutral face stimuli. 
 
Two further one-way repeated measures ANCOVAs (with magical ideation and 
handedness as covariates) assessed whether facial emotion (4 levels: neutral, 
happy, angry, fearful) systematically affected either laterality measure (initial 
saccade or dwell time). There was no main effect of emotion on initial saccade 
or dwell time laterality scores or any significant interactions with emotion (all Fs 
< 1.26, p values > .05).  
 
3.5 Discussion 
A number of clinical studies report reduced or reversed lateralised face 
processing in individuals with schizophrenia (Kucharska-Pietura, David, Dropko 
& Klimkowski, 2002; David & Cutting, 1990), and in a very similar task to ours, 
Phillips and David (1997) observed greater rightward saccade / left hemisphere 
biases in schizophrenia patients as compared to controls when free-viewing 
face stimuli. Continuum models of psychosis would predict similar laterality 
biases in high schizotypes when viewing faces. Contrary to this expectation 
however, a number of non-clinical studies have shown that high schizotypy is in 
fact associated with an increased left side / right hemisphere bias (Leonards & 
Mohr, 2009; Brugger et al., 1993; Christie & Raine, 1988) which is in 
accordance with face processing laterality biases in the general population (see 
Levy, Heller, Banich & Burton, 1983; Leonards & Scott-Samuel, 2005). 
Consistent with these non-clinical studies, we found that individuals who scored 
highly on the Magical Ideation scale were more likely to look initially to the left 
half of a face and also to have increased dwell time to the left half of a face. In 
line with Leonards and Mohr (2009), laterality biases during face processing 
were not associated with Physical Anhedonia scores suggesting that it is 
elevated positive schizotypy in particular that is associated with increased right 
hemisphere involvement in face processing. Our results cannot be well 
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explained by a general attentional bias to the left side of space because there 
was no difference between high and low schizotypes in laterality measures 
when viewing the fractal stimuli. This may suggest that positive schizotypy 
selectively impacts functions that are typically lateralised, such as face or 
language (e.g., Brugger et al., 1993) processing.  
As pointed out by Leonards and Mohr (2009), the discrepancy between 
sub-clinical research and the clinical data obtained by Phillips and David (1997) 
may reflect qualitative differences in “symptoms” between clinical and healthy 
samples. The patients in the Phillips and David study were diagnosed with 
paranoid schizophrenia and had prevalent negative symptoms whereas in both 
the Leonards and Mohr study and in the current experiment schizotypy was 
measured from magical ideation scores. It would be interesting to assess 
whether healthy individuals prone to paranoid thoughts (rather than to magical 
thinking) have laterality biases directionally similar to the patients in the Phillips 
and David study. Another possible explanation for the discrepancy is 
confounding effects of medication on laterality biases in the Phillips and Davids 
study.  
The fractal stimuli used in the current study were considerably more 
“face-like” than the fractals used by Leonards and Mohr (2009). Nevertheless, 
laterality biases were not observed during fractal viewing. Although faces are by 
nature almost symmetrical, it would be interesting to explore whether using truly 
symmetrical faces (e.g. right/right or left/left chimeric faces) as stimuli would 
derive different results. We have discussed the possibility that the association 
between laterality biases and schizophrenia may be dependent on the use of 
tasks that are lateralised (e.g., face processing / language processing), but if 
(for face processing at least) it is in fact specific stimulus properties such as the 
inherent asymmetry in the faces themselves, that is driving or triggering the 
observed laterality effects, then we might expect very different results with the 
use of perfectly symmetrical face stimuli. 
Previous research has shown that psychosis proneness is associated 
with heightened sensitivity to threat-related material (e.g., Coy & Hutton, 2012; 
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Green, Williams & Davidson, 2001), but we did not observe any association 
between schizotypy and facial emotion for either laterality index measure. One 
possible explanation for the lack of an emotion effect is that the task did not 
require overt emotion recognition and as such the emotion depicted by the 
faces could be ignored without a detrimental effect on performance. Our results 
do suggest that any effect of facial emotion on laterality biases during free-
viewing are not automatic. Future research could investigate whether emotion 
effects would emerge with a slightly revised task that required participants to 
attend to and distinguish between the different facial emotions. It would also be 
particularly interesting to replicate and extend the current study using combined 
eye tracking and functional imaging techniques in an attempt to uncover the 
neural correlates of our observation. 
In conclusion, we provide further support for the somewhat unexpected 
finding by Leonards and Mohr (2009) that high positive schizotypy is associated 
with increased right hemisphere dominance for face processing.  
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4. The influence of hallucination proneness and social threat on time 
perception 
 
4.1 Abstract 
 
Introduction: Individuals with schizophrenia frequently report disturbances in 
time perception, but the precise nature of such deficits and their relation to 
specific symptoms of the disorder is unclear. We sought to determine the 
relationship between hallucination proneness and time perception in healthy 
individuals, and whether this relationship is moderated by hypervigilance to 
threat-related stimuli.  
Method: 206 participants completed the Revised Launay-Slade Hallucination 
Scale (LSHS-R) and a time reproduction task in which, on each trial, 
participants viewed a face (happy, angry, neutral or fearful) for between 1 and 5 
seconds and then reproduced the time period with a spacebar press.  
Results: High LSHS-R scores were associated with longer time estimates, but 
only during exposure to angry faces. A factor analysis of LSHS-R scores 
identified a factor comprising items related to reality monitoring, and this factor 
was most associated with the longer time estimates.  
Conclusion: During exposure to potential threat in the environment, duration 
estimates increase with hallucination proneness. The experience of feeling 
exposed to threat for longer may serve to maintain a state of hypervigilance 
which has been shown previously to be associated with positive symptoms of 
schizophrenia. 
 
 
Keywords: hypervigilance, internal clock, psychosis, reality monitoring, 
schizophrenia, schizotypy 
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4.2 Introduction 
 
Individuals with schizophrenia frequently display an altered perception of time 
(see Bonnot et al., 2011; Allman & Meck, 2012 for reviews), and it has been 
suggested that deficient temporal information processing is related to, and may 
even underlie, some of the most intrusive symptoms and cognitive disturbances 
associated with the disorder (Posada, Franck, Augier, Georgieff & Jeannerod, 
2007; Volz et al, 2001; Andreassen et al., 1999; D'Argembeau, Raffard & Van 
der Linden, 2008). Shergill (2005) points out that dysfunctional predictive 
mechanisms (a likely manifestation of deficient time processing) could lead to 
difficulties anticipating the consequence of one’s own or of another’s actions, 
particularly given that disturbances to the timing of perceptual, motor and 
cognitive processes are a likely consequence of temporally disordered 
information processing (Carroll, O’Donnell, Shekhar & Hetrick, 2009; Bressler, 
2003). Delusions of alien control, megalomania, and verbal auditory 
hallucinations in schizophrenia patients may therefore be the phenomenological 
expression of dysfunctional neural timing (Gallagher, 2000; Haggard, Martin, 
Taylor-Clarke, Jeannerod & Franck, 2003; Shergill, 2005; Carroll et al., 2009).  
Whilst a large body of evidence suggests temporal processing is 
disturbed in schizophrenia, the precise nature of this disturbance and its 
relationship to other cognitive impairments that are known to be associated with 
the disorder, remain unclear. Early studies (e.g., Goldstone, Boardman & 
Lhamon, 1959; Pearl & Berg, 1963; Wahl & Sieg, 1980) tended to find that 
patients with schizophrenia generally overestimate temporal durations.  
However, more recent research has tended to report a relative underestimation 
of temporal durations in schizophrenia patients (e.g., Lee et al., 2009; Tysk, 
1983; 1990) and in those with a liability for schizophrenia (Lee, Dixon, Spence & 
Woodruff, 2006) as compared to controls. Carroll et al. (2009), however, report 
a significantly greater variability in the temporal estimations given by the 
patients as compared to the controls but no absolute difference between the 
two groups.  
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As other authors have argued, these inconsistent results are perhaps 
unsurprising given the generally small sample sizes and the very different 
methodologies used to assess temporal processing across these experiments 
(e.g. Davalos, Rojas & Tregellas, 2011; Bonnot et al., 2011). For example, 
some temporal tasks require visual processing during the timing intervals 
whereas others require auditory signals to be processed; tasks may require 
either prospective or retrospective time estimates, or estimates may be based 
on comparison, reproduction or verbal estimation. Finally the durations being 
estimated can vary from less than 1 second to minutes. Numerous other 
potential confounds and sources of variability exist in clinical populations that 
make it difficult to draw conclusions about the precise nature of the temporal 
processing deficits in patients with schizophrenia.  These include, among 
others, differences in motivation levels and possible confounding effects of 
antipsychotic medication on time perception. As Walker and Diforio (1997) point 
out, many measures of arousal or “hypervigilance” in schizophrenia patients 
such as heart rate and skin conductance (which are known to impact on time 
perception, see Zakay, Nitzan & Glicksohn, 1983), are also likely to be affected 
by the patients’ prescribed antipsychotic medications. Finally, patients with 
schizophrenia have well documented general cognitive impairments and 
specific impairments in working memory and attention (see Elvevåg & 
Goldberg, 2000 for a review) – both of which have been linked to time 
perception (see Elvevåg, Brown, McCormack, Vousden & Goldberg, 2004).  
One strategy for avoiding such confounds that has been increasingly 
employed by researchers interested in studying the relationship between 
cognitive processes and specific psychiatric symptoms, is to use sub-clinical 
populations. Schizophrenia is generally assumed to be a dimensional 
psychopathological disorder-  its signs and symptoms lie on a continuum with 
normal behaviour, and are seen to varying lesser degrees in healthy individuals 
such as unaffected first degree relatives of schizophrenia patients, as well as 
high / low schizotypes (see Eckblad & Chapman, 1983; Claridge, 1997). For 
example, healthy individuals who report hallucination-like experiences are at 
higher risk for developing a schizophrenia spectrum disorder (see Kelleher & 
154 
 
  
Cannon, 2011 for a review), providing support for the suggestion that a 
continuum exists between pathological hallucinatory symptoms and normal 
perceptual experiences (see also Johns & van Os, 2001). A large body of 
evidence has shown that the information processing deficits associated with 
schizophrenia are also present, albeit less severely, in high schizotypes (e.g. 
Park, Holzman & Lenzenweger, 1995; Barrantes-Vidal et al, 2003). 
Despite the advantages of recruiting from healthy populations, very few 
studies have considered time processing using non-clinical samples. Lee et al. 
(2006) used a time bisection task in which 101 healthy participants were asked 
to categorise auditory tones of varying lengths as closer to short or long anchor 
duration. The anchor durations were either 400/800ms or 1000/2000ms. The 
participants were divided into high and low scorers on the Schizotypal 
Personality Questionnaire (SQP; Raine, 1991). Bisection points (the tone 
duration giving rise to 50% “long” responses) were obtained for each 
participant. High SPQ scorers significantly underestimated the duration of the 
auditory tones compared to low scorers in the 1000/2000ms bisection condition. 
This finding is consistent with data from schizophrenic patients using a similar 
bisection task (Elvevag, et al., 2003).  
Difference in time perception between patients with schizophrenia / high 
schizotypes and controls can be interpreted within the framework of “Internal 
Clock” models of time perception.  According to these models (e.g., Meck & 
Church, 1983; Gibbon, Church & Meck, 1984; Zakay & Block, 1996; Wearden, 
2004) humans possess an internal clock which consists of a pacemaker, a 
switch (or gate) and a time pulse accumulator. Subjective time is based on the 
quantity of pulses that have been accumulated during the period being timed. 
The rate at which time pulses are emitted depends on a number of factors 
including, for example, arousal which has been shown to increase clock speed 
(Zakay et al., 1983; Wearden & Penton-Voak, 1995), resulting in time 
overestimations. In support of this contention, time estimates tend to be 
exaggerated when individuals are exposed to threat-related (more arousing) 
emotions such as anger and fear (Droit-Volet, Brunot & Niedenthal, 2004; Droit-
Volet & Gil., 2009; Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007). Threat-related attentional biases 
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have been shown in highly anxious individuals (see Cisler & Koster, 2010 for a 
review) who also tend to overestimate durations when exposed to threat-related 
faces during the timing interval (Bar-Haim, Kerem, Lamy & Zakay, 2010).  
A large body of research suggests that high schizotypes (e.g., Fisher et 
al., 2004) and people who are prone to visual hallucinations (e.g., Coy & Hutton, 
2012) are hypersensitive to threat-related emotional stimuli in the environment. 
It has been proposed that both hypervigilance and an altered time perception in 
schizophrenia may be related to or even underlie pathological experiences 
associated with psychosis such as delusions and hallucinations (Franck, 
Posada, Pichon & Haggard, 2005), but no study to our knowledge has 
specifically set out to assess whether hallucinatory experiences in particular (as 
opposed to experiences related to positive symptomatology viewed collectively) 
and altered time perception are associated. A number of studies have shown 
that versions of the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale consist of distinct factors 
including some or all of the following: tendency towards visual hallucinatory 
experiences, tendency towards auditory hallucinatory experiences, vivid 
daydreams, realness of thought (reality monitoring difficulties), and 
hallucinations with a religious theme (see Aleman, Nieuwenstein, Böcker & De 
Haan, 2001; Larøi, Marczewski & Van der Linden, 2004; Morrison, Wells & 
Nothard, 2000; Morrison, Wells & Nothard, 2002; Levitan, Ward, Catts & 
Hemsley, 1996; Waters, Badcock & Maybery, 2003). Whether any association 
between hallucination proneness and time estimation is driven by a distinct sub-
dimension of hallucination proneness would also be particularly interesting to 
explore. Finally, it has not been established whether there is any interaction 
between hallucination proneness (or particular sub-dimensions of hallucination 
proneness) and time processing during exposure to threatening (as compared 
to neutral) stimuli. The present study addresses these issues in a large sample 
of healthy participants, all of whom completed the Revised Launay-Slade 
Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R) (Morrison et al., 2000) and a temporal processing 
task in which they attempt to reproduce the length of time they were exposed to 
happy, angry, fearful or neutral faces. It is predicted that high hallucination 
156 
 
  
prone individuals will experience a slowing of time, particularly when exposed to 
angry faces.  
 
4.3 Method 
Participants. 206 healthy participants (mean age = 20.2 years, SD = 4.03, age-
range = 18.0 – 48.4; 176 female) took part in the experiment. All participants 
were students at Sussex University.  All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision.  The study was approved by the University of Sussex Psychology 
and Life Sciences Research Ethics Committee.   
 
Materials.  Stimuli consisted of 16 colour images of faces selected from the 
NimStim Face Stimulus Set (Tottenham et al., 2009). The photographs, oval 
cropped so that no hair or other non-facial information was visible, measured 
300 x 450 pixels. For each emotion (happy, angry, fearful and neutral), 2 male 
and 2 female faces were used. Stimuli were presented using Experiment 
Builder software (SR Research, Ontario) on IBM compatible PCs with 17-inch 
TFT monitors. 
Design.  The study had a within-subjects correlational design.  
Procedure. Participants were seated approximately 60 cm from the monitor. All 
trials began with participants focussing on a central fixation cross. A face image 
then appeared centrally onscreen and remained there for between 1 s and 5 s. 
The durations used were generated randomly prior to experimentation (6 
durations were generated randomly for each 1 s time interval. The same set of 
durations was used for each emotion. There were 96 experimental trials split 
equally across emotions.  
Participants were asked to focus on the face stimulus until it disappeared from 
screen and to try to remember how long it was there for. Text instructions then 
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prompted participants to press and hold the spacebar for the same amount of 
time that the face was present for. The duration of the spacebar press (in ms) 
was recorded by the Experiment Builder software. While participants pressed 
the spacebar, a grey oval (identical in dimensions to the face stimuli) appeared 
onscreen. Trials were presented to participants in random order over two blocks 
with a short break after the first half of trials. Instructions explicitly asked 
participants not to count during the presentation of faces. 
Participants completed the Revised Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS-
R) (Morrison et al., 2000) an adapted version of the original Launay-Slade 
Hallucination scale (Launay & Slade, 1981). The LSHS-R consists of 15 items 
that deal specifically with non-clinical predisposition to visual and auditory 
hallucinatory experiences. Each participant’s trait anxiety score was also 
obtained from the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983). 
 
Data Analysis. 
In order to establish whether any association between hallucination proneness 
and time estimation is driven by a distinct sub-dimension of hallucination 
proneness, a factor analysis was conducted. To ensure that any identified 
factors were distinct, the Anderson-Rubin method was selected which prevents 
any correlation between factors. Loadings less than 0.3 were suppressed, and if 
a particular item loaded 0.3 or above on more than one factor then it was 
included only in the factor that it loaded highest on (if the difference between an 
items factor loadings was less than 0.1, the item was not counted in either 
factor). A series of Pearson correlations between identified factors and time 
estimates were carried out in order to determine the relationship between the 
identified factors and time perception. 
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4.4 Results 
The overall mean LSHS-R score (N = 206) was 30.42 (SD = 7.87, range: 15 - 
55) and the overall mean trait anxiety score (N = 206) was 27.73 (SD = 2.70, 
range: 20 - 34). 
Data were trimmed to remove any time estimations that were more than 2.5 
SDs above or below the mean for that trial type (e.g., happy, angry, fearful, 
neutral). Consequently, 81% of trials were maintained for analysis.  Time 
estimation ratios (ratio = estimated time duration / actual duration) were 
calculated for each facial emotion. Values less than 1 indicate a subjective 
underestimation of time. The means were: angry (M = .7242, SD = .13); happy 
(M = .7212, SD = .14); fearful (M = .7222, SD = .13), and neutral (M = .7202, 
SD = .14). 
A measure of the effect of emotion for each participant was calculated by 
subtracting their mean time estimation ratio when viewing neutral faces from 
their mean time estimation ratio when viewing faces of a particular emotion 
(e.g., index for angry = angry time estimation ratio – neutral time estimation 
ratio). Positive values indicate that time estimates when viewing the expressive 
faces were longer than time estimates when viewing neutral faces (baseline). 
Mean (M) deviation from baseline time ratios were as follows: angry (M = .004, 
SD = .06); happy (M = .001, SD = .06); fearful (M = .002, SD = .07). A one-way 
repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the emotion index scores 
revealed no main effect of emotion on time estimation F(3,615) = .316, ns. 
Multiple correlations (with Bonferroni adjustment applied) were conducted to 
assess whether hallucination proneness or anxiety scores were associated with 
time estimations when viewing angry, happy or fearful (as compared to neutral) 
faces. Hallucination proneness correlated significantly with time estimation 
when viewing angry faces, r = .233, p< .05. No other correlations were 
significant. 
 
Factor Analysis 
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Factor loadings are presented below in table 1. Included items are marked with 
an asterisk. 
The factor analysis (principle component with Varimax rotation) revealed five 
subscales. Three of these (Factors 1, 2 and 3) had 3 or more items loading on 
to them and sufficient overall reliability (Cronbach’s alpha > .65) and so only 
these 3 were considered further.  The three factors each consisted of 3 items 
and combined accounted for 43.75% of the variance. Factor 1 items refer to 
perceptual distortions, factor 2 items refer to visual or auditory hallucinatory 
experiences and factor 3 items refer to reality monitoring – the ability to 
differentiate between real versus imagined events.  
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ITEM 
 
1 
 
2 
Factor 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
A passing thought will seem so real that it 
frightens me. 
  .681*   
My thoughts seem as real as actual 
events in my life. 
  .629*   
No matter how much I try to concentrate 
on my work unrelated thoughts always 
creep into my mind. 
   .698*  
I have had the experience of hearing a 
person’s voice and then found that there 
was no one there. 
 .623*    
The sounds I hear in my daydreams are 
generally clear and distinct. 
 .482 .538   
The people in my daydreams seem so 
true to life that I think they are real. 
  .724*   
In my daydreams I can hear the sound of 
a tune almost as clearly as if I were 
actually listening to it. 
 .688*    
I hear a voice speaking my thoughts 
aloud. 
 .479  .466  
I have been troubled by hearing voices in 
my head. 
   .677*  
I have seen a person’s face in front of me 
when no one was there. 
 .499*    
I have heard the voice of God speaking to 
me. 
    .876* 
When I look at things they appear strange 
to me. 
.828*     
I see shadows and shapes when there is 
nothing there. 
.536 .464    
When I look at things they appear unreal 
to me. 
.783*     
When I look at myself in the mirror I look 
different. 
.503*     
Number of items 3  3 3 2 1 
Cronbach’s alpha (reliability measure) .724 .602 .657 .234 n/a 
Variance explained (%) 27.81 8.30 7.64 7.30 6.98 
Table 1. Factor loadings of the hallucination proneness items. *Included items. 
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In order to examine whether any of the three identified factors (perceptual 
distortions, visual or auditory hallucinatory experiences, or reality monitoring) 
are associated with time over-estimates in the threat condition, a series of 
correlations (Bonferroni corrected) were carried out. It emerged that only the 
reality monitoring factor correlated significantly with time estimation when 
viewing angry as compared to neutral faces, r = .182, p< .05. All other 
correlations were non-significant. 
 
4.5 Discussion 
 
In general, participants underestimated the duration of the face presentations 
(all time estimation ratios were < 1). Systematic underestimation of time using 
prospective timing paradigms (in which participants are informed of the time 
judgment task before the interval duration commences) is consistent with 
previous research (e.g., Zakay et al., 1983; Angrilli, Cherubini, Pavese & 
Mantredini, 1997; Zakay, 1993). The key finding to emerge was that higher 
hallucination proneness was associated with a relative lengthening of subjective 
time estimates, but only during exposure to the most arousing facial expression 
(angry). This result is consistent with previous research that has also found the 
effect of emotion on time estimation to be dependent on the complex interaction 
between how arousing the stimuli used are / the affective valence of the stimuli 
(Angrilli et al., 1997), and the type of temporal task used (Gil & Droit-Volet, 
2011).  
Our key finding is consistent with previous research that suggests that 
threat relevance and individual differences affect time processing. When effects 
of emotion on time perception are observed, these tend to be greatest for threat 
related emotions such as anger and fear in both adults (Droit-Volet et al., 2004; 
Droit-Volet & Gil., 2009) and in children (Gil, Niedenthal & Droit-Volet, 2007). 
Further, the threat-relevance of stimuli interacts with individual differences. 
Specifically, higher negative emotionality (Tipples, 2008) and increased trait 
anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2010) both predict overestimations of time intervals, 
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but interestingly in these studies the effects of these individual differences tend 
only to emerge in the high arousal condition (i.e., when exposed to threat-
related faces during the timing interval). We did not observe an association 
between increased hallucination proneness and time overestimation in the 
fearful block, suggesting that any effect of threat on time processing observed in 
the current experiment is specific to a direct threat from another (angry) 
individual rather than some less specific type of impending threat in the 
environment (as indicated by a fearful face). 
According to dominant models of time processing, sensitivity to arousing 
(e.g., threatening) stimuli has a marked effect on time estimation. These models 
propose that humans possess an internal clock which consists of a pacemaker, 
a switch or gate (see Lejeune, 1998 for discussion), and a time pulse 
accumulator. As an event to be timed commences, the switch or gate closes 
and pulses emitted from the pacemaker begin to collect in the accumulator. At 
the cessation of the timed event, the switch or gate opens and no more pulses 
accumulate. Subjective time is based on the quantity of pulses that have been 
accumulated during the period being timed - duration estimates increase with 
the number of pulses collected. Heightened arousal is said to increase the 
speed of the pacemaker which results in the accumulation of more pulses over 
a given period (hence time would be overestimated). The current results 
suggest that hallucination prone individuals have internal clock mechanisms 
that are more responsive or sensitive to the presence of threat in the 
environment, thus for these participants specifically, exposure to angry faces 
resulted in an increase in time pulse frequency. 
Factor analysis of the LSHS-R confirmed that hallucination proneness is 
a multidimensional construct (see e.g., Aleman et al., 2001; Fonseca-Pedrero et 
al., 2010; Morrison et al., 2000; Serper et al., 2005; Waters, Badcock & 
Maybery, 2003). Questionnaire items loaded onto three distinct factors, namely: 
visual or auditory hallucinatory experiences, perceptual distortions and reality 
monitoring. It emerged that time overestimation during threat exposure is 
specifically related to reality monitoring (the ability to distinguish real from 
imagined events) an experience that often accompanies both hallucinations and 
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hypervigilance, and is observed in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), in 
which memories of traumatic events are experienced so vividly that the 
flashback experience can seem distressingly “real” (see Bremner, 2002). 
Interestingly, in PTSD vivid intrusive mental imagery co-occurs with an altered 
sense of time- for example, when a flashback is experienced, intrusive vivid 
imagery of a past traumatic event causes the trauma to be re-lived over and 
over in the present.  Morrison et al., (2000) report that intrusive images 
associated with hallucinations and delusions in their schizophrenia sample were 
mainly related to trauma, perceived threat or fear, and argue that there are 
numerous similarities between psychotic experiences and intrusive re-
experiencing in PTSD. Of note is the resultant hypervigilance in both disorders 
that may be involved in the maintenance of symptoms. Given the parallels 
discussed between psychosis and PTSD, it would be particularly interesting to 
explore common themes in the vivid imagery reported by non-clinical 
hallucination prone participants in order to ascertain whether these tend to be 
threat-relevant and / or related to past traumatic experiences. A study of this 
kind would have implications for psychosis interventions that specifically target 
amelioration of intrusive, vivid imagery. In addition, it would be interesting to 
investigate whether desensitisation to the angry faces may influence time 
estimates, and specifically whether doing so attenuates the relative temporal 
overestimation in those who experience vivid mental imagery / reality monitoring 
difficulties.   
Increased activity in the autonomic nervous system has been recognised 
as a likely “triggering element” in the onset of psychosis (Corcoran et al, 2003). 
Stress-diathesis models of numerous psychiatric conditions such as depression 
and schizophrenia postulate an inextricable association between heightened 
subjective stress and symptom exacerbation (Gispen-de Wied, 2000; 
Rosenthal, 1970; Walker & Diforio, 1997). More specifically, Delespaul, DeVries 
and van Os (2002) report that state arousal is a strong predictor of the 
occurrence and intensity of hallucinations in schizophrenia patients, and the 
current result also suggests some association between arousal (or sensitivity to 
arousing emotional expression- anger) and difficulties with reality monitoring. In 
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support of this contention, in a previous study (Coy & Hutton, 2012) we have 
highlighted an increased hypervigilance towards threat (a higher tolerance for 
false positive errors in threat detection) in high hallucination prone individuals- 
the tendency to misattribute anger to neutral faces in healthy individuals was 
more likely in those with high compared to low liability for visual hallucinations.  
There was no main effect of emotion on time estimates in the current 
study. The majority of studies in which significant main effects of facial emotion 
emerge use temporal bisection tasks (e.g. Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007; Gil et al., 
2007, but see Lee et al., 2011). Although it appears that bisection tasks are 
most sensitive to emotion effects, individual differences such as anxiety tend to 
interact with emotion in time reproduction tasks (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2010). 
Given that different temporal tasks appear to vary in terms of their sensitivity to 
emotion effects, it would be interesting to explore whether our results are 
replicated using a bisection task. The current study could be improved by 
increasing the number of trials in each experimental cell, and by incorporating a 
physiological measure of arousal (e.g. heart rate or galvanic skin response) to 
assess fluctuation in arousal during exposure to the different faces (e.g., 
threatening versus neutral). 
In conclusion, our results suggest that individual differences in 
hallucination proneness, and more specifically in reality monitoring difficulties, 
are associated with a subjective slowing of time when individuals are exposed 
to possible threat in the environment. Viewed within the framework of internal 
clock models of time estimation (e.g., Gibbon et al., 1984; Meck & Church, 
1983; Wearden, 2004; Zakay & Block, 1996) those individuals who are more 
hallucination prone have a lower threshold at which the threat-related stimuli 
increase arousal, and therefore speed the rate at which time pulses are emitted 
by the pacemaker. In practical terms, it appears that psychosis-prone 
individuals feel exposed to potential threat in the environment for subjectively 
longer time periods than non psychosis-prone individuals. Importantly, this 
experience may itself contribute to maintaining a state of hypervigilance to 
social threat.  
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